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Preface
Summary
This study is based on research in Kongsberg Automotive and its foreign subsidiaries
in Mexico, U.S.A, Poland and South Korea. The research methods have mainly been
open-ended semi-structured interviews and observations during a three-year period. This
period has coincided with an intensive internationalization process in the company.
This study has an exploratory character. The purpose is to improve understanding
of the challenges involved in internationalization processes in terms of how integration
can be achieved among separate organizations. To what extent are cultural, political and
social differences factors to consider when creating the international organization? In
what way do actors and structures influence the process and the practices that emerge?
A theoretical framework based on new institutionalism and learning is employed to
analyze the findings from Kongsberg Automotive. The data is presented focusing on
the various organizational entities in the company, the head office and the Scandinav-
ian units, and the local organizations in the U.S., Mexico, Poland and South Korea. It
is the development of practices and solutions in these organizations which is the focus
of the presentation. The subsequent discussion is structured around three main research
questions emphasizing the role of local leadership, the characteristics of governance
structures and the understanding of learning as a central part of the internationalization
process.
In an international organization cultural, political and social differences may create
barriers towards understanding the other. This may be further complicated by different
languages, time and geographical distances. These obstacles may create a situation where
it is the local manager who becomes the main representative for the local unit and who
thus is highly influential in the construction of understanding at the head office as well
as in the local unit. His perception of what is appropriate and his ability to make others
agree is central to an analysis of the various practices and solutions that emerge in the
local organization.
The main motivation and challenge of the central management is to control and co-
ordinate the international organization. While earlier research has focused on explaining
why some control mechanisms are used above others, the emphasis here is on the use-
fulness of different mechanisms and how the organization abroad and at home perceives
these attempts for control and coordination. The findings suggests that through time
v
there was a stronger reliance on mechanisms for socialization and enculturation, and
while these are directed towards creating a larger consensus in the organization, they
should also be seen as means for decentralized control and self-monitoring.
The various organizational entities in Kongsberg Automotive represent different com-
munities-of-practice and it is the interaction between these communities which is central
to an understanding of the learning processes that occur. To what extent these processes
are based on an approach which can be described as exploratory and open-ended, is
argued to have an influence on the innovativeness of learning experiences. Such a per-
spective may also confer an understanding of power as a productive element in learning
processes.
The implications of this study for theory and future research are in embracing the
complex nature of internationalization process. Relevant for understanding internation-
alization processes are both actors and structures intertwined. Institutional environments
are central to an understanding of how different actors perceive practices and structu-
res, and what they see as viable solutions. Neither the international organization nor the
learning processes these undertake can be torn loose from the local cultural, political
and social context.
vi
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1 Developing the research focus
Internationalization is a theme that has relevance for many scientific areas as well as for
practitioners, and to choose a research focus within such a vast theme is the task and
privilege of the researcher. The research focus in this dissertation is one based on both
my scientific and personal interests, but also one which, has been developed in coop-
eration with colleagues and others. While the subject matter interests me greatly, I also
believe that it is of interest to others, both within the research community as well as
among practitioners.
To study and understand the challenges of internationalization processes is related
to what I have always been interested in; international relations. The enigma of how
one may create conditions that allow people from different social, cultural and politi-
cal contexts to live peacefully together has had me wondering for years. It inspired me
to live abroad for several years, to travel extensively and to learn different languages.
It also inspired me to study political science and international politics. Through these
activities and my studies, I acquired some insight into how individuals behave when
faced with unknown cultural contexts, and how different political structures both inhibit
and promote peaceful interaction among groups of people. A related question was why
business companies could be seen to be successful even when they were building or-
ganizations across political and cultural divides. Was it merely their shared interests in
creating wealth which fuelled these cooperative relationships? Or could it be possible
that one could discern other solutions from their experience? My interest in studying
internationalization processes was therefore inspired by a desire to understand more of
the challenges these companies faced and how these were solved.
When the research project “Management and organization in the new industry1” was
announced, one of the subject areas was internationalization of Norwegian companies.
There were two PhD positions available and I applied for one of them. Sigrid Damman,
a social anthropologist, and I were hired on the project as PhD students. We were both
interested in internationalization as a theme for our studies and we were thus able to
cooperate on developing our shared, yet separate research areas. Still, this had to be done
in collaboration with the company we were to study, Kongsberg Automotive. To be able
1) In Norwegian: ‘Organisasjon og ledelse i den nye industrien’
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to gain access to their organization we were dependent on establishing good cooperative
relations with representatives from the company. We needed to gain their trust and to
prove that through our participation we were able to contribute in a constructive sense to
their organization. Through various activities which I will describe later, we were able
to do so, and after a time we experienced that the organization was open to us and we
were thus able to form our research study much after our own desires.
As I will discuss in more detail later on, my initial question when embarking on the
data collection in the organization was ‘How do they do it?’. Clearly lacking precision
and substance, this question was nonetheless my initial approach to the subject matter.
With time, and through our respondents, we were able to understand more about how
employees in this organization experienced their own jobs and living situations. We
were able to study most of the units in the company, traveling to the U.S., Mexico,
Poland, France, South Korea and Sweden. We spoke to people at all levels in the or-
ganization and our main concern was to invite these people to tell us how they saw the
organization and their own role within it. When visiting countries like Mexico, Poland
and South Korea the living conditions for factory workers were a salient issue. Some
of the females working in the factory in Mexico were from Vera Cruz in the south, and
had left their children with their mothers. They had five days of vacation each year and
had to travel 16 hours by bus to the south in order to see their children. Some of these
women were only 18 years old. In South Korea discrimination against female workers
was an important theme. It was striking to listen to one of the female office workers who
was highly educated and who, when we asked whether her male colleagues cooperated
with her, laughed and simply said that “no, they never ask for my opinion”. We were
also told many other stories. Unfortunately, it is impossible to present all these stories
in this thesis. A selection had to be made of both focus and research questions, which
naturally excludes some issues. The exclusion of an emphasis on the factory workers in
the different units is perhaps the one I have been most reluctant to make. On the other
hand, when describing the development of the various units in chapters 5, 6 and 7 the
voices of the factory workers are clearly present.
The focus I finally chose to emphasize in this thesis is one questioning the develop-
ment of the relationship between head office and the subsidiaries. This allowed me to
include cultural, social and political differences between the various countries and how
the interaction between the Norwegian management and that of the local units developed.
From the outset I was interested in the approach of the Norwegian management since
I knew they had limited experience with establishing units abroad. I expected that the
question of to what extent they would attempt to ‘export’ their Norwegian institutional
background to the foreign units would be central for understanding their approach.
2
1 Developing the research focus
My research focus has developed from a focus on how differences in cultural, social
and political institutional environments are a central factor in explaining the obstacles in
the internationalization process, to an acknowledgement that such environments should
first and foremost be understood in terms of how they are interpreted and enacted by
individuals or groups of individuals. Such an understanding focuses the attention on
practices and actions, which is where an analysis of the difference between cultures and
local contexts needs to be in order to understand how our interaction may be improved
(Morgan 1996).
1.1 Relevance for earlier research in the field
In which aspects is such a focus important in terms of earlier research in this field?
While this thesis includes research done in Mexico, U.S.A, South Korea, Poland, Swe-
den and Norway and the differences in these local contexts are essential, it is the various
practices that emerge and the interaction between actors from these units which is the
nucleus in this study. Furthermore, I have chosen to emphasize how socio-cultural fac-
tors influence these practices and the interaction within the organization. It is not the
political, economic or judicial matters which will be given prominence. This is in line
with the findings of Cartwright and Cooper (1992) and Datta (1991).
According to these authors the critical issues that in many cases determine the suc-
cess/failure of integration processes are socio-cultural. According to Datta (1991) about
half of all mergers and acquisitions are considered failures, and an important reason is
that socio-cultural factors are often ignored or forgotten during the process. Economic
and judicial issues take preeminence over issues related to cultural or social differences.
It is necessary in order to understand how integration processes can be made more
successful to study how companies solve challenges related to such issues .
Within the field of organization studies much of the research on such processes has
been focused on finding the normative best solution for business organizations. For
instance Finkelstein’s (2000) goal was to “reveal the potential minefield”, in order to
provide answers as to how an integration process may be planned. However, little has
been said about the actual processes and how these determine the content and result of
integration.
One of the reason why interaction has largely been ignored as an important part
of the integration process might be that rationalist perspectives have dominated in this
field. Traditionally the answer as to why organization structures are as they are has been
that they are subject to efficiency and rationality pressures. Pressures resulting from the
market, size, complexity and product range. These have been considered determining
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forces, which offer only a narrow range of organizational design alternatives that are con-
sidered efficient. The rationalist view of organizations has dominated discussion about
management and organizational behavior. The rational model of organizations holds that
behavior within a company is not random, but that goals are clear and choices are made
in a logical way. In making decisions, the objective is defined, alternatives are ident-
ified and the option with the greatest chance of achieving the objective is selected. The
rationalist model fails to take into account the differences of interests and objectives that
exist between individuals and groups within the organization. There has largely been a
focus on the integrating qualities of the organizations and how these can be nurtured to
create a unitary and more simplistic organization. This has also been due to a convic-
tion that a more homogenous organization is the best and most efficient organizational
design (Thompson 1967).
Increasingly, current organization theory offers a larger variety of perspectives that
take into account that organizations are under constant change and that the pressure for
change derives from forces both internally and externally. For instance, according to
Clegg (1989; 1990), the answer as to how organizational forms come about is likely to
be far more complex than what the rationalists advocate. He argues that the evidence
seems to suggest that organizational forms are less a result of size, product markets and
technology structure, but more a result of “culturally defined criteria of what a ‘dispo-
sitional good’ might be in terms of organizational structuring and the ability of certain
strategic actors to constitute these in ways which reproduce their own strategicality”.
(Clegg 1990: 106) Clegg advocates here a perspective on agency and power as well as
institutional structures as explanations for practices that emerge in organizations.
A comprehensive understanding of internationalization processes should include both
structure and agency, and seek to overcome the false separation between these concepts.
The study of how organizations internationalize by attempting to integrate new units
should therefore incorporate an understanding of how interaction among individuals in
the organizations is a major force in shaping the organization. Interaction among groups
and individuals can take the form of both cooperation and conflict in a manner which
produces new practices and organizational forms which are considered appropriate by
the members involved and the means of the organization. How interaction is a central
dimension in understanding change has rarely been applied to an analysis of internation-
alization processes. However, interaction should not be understood as disembedded from
either structures (including cultural structures) nor agency which is considered boundedly
rational.
Scott (2001) calls for more research on organizations within the framework of new-
institutionalism which is theoretically informed and cross-cultural comparative. This
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study answers such a call. Furthermore, it also approaches the study of organizations
within a relational and process based view whereas the tendency within new-institution-
alist research has been an entity-based view of social systems (Scott 2001: 213). To
apply a learning perspective to the development of an international organization may
increase our understanding of how relations and interaction affect the emergence of prac-
tices and solutions. As I will discuss in this thesis, it might be that creating a common
understanding of reality through interaction is essential for the integration process. That
is, when the goal of the integration process is not merely to create a local unit abroad
which needs to be strictly controlled by the parent company, but rather a unit integrated
with the company at large.
1.2 Social and political relevance
A growing number of Norwegian companies are establishing production and sales units
abroad, whether it is through acquisitions, new establishments or joint ventures. One of
the strong reasons for such a trend is increased competition in a globalized market and
the need to have the same competitive advantages as their international competitors.
While there is much discussion among politicians and in the media as to the reasons
why Norwegian industry is moving abroad, little is said about the actual process of inter-
nationalization these companies are undertaking and how this affects their organization
and employees at home and abroad.
There are significant challenges related to creating successful integration between
the foreign units and the parent company in an internationalization process. One of
the salient issues in these integration processes is the encounter between the culture of
the parent company and that of the local unit. Lack of knowledge, language skills and
perhaps also lack of experience as to working abroad are some important reasons why
business organizations find internationalization challenging. Much of the management
literature on these issues attempts to amend the lack of knowledge by providing quick
descriptions of the main traits of a specific culture. To approach a new country and con-
text with a belief that such descriptions are valid for all members of a specific culture
is at best misleading.
To study how actual internationalization processes proceeds and the challenges that
occur may increase our knowledge and understanding of how we may improve such
processes. This is not only important for the success of the Norwegian companies that
move abroad, but also for other international companies, and not least, for the foreign
employees who deserve to have employers who are capable of acting professionally.
While judicial and financial questions are to some extent predetermined by laws or
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regulations, socio-cultural issues are to a larger degree open for choice. How companies
cope with such issues is important for the employees in the organization but also for
the prosperity of the company. There has been limited research on such issues and
internationalization processes. This is something this thesis will attempt to amend.
1.3 Research focus
The research focus is thus on how companies internationalize and the challenges in-
volved in developing an integrated organization of local units spread across the globe.
The research questions I will discuss throughout this thesis are therefore focused on two
main issues for negotiations between the head office and the local subsidiaries; how do
local units attempt to create solutions adapted to their local needs and how does the
parent company attempt to control and coordinate the organization and each unit. The
third question focuses on the implications of this study for using a learning perspective
to create fruitful theoretical explanations for internationalization processes. A preview
of the research questions posed in this thesis is offered below:
·
Why is local leadership crucial for creating local solutions?
·
Why are governance systems built both upon structural and cultural
control mechanisms?
·
Why is a perspective on learning important for understanding the
internationalization process?
1.4 The structure of the thesis
The theoretical framework for analyzing the data material from Kongsberg Automotive
will be described and discussed in the subsequent chapter. Since my point of departure
is institutionalism and this is a vast theoretical domain, I will specify my understanding
of how and in what manner institutionalism is relevant for analyzing the data. I will
include perspectives both on power and learning and explain why these are central to
my theoretical framework. I will thereafter present my research questions and discuss
how these issues have been analyzed in earlier theory. Former theory has to a great
extent relied on structural variables for explaining local solutions in subsidiaries and
the shape of governance structures in international companies. I will therefore include
the most central variables from earlier research and discuss how these may be seen as
relevant. I will not discuss how these variables relate to the case of Kongsberg Auto-
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motive, because first it is necessary to present some background information on the
company.
Chapter 3 is therefore a presentation of Kongsberg Automotive and provides the reader
with information on the company and its internationalization process. This is necessary
in order to end this chapter with a discussion of how the organization of Kongsberg
Automotive may be understood within the theoretical framework and those explanatory
variables discussed earlier. When presenting the U.S., Mexican, Polish and South Ko-
rean units I will specify my expectations as to how these explanatory variables affect
these units.
Chapter 4 is a discussion of my methodological approach and to what extent the
material collected and the process of analysis can be said to have truth value for the
research questions in this thesis. Details of the data material and a description of both
data collection and research analysis will be provided. This will enable the reader to
assess the subsequent chapters presenting the empirical cases of the organizations in the
U.S., Mexico, Poland and South Korea.
Chapter 5 presents the development of the units in the U.S. and in Mexico. These
units are presented together since their development is largely intertwined. Chapter 6 is
a presentation of the establishment and development of the Polish unit, while chapter 7
considers the South Korean unit.
Chapter 8 is a discussion of the first research question focusing on the extent of local
solutions created in the different foreign units. While the status of the various units may
affect the extent of local solutions, it is explanations as to the role of the local manager
which are central to the discussion in this chapter.
Chapter 9 considers the second research question emphasizing the shape of govern-
ance structure in Kongsberg Automotive. The use of control mechanisms in the company
may be seen to evolve through time and explanations as why these developments occur
are provided.
In chapter 10 I will elaborate on the final research question emphasizing why a
perspective on learning is important for understanding an internationalization process.
The developments that have occurred in Kongsberg Automotive are highlighted and
a perspective emphasizing learning and power is brought to bear on explaining these
developments.
The final chapter returns to a discussion of the theoretical framework applied in this
thesis. I will discuss the theoretical implications my research questions may be seen to
have on both research on head office – subsidiary relations and on institutionalism as a
perspective for understanding the development of internationalization processes.
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2 Learning within institutional regimes
2.1 Introduction
With the growing interdependence of the world economy, the organizational landscape
is increasingly populated by companies that own and manage activities in more than
one country. To become a successful multinational company (MNC) there are numerous
challenges to overcome, and one of the most important concerns how to control and
organize activities across geographical, social, political and cultural borders. A part of
this challenge is to coordinate and integrate activities which take place in a number of
different locations across the globe. The other part is how to best organize and structure
the activities at each local site.
According to new institutionalism a company needs to comply with local cultural-
cognitive systems as well as with regulatory and normative systems (Scott 2001). The
most compelling reason for the company to adapt is to achieve legitimacy, to be accepted
by both internal and external actors. Hence, the more varied the types of environment
confronted by an organization, the more differentiated its structure needs to be. A MNC
will therefore consist of a set of differentiated structures and practices and each of these
will exist in the different sub-units of the organization. And the more local sites a MNC
consists of, the more differences will there be within the totality of the organization.
On the other hand, there are also forces that draw towards consistency and similarity
within the MNC. It has been argued that the ongoing global industrialization produ-
ces a convergence of management practices across countries (Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison
and Myers 1960). It is assumed that the ‘logic of industrialism’ creates uniformities.
In the past decade it has also been argued that standardization and convergence of
practices worldwide is a central feature of globalization. In addition there are for-
ces for consistency within the MNC itself. These are seen to stem from two factors:
imperative for control and organizational replication (Rosenzweig and Singh 1991).
The necessity to control its sub-units is a compelling reason for the head office to
create uniform and comparable systems for production and finance. There is a tend-
ency to establish foreign subsidiaries by means of replicating structures and practices
existent in other units. This tendency is considered especially high in a MNC be-
9
cause of the uncertainty establishing a unit in a foreign country represents (DiMaggio
1983).
Within organization studies there has been a lack of research investigating the re-
lationship between the conflicting pressures for consistency and conformity that MNCs
face (Rosenzweig and Singh 1991; Szulanski 1996; Zaheer 1995). And while new
institutionalism is the theoretical strand most developed in terms of research on the
relationship between an organization and its environment, there have been few studies
investigating the relationship between a MNC and its multiple environments (ibid.). So
while the argument for conformity with the local environment has received prominence
in the literature, there is little research to contradict these findings when it concerns the
characteristics of a MNC. Furthermore, the few studies investigating the MNC within
an institutionalist perspective have emphasized the impact of the mother-company/head
office on its subsidiaries, and not the influence that subsidiaries may exert on the head
office or other subsidiaries.
During the internationalization process of a Norwegian MNC I expect to find that
the various local environments affect how the local unit is organized. I also expect to
find that the individuals involved at the subsidiary and the headquarters influence the
development through both processes of power and learning. In the case of one MNC,
a Norwegian parent company with sub-units in South Korea, Poland, USA, Mexico,
Sweden and Brazil, the development of the local units is best understood by applying a
multidimensional and heterogeneous perspective. Multidimensional in the sense that one
needs to take into account the various geographical sites and the multiple perspectives
on choices and solutions existent in the organization. Heterogeneous in the sense that
one cannot expect to find the same structure between headquarters and subsidiaries at
all the units or that one function is structured in the same manner across all units. This
also implies that a perspective emphasizing change throughout the internationalization
process needs to be applied.
A number of authors (Czarniawska, Sevón, Sahlin-Andersson, Rottenburg and Røvik)
describing themselves as ‘Scandinavian Institutionalists’ emphasize the social process
by which organizational practices and structures are incorporated in organizations, and
how such social processes are contingent upon the ‘translator’ as well as the institutional
environment. This perspective allows for an understanding of organizational change as
simultaneously dependent on institutional formative forces as well as on the impact of
individual actors who, as decision makers, attempt to shape the practices and structures
of the organization. Such a model acknowledges that organizations change and develop,
and that individuals within an organization learn and adapt their behavior according to
their increased knowledge. These organizational actors consequently affect the structures
10
2 Learning within institutional regimes
and practices of the organization. In the following I will adopt a perspective focusing
on the role of learning (Argyris and Schön 1996) in the development of the MNC and
its subsidiaries.
On the following pages I will outline a theoretical framework based on new insti-
tutionalism for analyzing the development of organizational structures and practices in
a MNC. I will include the role of boundedly rational actors by emphasizing perspectives
allowing for power and learning as important aspects of the organizational development
process.
2.2 New institutionalism
In organization studies new institutional approaches emerged in the mid-1970s. With
the advent of open system theory it was becoming increasingly recognized that the wider
environment or context was shaping and forming organizations. Early institutionalists
within organization studies focused primarily on the significance of the organization’s
technical environment; resource- and task related information (Litwak 1961; Woodward
1965; Perrow 1970; Pugh and Hickson 1976). The understanding of organizations as
societal systems influenced by social and cultural forces emerged later, and was refined
with the advent of new institutionalism.
New institutionalism is an interesting framework for understanding the influences of
larger societal forces on actors such as individuals, organizations and states. The the-
ory asserts that individuals as well as their collective structures are shaped by rules,
norms and beliefs surging from their environment, which, combined with enforcement
mechanisms, constrain their choices and actions. Actors relate to different environments
simultaneously, and the number and variety in environments multiply through time and
geographical locations. Variety in geographical locations is the focus of this thesis, as
new institutionalism is brought to bear on understanding the variety and similarity in
organizations in Mexico, U.S.A., South Korea, Poland, Norway and Sweden. These
organizations (and the individuals within) all have a local environment they relate to
which is expected to influence and constrain their choices. Simultaneously, as these
organizations are parts of a larger multinational corporation in the automotive industry,
one can expect that there are other environments and institutions which also exert an
influence on their behavior. The main questions I will address in the following are how
institutions are seen to affect the choices and actions of organizational actors, how these
actors handle conflicting institutional pressures and whether handling such pressures
may have a longer term effect on their behavior.
It is the emphasis on what Scott calls the cultural-cognitive pillar which distinguishes
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new institutionalist approaches from earlier forms of institutionalism (Scott 2001). Scott
provides a definition of institutional environment emphasizing the different elements the
environment consists of: “Institutions are composed of cultural-cognitive, normative,
and regulative elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide
stability and meaning to social behavior” (2001: 48). These elements may also be seen
as rules of more or less stringent character. Institutional environments can therefore be
seen to be “characterized by the elaboration of rules and requirements to which individ-
ual organizations must conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy…” (Meyer
and Scott 1983: 149). Institutions are effective in constraining the behavior of actors
because actors need to be perceived as legitimate. The reward for organizations that
conform to the institutional environment is increased legitimacy, as well as resources
and survival capabilities (Di Maggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Scott 1983; Scott
1987; Zucker 1987).
The institutional environment for any organization is complex, but a useful cat-
egorization is to describe the environment as consisting of three pillars; the regulative,
normative and cultural-cognitive systems (Scott 2001).
The regulative pillar constrains and regularizes behavior through rule setting, moni-
toring and sanctioning activities. Regulative systems are expressed in rules or laws that
regularize how the organization and its members are to behave. These rules or laws may
be found both within the organization and in the external environment. Compliance to
regulative systems is achieved through inducement, sanctions, and authority. Accord-
ing to Scott, authority is the most common strategy, involving coercive power which is
legitimated by a normative framework. Hence, the regulative and normative pillar may
be mutually reinforcing.
Normative systems consist of elements that shape behavior through norms and values.
Norms specify how things should be done, what the socially accepted manner of pur-
suing an end is. Values may be defined as “conceptions of the preferred or the desirable,
together with the construction of standards to which existing structures or behaviors
can be compared and assessed” (Scott 2001: 54-55). Normative systems define both the
ways of how to pursue a specific goal as well as what the appropriate goals are. The
appropriate goal of a private enterprise is commonly defined as ‘making a profit’, and
the accepted way of achieving this goal is restricted by conceptions of fair business prac-
tices. The mechanisms of compliance to normative systems functions in a prescriptive,
evaluative and obligatory manner.
The cognitive-cultural pillar consists of the shared conceptions that individuals in a
group have, the nature of their social reality and the frames through which they create
meaning to behavior. The cultural external environment shapes internal interpretative
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processes so that a group of actors who share the same environment will have a similar
understanding of appropriate behavior. An important distinction between the normative
pillar and the cognitive-cultural is the extent to which the beliefs and standards for
behavior are internalized in the individual and taken for granted as appropriate.
The mechanisms of compliance mentioned above are means of enforcing institutional
rules and hence restricting behavior. As seen above, means of sanctions can take a variety
of forms, both economic and non-economic (Ingram and Clay 2000). Possible economic
sanctions include fines and penalties which may for example restrict the economic ac-
tivity of an organization. Non-economic sanctions may include loss of interaction with
other actors, or of certain rights and benefits, status and authority. Much emphasis has
been given to the manner in which institutions constrain and control behavior, however,
institutions also enable and support activities that are considered legitimate and hence
function as resources for actors who comply with them.
2.2.1 Multiple institutional environments
When analyzing a MNC within an institutionalist framework, the different institutional
environments the organization needs to face should be specified. Because of the variety
in institutional environments one may expect that sub-units or individuals are faced with
conflicting institutional pressures. Before I move on to discuss the manner in which ac-
tors may respond to institutional pressures, I will first have a closer look at the various
environments a MNC might face.
What I will refer to as the local environment is in line with how new institutional-
ism defines an institutional environment. The local environment consists of regulatory,
normative and cultural-cognitive systems. In the case of a MNC each subsidiary relates
to an institutional environment both on a national and more local level. Important insti-
tutions are national legislation, local laws, social and cultural norms as well as beliefs
and shared understanding within locally defined groups.
In a MNC the institutional environment of the parent organization is also likely to
influence the local subsidiaries abroad. The parent organization is engrained in its own
local environment, and rules, norms and beliefs originating from this environment may
be diffused from the headquarters to the various sub-units. This institutional environment
I will refer to as the parent environment.
The various global industries, such as the automotive industry, are also seen to be
increasingly institutionalized. Organizational recipes, production processes and regulat-
ory systems, such as certification systems are seen to be institutionalized as they reach
widespread acknowledgment across countries (Røvik 1998). These ideas are recipes for
how parts of the organization should be structured, and are considered legitimate and
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appropriate by those who constitute the industry. In the automotive industry there is
increasingly a direct demand from customers to their suppliers for implementation of
specific processes and practices. It is not uncommon that the customer oversees the im-
plementation of such practices at the supplier’s sites and evaluates whether the work
processes have changed accordingly. Glimstedt and Lange (1998) argue that there has
been a ‘Japanization’ of production methods in the world automotive industry. The
global institutionalized environment of the automotive industry is thus one of multiple
environments a local organization will face.
However, the categorization above does not pretend to include all possible environ-
ments faced by the organizations in a MNC. Such a discussion would bear too far into
both delimiting the borders of an environment and to a complex analysis of the ori-
gin and effect of a great number of institutional forces. The discussion above can be
summarized in the following figure.
The organization structures and processes in the local subsidiary are shaped by dif-
ferent pressures surging from multiple institutional environments. New institutionalism
has had a tendency to merely focus on the local institutional environment arguing that
the legitimacy of the local unit is achieved by complying locally. In a MNC it is also to
Local 
Subsidiary 
Local 
institutional 
environment 
Global 
insti-
tutional 
envi-
ronment
Parent 
institutional 
environment 
Figure 2-1
Conflicting pressures for consistency within the MNC and for local conformity
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be expected that the parent company will exert pressure, pressure which is influenced
by the institutional environment of the head office. And finally, the global automotive
industry is also seen to be increasingly institutionalized, incorporating rules, norms and
shared beliefs that an organization within the environment is expected to comply with.
However, the discussion above and this figure do not address the relationship between
these conflicting pressures, and how the local unit may respond.
2.2.2 Responses to institutional pressure
By according to the rules, norms or common beliefs of the local environment, an or-
ganization may become socially accepted and viewed as credible by its members and
other actors. The regulative systems allow the organization to be viewed as legally
sanctioned, while accordance to normative elements provides credibility as being mor-
ally governed. Complying with cognitive-cultural systems allows the organization to
be culturally supported by its environment. In the case of a MNC this picture becomes
more complex. A local subsidiary in a MNC will need to attempt to achieve legitimacy
in the eyes of actors in the local environment and in the parent organization as well as
with customers, suppliers and competitors in the global industry. The local unit will be
under formal and informal pressure from multiple sources to adopt certain structures and
practices. A multinational company needs to coordinate its various subsidiaries and will
therefore apply pressure to obtain a minimum level of consistency among the units. New
institutionalism has not adequately addressed how the encounter between different insti-
tutional environments is resolved. How do such organizations behave when attempting
to reconciliate various institutional pressures, and especially when these conflict?
Oliver (1991) has suggested a broad array of potential responses to institutional pres-
sures by individual organizations. She labels these responses as conformity, compromise,
avoidance, defiance and manipulation. Avoidance incorporates the widely recognized
response of decoupling as argued by Meyer and Rowan (1977). Decision makers may
consciously try to increase the legitimacy of their organizations by adhering to the in-
stitutionalized patterns, that is, on the surface. Scott (2001) argues that it is important to
acknowledge that organizations themselves respond to their environment, be it groups
or individuals within the organization. These responses are sources of diversity within
the organization. How the organization responds depends on a number of issues like the
size of the organization, its power in the environment and whether its values or norms
are concurrent with institutional forces. He also acknowledges that even though there
is evidence of isomorphism between organizations within the same sector or the same
geographical area, the same institutional forces will not have the same effect on all or-
ganizations. Organizations exhibit various means of responding to institutional pressure,
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dependent on their capabilities to do so (Abzug and Mezias 1993; Alexander 1996; Oli-
ver 1991). However, how organizations respond to institutional pressures has not been
analyzed in the case of a MNC which confronts a number of institutional environments.
This is a context where one may readily expect a greater variation in institutional regimes
as they extend across different countries and cultures (Scott 2001).
To discuss the potential responses of a MNC to different institutional pressures the
level of analysis needs to be explicit. That institutional regimes exert similar pressures
on organizations has been supported by numerous studies demonstrating isomorphism
between organizations subject to the same institutional forces. On the other hand, other
studies also show that while organizations may reveal a striking homogeneity, there is
also a strong degree of heterogeneity between apparently similar organizations. This
heterogeneity becomes visible above all when scrutinizing the content and practices of
organizational solutions. Even though a group of organizations may have all introduced
well-known solutions like ‘quality improvement’ or ‘team structures’ there is a remark-
able variation in the actual practices of such ideas. The level of analysis in these studies
is on the organization or organizational sub-systems. This is also the level which will
be analyzed in this thesis. It is the development of practices and structure in the various
units of one organization which will be the focus.
To better understand how the various sub-systems of one organization respond to
institutional pressures, a fruitful approach may be to include Ingram and Clay’s (2000) dis-
tinctions of centralized – decentralized and public – private institutions. The centralized
– decentralized dimension encompasses the degree to which institutions are enforced
by identifiable functionaries. The public – private dimension refers to who makes the
institutions, with public indicating the state and private indicating organizations or in-
dividuals. This will allow for a perspective where the responses of organizational units
to institutional pressures are linked to the individuals within these organizations. These
individuals may be seen as actors who create and transform institutions.
Ingram and Clay distinguish between three forms of institutional constraints each
linked to a specific actor who produces them. Individuals are seen to produce private-
decentralized institutions, organizations create private centralized institutions, while sta-
tes produce public-centralized institutions. In this perspective, actors pursue their own
interests constrained by institutions while at the same time creating new constraints for
other actors. The interplay between these actors and institutions can be seen as a three-
layered hierarchy, with states constraining organizations which in turn constrain indi-
viduals. However, there is also upward influence in this hierarchy with individuals and
organizations attempting to affect the institutions which constrain them. There is inter-
dependence between these institutions in that public or private-centralized institutions
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may not have their desired effect unless they are supported by private-decentralized
institutions which encourage individuals to support them (Nee and Ingram 1998).
This interdependency among forms of institutions acknowledges that actors produce
institutions and that they do so in interplay with other institutional orders. Institutions
are no longer seen as constants and out of reach from the influence of individuals
or organizations. This perspective also gives more room for acknowledging that insti-
tutional systems consist of a myriad of institutional orders including the economy, the
community, the societal spheres of politics, the family as well as culture, science and
religion. Each of these incorporates its own definitions of reality-systems based on clas-
sification, symbols and action systems that give meaning to practice. And they are not
necessarily correspondent, meaning that practice in line with one institutional order is not
necessarily coherent with practice in another, even though the geographical location is
the same. But there is an interdependence which demands some sort of correspondence
between institutional logics for them to be effective. Rottenburg (1996) argues that the
practices which do materialize are related to the institutional environment in the sense
that they are coherent with the notions and interests of the actors concerned, or put dif-
ferently, they do not contradict the institutional orders deemed relevant by these actors.
The interplay and interdependence among forms of institutional orders will allow for a
perspective on the behavior of actors within institutional constraints.
2.2.2.1 Behavioral assumptions
When new institutionalism acknowledges that organizations respond to institutional
pressure instead of merely adapting passively, the organization has been viewed as one
coherent entity and the impact of groups with divergent opinions has rarely been an issue.
When internal actors (groups or individuals within the organization) have been a focus,
it has been expected that the encounter between different institutional environments will
cause higher levels of conflict within the organization (Meyer and Scott 1983). Be it
within the local organization or between the subsidiary and the headquarters. It is an
“ever present state of tension” which prevails (Prahalad and Doz 1981: 191). The beha-
vioral assumption in new institutionalism is that “actors pursue their interest by making
choices within constraints” (Ingram and Clay 2000: 527). Individuals are boundedly
rational (Coase 1937; Simon 1957).
Based on these assumptions, the cooperative climate between a subsidiary and the
head office in a MNC has been viewed as conflictual. The leader of a local subsidiary
has been seen to be heeding local needs foremost, protecting his own interests. Viewed
in an institutionalist perspective the local manager will consider his own familiar frames
of rules, norms and beliefs as institutions one should comply with. Local managers are
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therefore expected to have a natural resistance to the imposition of externally mandated
solutions and practices. It has been acknowledged by a number of authors that the failure
to adapt to institutional pressure may cause problems within the organization (Sharma
and Wallström-Pan 1997; Oliver 1991). The main priority of the head office is to exercise
control and coordination throughout the organization. In MNCs the establishment of a
foreign subsidiary often follows the process of organizational replication. A common
assumption among managers is that with the same type of production, the same organiz-
ational structures and practices will suffice (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989). Furthermore, it
has been shown that control and coordination becomes easier across borders when sub-
units have similar organization structures and processes (Flaherty 1986). The need for
control and coordination is also expressed in the use of a wide array of control mechan-
isms. Formalized and standardized mechanisms are used across the different sub-units,
creating consistency among the units. Centralized mechanisms such as a hierarchy of
authority allows for dominance and for power to be vested in the top-management. An
emphasis on these motives and interests of the involved actors makes for a relationship
between subsidiary and head office based on constant negotiations and power plays. On
the other hand, there are a number of shortcomings with this perspective which I will
address below.
2.2.2.2 Actors and institutions
The interests of a boundedly rational actor are in new institutionalism defined broadly.
This is a definition which includes material rewards, as well as ideology, values, norms
and social rewards such as status. Despite this definition, Ingram and Clay (2000) argue
that ideology and preferences have been given a too small role in research conducted
within a new institutionalist perspective.
The interdependence between levels of institutional orders, discussed above, im-
plies that the operation of both public- and private centralized institutions is dependent
on private-decentralized institutions. These institutions may also be termed the mental
constructs of individuals, their shared belief and understanding. As Levin (1997) has
shown, technology transfer is not merely a matter of moving equipment from one place
to another, but the skills, knowledgebase and culture of the recipient unit is essential
in terms of how the new technology will be received and put into operation. North
(1993), studying variance in performance between public institutions in Western econ-
omies to those economies making the transition from state socialism, attributes variance
in performance to differences in the mental constructs of individuals in these societies.
Cognitive frames may determine what institutional alternatives are accepted or rejec-
ted. According to Rottenburg (1996), in order to bring an idea successfully into a local
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context it is necessary to adapt it to the local cultural code. However, as he argues,
the assumption that there is only one culture code present does not hold. Rather there
is much to support the assumption that each culture has several mutually contradictory
codes and hence multiple explanations as to how the world is ordered. These codes are
available to people in much the same way as alternative repertoires for thought. The
workings of private – decentralized cognitive institutions may therefore be seen to be
fundamental to the workings of the institutional framework, a different role from what
has been postulated by new institutionalism. And the institutional assumption that it is
possible to find the right ‘fit’ between an organization and its environment is hence
questionable.
New institutionalism has also been criticized for its perspective on the effect of inter-
personal relationships in strategic choice situations. Ingram and Clay (2000) argue that
new institutionalists hold the assumption that interpersonal relationships are important
because they strengthen institutional norms by creating social sanctions. A different
perspective is to acknowledge that actors are embedded in social networks, and that
socially constructed interpretations influence what they perceive as rational choices.
Social networks add other influences on the immediate action frame of self-interested
actors. Lysgaard’s study on organizations shows how workers in order to belong to the
social community at work, comply with other rules than those guiding individual gain
(Lysgaard 1961). The need to achieve respect among co-workers is important in order to
be socially integrated. The choice within institutional constraints can therefore be seen
as encompassing more than the weighing of competing interests. The choice of an in-
dividual actor is also dependent on his membership in social networks and the shared
interpretations that prevail within this network. The analysis of boundedly rational ac-
tors must acknowledge that social embeddedness exerts an influence on the individual’s
rational choice of benefits and gains. However, this is also related to how changes in
private – decentralized institutions emerge.
Ingram and Clay hold that a fundamental problem in new institutionalism and its
behavioral assumptions is the failure to explain what they refer to as ‘the origin of
preferences’. How do individual actors change and create beliefs and shared understand-
ings? New institutionalism has had a tendency to view the institutional framework as
a complete and constant set of rules, norms and beliefs, and hence given less attention
to the question of how changes in private – decentralized institutions come about. Pref-
erences are related to social structure as Veblen argued (1899). Giddens (1987) shows
how preferences are created in interaction with other, also across time and space in in-
teraction with “absent others” (p. 146). More recently, DiMaggio, Friedland and Alford
discuss how preferences are socially constructed by boundedly rational actors in social
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networks (DiMaggio 1990; Friedland and Alford 1991). Accepting that private – decen-
tralized institutions may be seen as fundamental to the workings of other institutional
levels, it is becoming apparent that a theoretical framework attempting to cast light on
the development of a MNC also needs to include perspectives on how actors change
their preferences and what effect this may have on the private – centralized institutions
of the organization.
2.3 Institutional change
Organizations have in earlier research been viewed as motors for institutional change.
That is, change would come about when the need arose and the timing was optimal for
economic gains (Davis and North 1971; North 1981; Williamson 1975; 1985). This view
has been contested in that organizations are seen to strive for institutional change for
other reasons than economic ones (Simons and Ingram 1997). On the other hand, other
studies have shown that organizations are inert structures which are more likely to resist
institutional change than to promote them (Hannan and Freeman 1984). As Stinchcombe
(1965) argued, organizations reflect the conditions of their founding even decades later.
In the same vein, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) hold that the administrative heritage of
an organization is essential in understanding the workings of that particular organiz-
ation. It is therefore argued that the influences exerted by organizations on institutional
frameworks are incremental and limited to their familiar institutional environment.
These researchers have been concerned with explaining institutional change on a
higher level than the emphasis in this thesis. The focus of this study is not change in
centralized – public institutions on a state level. Rather I am concerned with how indi-
viduals may be seen to change the centralized – private institutions of their organizations.
On the other hand, change in institutions on whichever level, as argued earlier, is depen-
dent on support in institutions on lower levels. Institutional orders created and enforced
by organizations and states are dependent on acceptance on the private –decentralized
level. Private – decentralized institutions such as values and norms shared by a group
of people need to endorse institutions on a higher level.
How are institutions created on a private- decentralized level? The behavior of indi-
vidual actors is not merely contingent upon calculated self-interest, but, as argued above,
individuals are themselves parts of social networks which influence their behavior. Indi-
viduals as boundedly rational actors change their preferences in social interaction with
others, and their preferences exert an influence on institutional orders in an organization,
or for that matter on a state level.
New institutionalism has not addressed what occurs when the organization consists
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of actors familiar with different institutional environments, and who can be seen to be
capable of acting to change the private – centralized institutions of their own organization.
Knight (1992) argues that institutional outcomes are dependent on bargaining between
interested parties. As Ingram and Clay state; “the process of institutional change [ ]
appears to be as much a comparison of rhetorical claims, the outcome of which depends
on deep social values of the audience” (2000: 541). The bargaining process changes
centralized institutions such as when political parties discuss introducing new laws, but
is also relevant when understanding how changes in norms and beliefs are produced. As
Kalleberg (2001: 43) holds, it is not an expression of being out of touch with real life
to insist that rational conversations are a form of influence in organizations.
2.3.1 Learning as a dynamic for institutional change
The internationalization process can be expected to yield learning processes because the
actors who are involved acquire trust and knowledge of each other, and create behavioral
rules which make their future interaction more effective. Argyris and Schön (1996) de-
fine organizational learning as an organization’s acquisition of understandings, know-
how, techniques and practices of any kind and by whatever means. Others define organiz-
ational learning as processes of translation (producing and re-producing organizational
rules) through individual bargaining, compromising and negotiations (Huber 1991; Levitt
and March 1988). Experiences are central in both these definitions; organizations learn
particular behaviors based on individual bargaining over specific experiences which are
encountered in a variety of situations.
A definition of learning which is central to the perspective taken in this thesis is
that of collective learning. An important distinction between individual learning and
collective learning is that the latter depends on changes in the interaction among indi-
viduals (Levin and Klev 2002). So while individuals in the organization may develop
their knowledge and know-how this does not constitute collective learning before this
knowledge affects the collective action of a group of individuals. Organizational or col-
lective learning signifies a change in shared interpretations, interpretations which are
constituted in relations and interaction within a community (ibid.). This definition of
learning also implies an emphasis on the actual practices within a group rather than a
focus on the abstract knowledge of its members. As discussed by Brown and Duguid
(1991) it is the actual practices that determine the success or failure of organizations.
And insightful practices are created in collaboration among individuals building on their
individual experiences. Brown and Duguid (ibid.) elaborate on how communities-of-
practice are essential for understanding how learning develops at the work place. Com-
munities-of-practice should be understood as consisting of individuals who work and
21
Institutional change
practice together as well as the site where these practices take place. When applying
such a perspective on a MNC the organization can be seen to consist of a multitude of
communities-of-practice and both the individual experiences of those participating and
the particularities of the site where these practices take place are important elements.
Power is important for understanding how learning develops. Actors may have dif-
fering capabilities (based on status, gender and age) to effectively define reality so that
other organizational actors accept them. A common characteristic of learning processes
is that they often reflect asymmetrical bargaining. A dominant individual or group of in-
dividuals typically acts as “writers of scripts and providers of cues and prompts” (March
1994: 72). The authority of various individuals (or groups) in the bargaining process is
seen to be crucial to whether such negotiations result in outcomes with longer-term effects
than the immediate negotiated solution. As Holmquist (2003) holds, any domination of
whatever kind is always grounded in the dominating party’s simplified understanding
of experiences, thus limiting the amount of attention paid to the full complexity of any
situation. Even though domination by one of the actors in a negotiation process is seen
as a barrier to change and new solutions, there is reason to expect that the variety of
resources that are available to the actors make for nuances in their relative power. In the
case of a MNC, even one with a strong centralized authority structure, the knowledge
of the local environment of the subsidiary is a resource for the local representative.
In addition to relative power, there are other factors which influence learning proces-
ses. Ostrom (1998) holds that trust obtained through communication and substantiated
by a reputation for being trustworthy, may significantly alter a previous situation charac-
terized by tension and conflict. Trust is contingent upon communication between the
actors and is thus something that can increase with time. Through negotiations the ac-
tors also become more skilled negotiators as their knowledge and understanding of the
cognitive and socially embedded foundation of the other increases. And finally learn-
ing is dependent on the production of standard operating procedures, routines and other
‘behavioral rules’ (Holmquist 1999; Zollo, Reuer and Singh 2002). These rules generate
certain couplings between otherwise independent behaviors and can be seen as templates
for interactions with one another and interactions with others.
The development process of establishing new subsidiaries and creating a coordinated
MNC is to a large extent a learning process for the members in the organization. As an
accumulative process, the organization builds knowledge through successful and failed
experiments and will with time become increasingly competent in its endeavor. While I
do not argue that the organization will learn more readily from failure than from success,
I do expect that the awareness of the need for learning may more readily be triggered
by problematic situations, here viewed as tension and conflict within the organization,
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than when organizational life is considered harmonious. This is in line with what Argyris
and Schön define as productive learning;
It is the detection of error, which we define as the mismatch of outcomes to expec-
tations, that triggers awareness of a problematic situation and sets in motion the inquiry
aimed at correcting the error. When the outcomes of our action are mismatched to
expectations, the inquirer gets an experience of surprise – an experience essential, as
Israel Scheffler wrote (1987), to the process of coming to think and act in a new way
(1996: 31).
An illustrative example is presented by Lindsey and Braithwaite (1996) who found
that U.S. expatriates working in Mexican companies tended to learn intercultural com-
petence through norm violations. That it is when an expatriate breaks a local norm
that he starts to reflect on his own cultural understanding and will attempt to adapt his
behavior to the local expectations. This is, by Ochs (1991), seen to be similar to what
happens in early childhood processes where norm violations serve a positive function
in enculturation.
Learning may be seen to occur on two levels. Through negotiating appropriate sol-
utions the actors learn what the correct behavior and effective arguments are, and how
their disagreements are solved. At a different level one may say that the organization as
such learns when these negotiated solutions are transferred to new situations. Bargaining
between organization members, which is typically informal and arising in ordinary daily
talk, discourse, conversation and other activities produces sets of incomplete agreements.
These agreements impose constraints on the behavior of organization members, but also
provide them with resources to perform specific activities (Giddens 1984; March 1994).
The agreements that at any one time prevail over other potential agreements can be called
‘organizational rules’ and they include standard operating procedures, routines, codes,
programs etc. that generate couplings between otherwise independent behaviors. In fu-
ture negotiations the cognition and behavior of the members are organized with varying
force by existing organizational rules, which thus serve as templates for interactions
with one another and with others.
What is characteristic for the ‘organizational rules’ that emerge? Scandinavian insti-
tutionalists, such as Czarniawska, Sevón, Sahlin-Andersson and Røvik, discuss in more
detail the practices and structures that are negotiated in organizations. Czarniawska argues
that all ideas can be proven to fit most problems, and it is the success of the presentation
that matters (1996: 25). It is the social processes where actors discuss, interpret, advice,
suggest and certify some ideas as more appropriate than others which determine the
organizational practices and structures that materialize. However, this is not to say that
‘anything goes everywhere’. The process of translation is defined by Latour (1986) in
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contrast to a more traditional diffusion model (Rogers 1962; Levitt and March 1988).
Translation in Latour’s terms is “displacement, drift, invention, mediation, creation of
a new link that did not exist before and modifies in part the two agents, those who
translated and that which is translated” (1993: 6). The translation process is an ongoing
process where structures and practices are renegotiated and reinvented constantly. This
is because all organizations contain elements which are considered illegitimate, contrary
to the interests or ethical principles of some actors, and these will engage in a constant
renegotiation to change or reinterpret these elements. This is also due to an encompass-
ing vision of progress where the possibility of constant improvement is unquestioned.
Organizational actors constantly attempt to change elements of their organizations to
find better solutions.
Translation processes do not happen haphazardly. The purpose of such a process is
to tie meaningfully the arrival of an idea to present problems experienced by people in
the organization or attributed to the organizations themselves. And organizational actors
do not attempt to translate whichever idea they first come across. Foremost they are
restricted by their span of attention. An actor will not grasp at whichever solution he
comes across, he is restricted by his former knowledge and experience. We approach an
idea in terms of what we already know. Sevón speaks of how our identities inhibit us to
accept whichever solution as appropriate and rational (Czarniawska and Sevón 1996).
We apply a logic of appropriateness which allows us to make a judgment of what is
rational or appropriate action. And in accordance with new institutionalism as advocated
by Scott, an organization imitates other organizations that are perceived to be similar.
The organizational field an organization perceives itself to be a part of functions as a
source of ideas and solutions that, when considered successful, might be the subject of
imitation. That organizational fields often become the focus is a result of a match based
on identity. Organizational change is thus a process of learning from the experience
and performance of other organizations. The change process is contingent on a match
between situation and identity, based on a logic of appropriateness and rationality.
The reason why organizations within the same organizational field do not become
clones of each other is due to the above mentioned translation process. Sevón labels this
“imitative action in a performative perspective” (Czarniawska and Sevón 1996: 50).
Imitation is not the copying of a stable feature, but a translation process which alters
the original idea to correspond with a new context and the interests of the imitators.
Translators or imitators are however restricted by their social embeddedness, institutional
environments and their above-mentioned span of attention. In order to translate an idea
so that other relevant organizational actors deem it as appropriate, the translation process
needs to accommodate contingencies resulting from the institutional environment. This
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is similar to what Ingram and Clay refer to as private – decentralized institutions, which
are seen to support the functioning of institutions on more aggregate levels. Solutions
and ideas which run counter to legitimate norms and beliefs will not be accepted by
individuals, but need to be translated to fit the particular institutional environment.
The figure above summarizes the theoretical framework that will be applied in the
further analysis. The actors – head office and subsidiary - are seen to be constrained
by institutions (regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive) and are also embedded in
social networks. In their encounter with other actors their behavior and actions will be
influenced by these factors as well as their own interests and negotiating power. These
resources and constraints may be seen to limit the attention span of an actor, but in
repeated interactions with other actors which result in learning, the attention span can
be enlarged. This occurs because the actor is able to acquire new knowledge of the
constraints and resources of the other actors as well as how appropriate solutions can be
negotiated despite these differences. To arrive at new solutions and practices is depen-
dent on the resources and constrains of the actors, but also on arenas for communication.
It is through communication that the actors are able to convince each other and where
rules and knowledge for their future interaction is articulated. That increased interaction
Head office 
 institutional 
constraints
 socially 
embedded
 interests 
 relative power 
Subsidiary 
 institutional 
constraints
 socially 
embedded
 interests 
 relative power
Interaction 
Learning 
 trust
 behavioral rules 
 increased knowledge 
New centralized –private 
institutions
Translated ideas at 
each subsidiary 
Figure 2-2 Theoretical framework
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results in learning is facilitated by such knowledge as well as increased trust between the
actors. When learning results in new solutions which in turn become institutionalized
within the organization, change has occurred, that is changes in the centralized – private
institutions of the organization.
To include the role of boundedly rational actors to the extent that this model portrays,
goes counter to traditional research on the relationship head office – subsidiary. Earlier
research has emphasized structural explanations for how the dichotomy centralization
vs. decentralization in a MNC is solved. The ultimate goal in such research has often
been to find the appropriate ‘fit’ between the local needs for flexibility and the needs
of the head office for consistency and control across the subsidiaries (Doz and Prahalad
1984). The focus of the following thesis will be less on the ultimate outcome of such
processes, and more on the processes themselves. However, I will not disregard that
structural explanations do have value, and I will include such variables in the following
chapters.
According to Ostrom (1997), a behavioral theory of rational choice allows for struc-
tural explanations of human behavior as well as an inclusion of the effect of individual
choice. It is thus possible to do both; include both structural explanations as well as the
role of actors. Her argument is that when actors are seen as central in how a situation
is solved, it also follows that the effect of their interaction is included. Trust among
the participants is one such effect, and this is a factor which may significantly alter
the outcome of the interaction. The social dilemma situation that Ostrom discusses is
similar to what has been identified as the decentralization vs. centralization dilemma
that MNCs are seen to face. Or put in a different way, it is the dilemma of cooperating
with the head office and accepting centralized decisions while heeding local needs and
pressures for consistency with the local environment. Ostrom defines social dilemmas
as “a large number of situations in which individuals make independent choices in an
interdependent relationship” (Ostrom 1997: 3). The model depicted above illustrates a
behavioral approach to rational choice theory, including both structural explanations and
the role of individual actors.
2.4 Research questions
I will approach the following analysis focusing on the role and motivations of the two
main actors – head office and subsidiary, and the process by which these interact.
Since heeding local interests has been identified as one of the main interests of the
local unit, I expect to find that adapting to the local environment is an important theme
in the negotiations between the subsidiary and the head office. The local manager who
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is the representative for the local subsidiary is the actor who most immediately can push
for local solutions in negotiations with the head office. The first research question is
therefore: Why is local leadership crucial for creating local solutions?
The main motivation of the head office in relation to the subsidiaries is to create
consistency in order to control and coordinate the various units, and I expect that forms
of control and coordination are central in their communication with the units. While
former theory has emphasized the use of centralized and formalized control mechanisms
I will also include a focus on socialization mechanisms. When creating an appropriate
governance structure for the international organization, I expect to find that they build
upon both structural means for control as well as more cultural ones. The second question
posed in this study will thus be: Why are governance systems built both upon structural
and cultural control mechanisms?
The final research question I will address is related to the learning model discussed
earlier. I expect to find that over time the actors involved will learn how to negotiate
through increased knowledge of each other, increased trust and by constructing behavioral
rules. The various sites the organization consists of can be understood as incorporating
different communities-of-practice, and to understand the learning processes that occur the
encounter between such communities are important. Furthermore, I expect that learning
does not only have an effect on isolated practices and solutions at each subsidiary, but
will over time also have an effect on solutions and practices employed in the totality of
the organization. The final question is thus: Why is a perspective on learning important
for understanding an internationalization process?
Below I will discuss how these issues have been approached in former research. The
tendency has been to rely on structural explanations for variance on these issues among
MNCs. These variables will be included in the discussion below.
2.4.1 Local solutions and local leadership
The first research question I will address is: why is local leadership crucial for creating
local solutions? The role of the local manager has rarely been emphasized in earlier re-
search analyzing the structures and practices of local organizations within MNCs. While
I will include other explanatory factors as identified in earlier research, it is the role of
the local leader which will be given prominence below.
Establishing a foreign subsidiary often follows the process of organizational repli-
cation. When setting up a new unit existing practices and structures which are deemed
successful in other places are replicated because this is perceived as less uncertain than
to establish new ones. This tendency has been reported to be especially great in MNCs
because the establishment of a local unit in a foreign and unknown country represents
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a high level of uncertainty and ambiguity (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; March and Ol-
sen 1976). Technology transfers from the parent to the subsidiary further accentuate the
motivation for organizational replication. An underlying assumption when transferring
technology is that the same type of production will need the same type of structures
and practices in the organization. While this has been contested by empirical research,
it is nonetheless a common assumption among managers (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1998).
Studies have shown that transferring technology is not a matter of moving equipment
from one place to another, but that the skills, knowledgebase and culture of the recipi-
ent unit is essential in terms of how the new technology will be received and put into
operation (Levin 1997). However, it is still a common assumption in organizations that
it is possible to merely replicate structures and practices from the parent company when
developing a new organization with similar technology and production. Expatriates or
others from the parent organization often functions as carriers of organizational practices
and structures from the parent to the new organization. And if they are able to affect
the initial form and practices of the new organization, there is reason to expect that later
modification of these structures and practices will only be moderate (Rosenzweig and
Singh 1991). Faced with these assumptions is the local organization which for different
reasons may have both the interest and power to alter these initial forms and practices.
Their capability to do so depends on a number of structural variables which I will discuss
below, as well as the role of the local manager.
The local manager is the representative for the local subsidiary and is therefore the
one who negotiates with the head office. The geographical distances as well as language
barriers often make the local manager the sole negotiator with the head office, even
though it can also be expected that he represents views and opinions of others at the local
unit. In new institutionalism he has been viewed as the antagonist who fights for the
independence of the local unit in opposition to the head office. The relationship between
the local manager and the head office has been viewed as one of ever-present tension
(Prahalad and Doz 1981). This emphasis on a relationship based on conflict and power
also implies that subsidiaries are not equally vulnerable to pressure from the head office.
Structural explanations for their varying degrees of autonomy have been the focus of
much research (Rosenzweig and Nohria 1994; Egelhoff 1988; Porter 1986; Prahalad and
Doz 1987). These structural variables may readily be seen as operationalization of the
concepts I introduced above: interest, power and institutional constraints. Factors related
to social embeddedness have rarely been used as explanations in earlier research. The
relative power of the local subsidiary to push for local adaptation is shaped by its depen-
dency on the local institutional environment, its dependency on the head office and which
resources the local leader as a representative for the unit holds. The relevant variables are:
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·
Local manager
·
Method of founding of the subsidiary
·
Age of subsidiary
·
Size of subsidiary
·
Local dependency
·
Dependency on parent company
The local manager is the main representative for the local unit in negotiations with
the head office. Earlier research has ignored the role of such individual actors, but I
will argue that since the head office in most cases needs to rely on the interpretation
of the local manager on local conditions, his role is central in the subsidiary – head
office relationship. The capabilities of the local manager to understand the resources
and constraints of the local institutional environment and his own role in the socially
embedded networks at the local plant, are expected to affect his ability to behave as a
representative on behalf of the local unit. Simple assets as having the same language as
the employees at the plant and an upbringing in the same institutional environments may
be essential in how he is able to understand and exploit1 the local conditions. Further, his
understanding of the institutional constraints of the global industry and its requirements
is important in order to negotiate within the same framework as the head office.
It is argued that the method of the founding of the local unit will affect the degree
of local embeddedness. Gates and Egelhoff (1986) hold that foreign acquisitions gen-
erate internal complexity. The acquisition has well-established organizational structures
and processes in place, and these are likely to differ from greenfield establishments
where the parent company has had a significant role from the beginning. The parent
company may encounter difficulties in gaining control over a subsidiary with an inde-
pendent history and structure, and the head office may also decide to not interfere with
a foreign unit which is already adapted to suit its local context. This hypothesis has
been supported by empirical findings in various studies (Hedlund 1981; Garnier 1982;
Gates and Egelhoff 1986). There may thus be less pressure for change from the head
office in the case of an acquired unit, and in a similar vein, a pressure for change in
an acquired unit may also be met with more resistance locally. It can be expected that
if the MNC employs institutional pressures for change towards certain practices these
will be met with more resistance in an already established organization than a green-
field establishment. Greenfield operations are often founded by employees of the parent
1) Exploit, is here given a positive significance, meaning to find room to manoeuvre within the constraints of
the institutional environment and to value its resources.
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company who will tend to replicate characteristics of the parent company in the new
organization.
It is expected that the age of the subsidiary will affect the extent to which the
unit adheres to the local environment. As Rosenzweig and Nohria (1994) argue, the
subsidiary will over time increasingly adapt to the local environment thereby caus-
ing a greater extent of autonomy in the local unit. This assumption is questionable
though, as other factors such as the international experience of the parent company
may be an equally plausible explanation. In fact, Gates and Egelhoff (1986) found
no support for age as an explanatory variable when controlling for international
experience.
The size of the subsidiary has been expected to affect the relative power of the sub-
sidiary. It has been theorized that the larger the subsidiary relative to the parent company,
the better bargaining position would the subsidiary have towards the headquarters, and
hence, would be able to gain more autonomy (Garnier 1982). In the same vein, Picard
(1977) argued that the parent company would grant more autonomy to larger subsidiaries
as they have the resources to support a full management staff. However, findings by
Gates and Egelhoff contradicted Garnier’s findings, and other studies have been incon-
clusive or to the contrary for Picard’s hypothesis (Hedlund 1981; Garnier 1982; Gates
and Egelhoff 1986).
If the subsidiary is highly dependent on local resources it may be expected
that the unit will adhere to the local environment to a greater extent. Rosenz-
weig and Nohria (1994) restrict the definition of resources to physical products
like raw materials, tools, intermediate parts etc. But there is reason to believe that
other resources such as employees also matter, especially if there is a scarcity of
manpower in the local area. The local unit may also be dependent on comply-
ing with external actors such as customers, competitors and suppliers, and local
and national authorities who might place divergent demands on the local units. A
high dependency on local resources may cause the local unit to be less vulner-
able to pressure from the head office as they have a higher stake in preserving their
autonomy.
In their survey Rosenzweig and Nohria (1994) argue that their cases will vary based
on the degree of dependence on the parent company. If there is a high degree of depen-
dence on the parent company know-how and expertise, the parent company will have
a greater chance of influencing the local unit. This has also been confirmed in other
studies (Jarillo and Martinez 1990; Gupta and Govindarajan 1991; Egelhoff 1988; Ghos-
hal and Nohria 1989). In their study of MNCs Ghoshal and Nohria argue that resource
dependency is the key determinant of internal exchange relationships within complex
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organizations2. It is in other words, the internal distribution of organizational resources
which is expected to most strongly affect organizational processes and structures. It is
expected that when the subsidiary is highly dependent on the headquarters for resources
the subsidiary will be more willing to comply with the authority of the headquarters and
have little autonomy of their own. A strong dependency on the head office is related
to issues such as shared technology and infrastructure, reliance on funding and capital
originating from the head office, allocation of orders, available channels for sales and
marketing etc. As discussed earlier, a common assumption among managers is that if the
production is the same the organizational solutions and practices also need to be similar.
Shared technology between the parent company and the subsidiaries can therefore be
expected to create less autonomy on behalf of the local unit, as diffusing technology is
also related to patterns of organizational structure.
The variables discussed above (method of founding, age, size, local dependency,
dependency on the parent company and the local leader) have been seen to affect the
relative power of subsidiaries, their interests in preserving their autonomy and their
need to comply with the local institutional environment. The role of the local leader
also allows for including the effect of social embeddedness as he, in his dealing with
the head office, is expected to also be influenced by social networks at the plant and his
own role within it. A local manager with knowledge of local conditions, who speaks the
language and who also understands the global automotive industry will be more capable
in negotiations with the head office to push for local adaptation. If the subsidiary in
addition is older and fairly big compared to other units, has organization structures in
place through being an acquired unit, have a high local dependency and a low depen-
dency on the parent company, then it is to be expected that it will have more autonomy
compared to other subsidiaries in the company.
Assuming that these variables will affect the vulnerability of the local subsidiary
and their interests, I will discuss how Kongsberg Automotive and its subsidiaries can
be described according to these factors in the next chapter. Variance on these variables
may ultimately affect my first research question. I will now specify how also structur-
al variables are seen to affect the shape of the governance structure the head office is
creating, the second question of this thesis.
2) See also, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978.
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2.4.2 Governance system
The second research question I will discuss is: why are governance systems built both
upon structural and cultural control mechanisms? To be able to coordinate and control
activities across geographical, social and cultural distances, a MNC faces considerable
challenges. Earlier research has had quite a narrow approach to control and coordination
issues in organizations. Agency theory has for instance emphasized control in terms of
either ‘outcome’ or ‘behavioral’ models (Eisenhardt 1989). Such a dichotomy hinders
a greater understanding of more non-economic dimensions of control and coordination,
such as socialization and normative measures. However, there is a stronger focus on
such control mechanisms today both in research and in the organizations.
In a literature review of research on coordination mechanisms in multinational cor-
porations, Martinez and Jarillo (1989) report that there are essentially two categories
of mechanisms in use by these companies. While structural and formal mechanisms
have been commonplace in most companies for decades, there has in recent times
been an increased emphasis on more informal and subtler mechanisms. It is argued
that the international competitive environment induces companies to implement more
multidimensional coordination. Fleming and Søborg argue that “hierarchical control is
conceptually outdated”, and that it no longer works in complex organizations (1998:
121). Instead companies are increasingly emphasizing training and socialization of their
employees in order to implement company goals. Human Resource Management has
become an important mechanism for MNCs to integrate and control the organization
(ibid.). In new institutionalism the use of informal mechanisms has been explained as
a result of a failure to solve conflicts. Meyer and Rowan (1977) hold that when it is
not possible to solve inconsistencies by formal structures the organization will turn to
conflict resolution by individuals and informal structures.
When Rosenzweig and Singh (1991) argue that the need for control and coordination
is one of the main dynamics in pushing for consistency within the MNC, their underlying
assumption is that control and coordination mechanisms are centralized and formalized
and restrict the autonomy in the subsidiaries. Normative mechanisms such as socialization
allow for more flexibility and differentiation in subsidiary – headquarter relationships.
Employing such control mechanisms may therefore have the effect of allowing for more
autonomy at local units. These mechanisms will be further specified in Chapter 9. For
now it is sufficient to state that control and coordination mechanisms have in earlier
research been seen as a central dynamic in shaping the relationship between the local
subsidiary and the headquarters. The implicit assumption is that such mechanisms are
employed top-down – it is the sole decision of the head office of how to control and
coordinate the subsidiaries. However, former research has also attempted to predict the
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use of control and coordination mechanisms based on a number of structural variables.
The relevant variables are:
·
Global vs. multidomestic industry
·
Nationality of the company
·
International experience
Porter (1986) distinguishes between multidomestic and global industry. Global in-
dustries are defined as where a firm’s competitive position in one country is affected
by competition in other countries, while multidomestic industries are independent of
competition in other countries3. Local subsidiaries in a global industry, such as the
automotive industry, will be able to depend on the resources within the MNC organiz-
ation. They are less dependent on the local environment and will be under less pressure
to conform to institutional norms. Thus their organizational structure and managerial
practices may resemble more fully those found elsewhere in the MNC and there will be
less need for local autonomy. It is also held that companies in global industries are more
prone towards centralization than companies in multidomestic industries (Rosenzweig
and Singh 1991). Gates and Egelhoff (1986) found that the automotive industry could
be characterized as more centralized than other industries when it came to marketing
centralization. The observation is that some industries must consider local market recep-
tivity more than others. Customers in the automotive industry are not as strongly linked
to the local market as in for example the food industry. The automotive industry operates
to a greater extent with regional markets, which leaves the different subsidiaries more
room for standardization within larger markets.
Hedlund (1981) and Egelhoff (1984) measured control mechanisms across companies
of different national origins. Their findings are similar, that European MNC, and in
Hedlund’s case, Swedish MNCs, have a tendency to allow more autonomy to their
subsidiaries. In terms of control and coordination mechanisms they use less centralized
mechanisms and employ more flexible and informal mechanisms than MNC from other
geographical regions. In a similar vein, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) argue that the admin-
istrative heritage of a company influences which coordination and control mechanisms it
relies on, also when the organization has become international. The administrative herit-
age is influenced by amongst other things the national and local culture, and represents
‘our way of doing things’.
3) Examples of global industries are automobile and electronic equipment, while multidomestic industries
include retailing and consumer goods.
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Another characteristic of the parent company that is expected to affect the degree of
autonomy across the units is the ‘international experience of the parent’. As discussed
above, a MNC that establishes a subsidiary abroad may at first attempt to replicate its
home country practices (Franko 1976; Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989). With greater inter-
national experience however, it is expected that a MNC develops a more cosmopolitan
perspective (Stopford and Wells 1972). Gates and Egelhoff (1986) found that control
and coordination with time became less centralized and formalized and were increas-
ingly based on more informal and subtler mechanisms. Rosenzweig and Nohria (1994)
followed the same argument, and held that a cosmopolitan perspective may lead to a
greater acceptance for local varieties in practices and structures at the subsidiaries. How-
ever, in an empirical survey of 249 subsidiaries of foreign-based MNCs in the United
States, they found that the international experience of the parent had no significant effect
(ibid.). I will argue that how time and increased experience may be thought to affect the
relationship between the head office and the subsidiary may be more readily addressed
in a perspective emphasizing how repeated negotiations may result in learning which
affects the two groups of actors and their approach.
The structural variables discussed above are found in earlier research to be affect-
ing the relative power and interests of the head office to allow for different degrees of
autonomy at the subsidiaries. A reliance on centralized control mechanisms is seen as
equivalent to restricted local autonomy. In a global industry like the automotive indus-
try, the MNC is expected to have less need for local receptivity, as customers can rarely
be considered local, but operates in regional and international markets. The national ori-
gin and administrative heritage of a MNC is expected to affect their tendency to allow
for autonomy on a local level. European and Scandinavian MNCs are seen to be more
willing to allow for local autonomy than e.g. US MNCs. Increased international experi-
ence in a MNC is expected to affect the extent of centralized control. With increased
experience the head office is seen to accept more local autonomy. One may expect that
the central managers of a MNC are affected by these variables as they are pushing for
consistency across the subsidiaries. While the empirical case in this thesis does not allow
for measuring how such variables affect different MNC, I do expect that the explanatory
value of these variables will be identifiable in my material when respondents discuss
and argue for the rational behind various practices.
I expect to find that these structural explanations for the extent of consistency through
centralized and formalized mechanisms also will have explanatory value for Kongsberg
Automotive. This may affect my second research question: Why are governance systems
built both upon structural and cultural factors?
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2.4.3 A perspective on learning
The third main question I will address in this thesis is as earlier specified: Why is a per-
spective on learning important for understanding the internationalization process? As
discussed, repeated negotiations may develop into learning processes in the organization.
Processes which on one level cause new ideas to develop and be implemented at the local
units, may at a second level allow for changes in the institutions of the organization –
the private-centralized institutions. To be able to address whether this is an appropriate
explanation of these processes, I will in the subsequent analysis identify how change
is observable in the relationship between the head office and the subsidiary, and how
these changes are reflected in the totality of the organization. I will thus concentrate on
the production and re-production of organizational rules.
Earlier research studying how the relationship between the head office and the sub-
sidiary evolves through time has mainly operationalized the contact between these actors
in terms of flows of communication and the presence of expatriates at the local unit.
I will rather rely on indications of trust, the creation of behavioral rules and increased
knowledge as factors which may affect the relationship. Trust can be inferred from how
the actors perceive the other and their relationship through time. Indications of trust
are statements expressing positive expectations to the others’ actions. However, trust
may also be lost, and loss of trust may have negative consequences for the relationship
between the unit and the head office. Increased knowledge is inferred from statements
of agreement and understanding of the other actor’s motives and interests, as well as
to how other actors are constrained by social networks and institutional environment.
Behavioral rules are templates for interaction between the subsidiary and the head of-
fice which is related to how they negotiate and reach solutions. These may be informal
agreements as to how and where issues are discussed, or the creation of new alliances
between actors in the organization. It may also include practices which are created to
make negotiations easier.
I expect that through time repeated negotiations between head office and subsidiary
become more effective as mutual knowledge has been established.
When more respondents express agreement on some basic sets of organizational rules,
learning has taken place and negotiations become more effective as the focus will be
more on the problem area than on how such issues are solved within the organization
or on which alternatives are viewed as legitimate. I expect that learning which results in
changes in private-centralized institutions will be observable. Levitt and March (1988)
refer to private – centralized institutions as ‘routines’. According to them, “organiz-
ations are seen as learning by encoding inferences from history into routines that guide
behavior” (1988: 320). This perspective stems from the view that behavior in an or-
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ganization is based on routines. ‘Routines’ include the organization’s procedures, rules,
forms, strategies and technologies as well as more informal routines like structures of
beliefs, culture, codes and knowledge. Routines are seen as recorded in the collective
memory of the organization and transmitted to its members through socialization and
education. It is independent of each individual member and can survive considerable
turnover in the organization. I expect that through the internationalization process such
routines or organizational rules are created and these may be seen to change the former
characteristics of the organization.
2.5 Becoming global – the troublesome integration process
The theoretical framework discussed above builds strongly on new institutionalism as a
perspective for understanding how actors and organizations may be seen to be influen-
ced by institutional environments. Such a perspective is important for understanding the
differences between the various units in Kongsberg Automotive which are situated in
countries like Norway, Sweden, U.S.A., Poland, South Korea and Mexico. The different
institutional constraints that influence members of these units are expected to be important
when these actors meet and attempt to create one single international organization.
However, it is also discussed above that through social interaction individuals may
be seen to change private – decentralized institutions, that is norms and values shared
by a group of individuals. The internationalization process creates encounters between
actors familiar with diverse institutional environments and one may expect that through
negotiations and interaction these actors create new practices in their organization. These
are changes that create new practices in the various local units, but which ultimately
may also be seen to change the private – centralized institutions of the organization.
In this thesis I will focus on two issue areas where one may expect to find that
practices are changed throughout the internationalization process. The dichotomy of
decentralization vs. centralization has been the focus of earlier research. The local units
are seen to strive to create local solutions which allows for more autonomy locally and
a more decentralized organization. The head office’s main priority is to control and co-
ordinate the organization and a common assumption has been that this is done by creating
a centralized organization through structural and formalized control mechanisms. The
opposite interests of the head office and the subsidiary have earlier led to characteriz-
ations of their relationship as one of “ever present tension” (Prahalad and Doz 1981:
191).
The learning perspective included above allows me to have a closer look at the re-
lationship between the head office and the subsidiaries. I expect to find that through
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repeated negotiations actors from these units learn to cooperate more efficiently and
that compromises are developed. On the other hand, this depends on whether the actors
are able to create trust, knowledge of each others and behavioral rules which guide
their learning experiences. Relative power is also an important element in such learning
processes.
These issues will be discussed later in this thesis, but first I will present some
background information on Kongsberg Automotive ASA and their internationalization
process.
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3 Kongsberg Automotive ASA
3.1 Introduction
Kongsberg Automotive ASA is a Norwegian based company in the automotive industry.
The head office is in Kongsberg, Norway. The production units are in Norway, Sweden,
Poland, Mexico, Brazil, England and South Korea. The company also has sales offices
in England, Germany, Japan and France, and a sales and R&D centre in the United
States. The company develops, manufactures and markets systems for gearshift, clutch
actuation, seat comfort, stabilizing rods, and electronic components. Their leading cus-
tomers include Volvo, Saab, Scania, GM, DaimlerChrysler, MAN, DAF, Renault, PSA,
and Toyota. Today the company delivers to the following markets: Argentina, Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, England, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea,
the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Spain, Sweden, and the USA. The company employs
1900 people and had in 2003 operating revenues of approximately 1.6 billion NOK.
Figure 3-1 Products of Kongsberg Automotive
Head restraints
Seat heater
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3.2 Historical development
Kongsberg Automotive was established in 1987 as a continuation of the activities in
the Automotive Parts Division of Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk. Here production for the
automotive market had commenced in 1957, when a major contract for producing
brakes for Volvo was signed. During the 1970s as a part of a governmental strategy
to increase industry in the rural districts, two factories were established, one in Hvit-
tingfoss and one in Rollag, close to Kongsberg. In 1987 employees and managers in
the company took over the auto division and founded Kongsberg Automotive. The
company expanded in 1996, buying one of the world’s leading suppliers in seat heat-
ing, Scandmec. Scandmec was a major industrial company in Sweden, dating back to
1946. From 1996 and onwards, Kongsberg Automotive has established themselves in
ten different countries with production facilities and sales offices. A future establish-
ment in China is being planned at this moment. Despite increased internationalization
and lower labor costs abroad, the company has maintained production in their five
Norwegian and Swedish factories. One of these factories was acquired as late as 2004
(Raufoss Automotive ASA). The labor costs in their different production units vary
greatly. A Norwegian assembly worker costs the company 175 NOK per hour (incl.
social costs) while a Swedish worker costs 156 NOK. Both of these work 37.5 hours
per week. In contrast a Korean assembly worker costs 55 NOK an hour and works 44
hours per week, while a Polish worker costs 26 NOK per hour and works 40 hours
per week. Among the units discussed in this thesis the lowest labour costs are in
Mexico. A Mexican assembly worker costs 21 NOK per hour and works 45 hours per
week.
3.2.1 Automotive industry
The international automotive industry has changed considerably during the last dec-
ade. The focus of the industry is structural rationalization on both the supplier and
customer side where larger units, constant quality improvements, greater standardiz-
ation, higher volumes and demands for substantial cost reductions prevail. The prices
for raw materials such as aluminum, steel, plastic and electronic components have
increased significantly. To an increasing degree, car manufacturers are attempting to
transfer their guarantee costs to suppliers as well as to expand the guarantee period.
For suppliers it therefore becomes increasingly important to supply products with no
defects. Improvement programs to ensure zero-defect deliveries are emphasized at all
factories in the company, as well as the development of robust technical solutions and
testing. Kongsberg Automotive is highly aware of the demand from the global auto-
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motive industry and attempts to comply with these when they are considered useful or
necessary1.
3.3 Internal structures
The company is split into three separate Business Areas, and each local subsidi-
ary relates to one or more of these business areas. These three distinct operational
units all relate to the same centralized functions located in Sweden and Norway;
purchasing, R&D, finance, IT and Human Resources. The R&D centre compro-
mises approx. 120 employees, and has a smaller centre located in the U.S. as
well. In the figure below the different production units and business areas are
illustrated.
The Business area managing directors have team-reviews regularly with the sub-
sidiaries, following up on their results and looking for improvement potentials. While
traveling extensively, the Business area managing directors have their home offices in
either Sweden or Norway. Although the three Business Areas are to be rather indepen-
dent in theory, they are under considerable central control. This can both be seen as
a result of the small size of the company, employing 1900 people and of a strongly
engaged central management. In addition the owners of the company are strongly in-
1) http://www.logistikk-ledelse.no/2000/it/it3-09.htm
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volved. The chairman of the board of directors represents the largest owner, FSN
Capital, and is involved in all major decisions. As the president of the company himself
says, the owners are on the phone every day to discuss goal achievement and future
development2.
The various subsidiaries are directly supervised by the Business Area Managing Di-
rector. The directors of the different Business Areas visit the plants and review the reports
and the latest figures. Last month’s figures are discussed and the subsequent targets for
the next weeks. There are at times improvement projects which are initialized and then
followed up. At each review there is also a ’walk-talk’, which is a tour throughout the
factory. The managing director comments on issues for improvement and expects these
to be sought out.
At the Mullsjø plant in Sweden, the Purchasing and R & D departments service
the totality of the local subsidiaries. The Mullsjø plant has been named a “Center of
Excellence” emphasizing that the best expertise in production and logistics are to be
2) Dagens Næringsliv, 14 September, 2004, p. 28–29.
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found here. All the material for the units in Kongsberg Automotive Inc. is supplied
from Europe, and the suppliers are managed by the central purchasing department.
This is also the case for machinery and most technical equipment. The R&D center is
responsible for developing new products and altering the designs of already existent
ones. While the design department in the U.S. received more resources during 2002-
2003, the main responsibility for design is located in Sweden and alterations in the U.S.
needs to be approved by the center in Mullsjø. All the foreign subsidiaries relate to a
financial controller in Scandinavia who is responsible to follow up on their assigned
units.
3.3.1 The Human Resource Department
The company established a Human Resource department in 1995 at the head office.
The HR department exists alongside a more traditional personnel department. The HR
Manager is today assisted by two people, one in Sweden and another in Norway. The
HR department is small and the central management at the head office as well as board
members are closely involved with decisions and implementation of ideas and projects
related to the HR area. The HR Manager implements projects and activities related mostly
to training and recruitment throughout the company. Main activities are for example,
an international management course that the company initiated in 2001, various man-
agement courses at different levels for staff both home and abroad, a trainee program
and strategies related to recruitment at the local subsidiaries at management level. A
central policy of the HR department is that solutions and activities implemented in the
organization should also be created in the company to make sure the focus fits with the
company’s own challenges.
3.3.2 The IT - department
Also situated at the head office in Norway, is the IT department which services the
various subsidiaries of the company. A policy in Kongsberg Automotive is to not use
the latest versions of software. While common programs such as Word, Excel, Power
Point and so forth are provided to all the units, the company heeds a certain parsi-
monious policy of not spending money on the newest software. The argument is that
upgrading should be based on usefulness and not simply because the software is new.
It has been argued that this has made them avoid many of the initial weaknesses of
early software releases. The e-mail system is often brought forward as an example
where the company has suffered few problems, such as virus attacks, compared to other
companies. Use of hardware or software that has not been pre-approved is restricted.
This has been done in order to hinder the spread of viruses by alien programs, as
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well as having to service solutions which are unknown to the central IT-department in
Norway.
3.4 Internationalization strategy
The extensive internationalization period from 1996 up to today has been pursued through
an internationalization strategy including a number of principles for establishing and
following up the various foreign subsidiaries. The company describes itself as a “glo-
bal company with a strong corporate culture that combines goal achievement, positive
values, discipline and best practice with respect for local conditions” (Kongsberg Auto-
motive Annual Report 2003). The above quotation illustrates the main characteristics
of the company’s approach towards internationalization.
The strong corporate culture stemming from Norway is the foundation for a number
of principles such as lean organizations, standardized production processes and infra-
structures, avoidance of overtime in production etc. The emphasis in the quotation above
concerning goal achievement and discipline is also characteristic for the company. There
is a strong focus on reporting routines as well as how negative results are followed
up. The picture below illustrates how the process of goal achievement and discipline is
presented throughout the company.
The emphasis on positive values in the quotation above illustrates a discussion within
the company during the past years. With the increasing numbers of foreign subsidiaries
it became less certain that the company’s model for principles on how employees should
be treated was appropriate in all local contexts. The picture below represents the model
most widely used when discussing such issues within the company.
Planning Execution Result 
Comparing result 
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Corrective action
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Figure 3-4 Goal achievement
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There is an understanding in the company that local conditions need to be respected.
Local regulations are heeded, such as systems for pensions, transportation to work, can-
teen facilities etc. Kongsberg Automotive has a strong emphasis on company integration,
and demands that local subsidiaries apply a number of standard procedures as well as
computer systems allowing for standard accounting and report systems. While the cen-
tral management argues that it is necessary to adapt to local conditions on one hand, on
the other disintegration of the company is seen as a possible threat. The establishment
and follow-up of foreign subsidiaries has been discussed related to this dilemma the past
years.
While the main focus of the planning and implementation phases of the overall estab-
lishment processes abroad has been on economic and technological issues, increasingly
there are more discussions and more activities related to organization and management
issues. This has also caused a debate within the company about the degree of standardiz-
ation between the foreign units and the mother company. When it comes to machines,
equipment, computer software, logistics and production systems the company has aimed
for standardization throughout the company. However, with the larger number of foreign
subsidiaries, it has become increasingly clear that technical production systems may
have consequences for internal management styles and treatment of employees.
The process of establishing a unit abroad has followed a principle of copying the
production systems and organization structures from more established units. When es-
tablishing units abroad the policy has been to “run the work processes through the Xerox
machine.” This is supported by arguments that it is the technology that they have tested
and gained experience with and no extra time is to be spent by trying out new equip-
ment or machinery. Furthermore, it is argued by the central management that by using
the same technology in all subsidiaries it will be easier to close down a plant and open
it elsewhere should it be necessary. The most visible aspects of the standardization in
VALUE BASED LEADERSHIP
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 THEY ARE RECOGNIZED
 THEY ARE APPRECIATED
 THEY ARE TREATED WITH RESPECT AND 
HONESTY
Figure 3-5 Values
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production are in the physical work environment, which is characterized by the same
look, material standards, and rules of order and cleanliness everywhere. It is the same
machines, tools and equipment which are used in all plants which have the same pro-
duction. And all units receive their machinery from the same supplier in Sweden. The
use of “kanban”-cards, quality controls and improvement techniques inspired by the
so-called ‘Japanism’ within the modern automotive industry is present in all the factor-
ies. Also routines and procedures are, as far as possible, exported to the foreign units,
as well as the IT-infrastructure as mentioned above. While there are openings for adap-
tation to local conditions when it concerns organization structures, a lean organization
is a prevailing principle in Kongsberg Automotive.
The organization is to be as small as possible and no unnecessary resources are to
be spent on administration and other functions which are not directly linked to the pro-
duction. The idea is that there should be no intermediary positions between the plant
manager and the various production teams. People in high management positions are
not supposed to have assistants or a staff of their own. The layout of the plant at the
different locations is similar. It is expected that the plant manager has an office in the
production hall in order to be close to the operators and the production. Also, managers
as well as workers need to be prepared to step out of their own area of responsibility
and take on menial tasks when needed, for example to book airplane tickets themselves,
brew coffee or other tasks.
3.4.1 The team model
The production workers in factories in Norway and Sweden are organized in teams,
each being responsible for one production line, e.g. orders belonging to one specific
car model. The team is coordinated by a team leader who is also a regular production
worker within the team. The advantage of having a team leader who is recruited amongst
the workers and who is considered by the team as one of them, is increased cooper-
ation within the team as well as with management at the factory. Most team leaders will
function as a representative for workers who feel uncomfortable approaching the man-
agement. The team leader may have different responsibilities depending on the factory.
Main responsibilities often include:
·
following up production in accordance with specifications
·
supplying materials for the team
·
making sure the production is in line with standards of quality
·
planning the manning of the production line with regard to absentees
and production plans
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·
following-up plans and routines for maintenance
·
acting as a representative on behalf of the workers
·
following-up workers who are absent or who are not complying with
expectations
In Norway and Sweden the responsibilities of the team leaders vary according to the
factory and their own capabilities. When team leaders take on full responsibility the
former position of foreman is normally no longer in use.
The workdays for production workers are in line with Norwegian and Swedish regu-
lations in these countries. Working hours, vacations as well as breaks during the day
are regulated through national legislation. Dependent on the volume of production there
are sometimes two or three shifts in a factory, but the norm is one. The policy of the
company is to be manned sufficiently, hence, avoiding use of overtime which requires
higher payroll costs. In these factories there is often also an emphasis from both workers
and management on ergonomics and variety of work tasks. Much of the sick leave at
these factories is due to physical strain from work. Programs for improving the safety of
the work place are therefore emphasized. Training and courses at the factory are offered
which may give the workers increased competence and thus renewed responsibility and
higher salaries.
In the foreign units, all but one has introduced the team model including recruiting
team leaders from amongst the workers. The responsibilities of the team leaders vary, but
are less than those of the team leaders in Scandinavia. The Polish factory has preserved
a foreman position in addition to the teams. While the policy of not using overtime is
heeded, the structure of the workday is in accordance with local regulations or norms.
None of the foreign unit has an emphasis on ergonomics or on variety of work tasks.
However, there are actions taken to avoid physical injuries and to increase safety at the
work place. In some of the foreign units there are possibilities for workers to increase
their competence through courses and in-house training.
3.4.2 The SAP system
The IT department has chosen a certain number of programs which are implemented
throughout the company. The most important of these is the SAP system. The SAP system
is based on a portal infrastructure which allows the various subsidiaries and departments
as well as external actors such as customers and suppliers to view information in the same
system only restricted by their role-based access as users. The portal makes it possible to
integrate a number of different software programs so that the same role-based access can
be used for a number of programs. The software solutions that Kongsberg Automotive
47
Internationalization strategy
have chosen to integrate is the financial system allowing for functions for accounting,
financial reporting and performance management. Supply chain management solutions
have been included allowing for planning of supplies across the various units. Solutions
for customer management are included, allowing for contract and billing management,
availability checks and order tracking across the company.
The centralized IT-department is responsible for implementing the SAP system in
the different local units. As a part of the implementations some training was offered to
key-personnel at the local units. These people were also able to rely on support from the
SAP personnel in Sweden, and could call when problems arose. Because of geographical
distances and time differences it was at times difficult to get help at the moment it was
needed. All the units were, on different occasions, in need of support from Sweden, as
it was not available in other places. However, with time employees in the different units
became more experienced and could increasingly fix the problems themselves.
3.4.3 QS9000
The QS9000 quality system is to be implemented in all the units of the organization in
addition to other types of quality systems. As an international accepted solution in the
automotive industry, companies are expected to have certification in accordance with
the QS9000 standard. Customers demand, to an increasing degree, that their suppliers
are accredited in accordance with the standard, and furthermore that the supplier also
proves that their own suppliers adhere to it as well. The system is subject to regular
evaluation on the basis of a set of standardized procedures and rules. The quality system
regulates internal processes related to production, training of employees, career devel-
opment, information within the organization amongst other processes. It also provides
procedures and routines for external processes related to contracts and implementation
of customer orders.
3.4.4 "Interdal" course
A central part in the internationalization strategy has been internal courses for managers
and trainees. Two main programs were initiated during 1999 and 2000, a trainee program
for new employees and a course for young ’high potentials’, called "Interdal". Both
programs aimed to provide the participants with international experience. They were
initiated and defined by managers within the company as a response to the challenges
the company was facing in their internationalization process. The focus in the trainee
program was on experience and the trainees were therefore sent to various locations for
both short and long-term assignments, home and abroad. The Interdal course consisted
of 5 week-long seminars with lectures on international negotiations, business strategies,
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cultural awareness and financial issues. These seminars were held at the localities where
the company had their subsidiaries, both home and abroad. While the content of the
trainee program relies on the individual experiences of its participants, the central man-
agement decided upon the scope and content of the training program. The fundamental
principles of the program were to focus on the company’s own strategies, challenges, and
business models, there was to be limited involvement from external parties, an active
role for central management, all participants should be willing to undertake international
assignments in the future and the participants were preferably young and viewed as
‘high potential’ by their leaders. For the first Interdal course only two of 23 participants
were from other countries than Sweden and Norway. These two were both older and
had more experience from the automobile industry than the other participants.
While the official aim of the training program was to create a new generation of
managers eligible for international job assignments, early-on it became clear that the
program also served to socialize these young managers in the company. In addition,
through the involvement of the top management, the participants were also evaluated
throughout the program. This was not clearly specified at the beginning of the program,
but is much in line with prevalent attitudes and working methods at the company. On most
occasions there is an atmosphere of monitoring and evaluation that often is expressed
through feedback, not necessarily in private.
In defining and prioritizing themes for the various seminars the central management
in Kongsberg Automotive made some choices as to what they considered important for
a future international leader to learn. The majority of the issues included were based on
the company’s own business strategy and policies. Most of the issues were company
specific and presented by central person in the company. External speakers held seminars
on teamwork, negotiations, and culture. The themes of the seminars were predominantly
fact-oriented and related to issues relevant for the company. The program gave an over-
view of central issues for the company, focusing on existent business strategies and the
expectations from the owners. An instrumental engineering perspective prevailed, and
as a program to prepare for international job assignments one may say that other more
intangible issues were not emphasized. The seminar on culture for instance was ‘fact’-
oriented, attempting to provide the participants with quick answers as to what they could
expect to face in a certain culture. Discussions as to approach, relational skills or com-
munication abilities received limited focus. However, the second Interdal course initiated
in 2003 included more participants from the foreign subsidiaries and had more focus on
socio-cultural issues.
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3.4.5 Instrumental engineering perspective
Kongsberg Automotive is a male-dominated company, and the most common educational
background for managers is engineering. This makes for a strong instrumental perspec-
tive. Despite recent attempts to counterbalance such trends, one may say that a ‘tough
guy attitude’ is visible in the company, but perhaps more so in Scandinavia than in the
units abroad. This is for instance exemplified by expression like “lean and mean”, which
is humorously used by employees to describe the nature of the company. It is also ex-
pressed through the types of feedback given to subordinates, emphasizing the qualities
of hard work, challenges and being tough. The dominance of engineers may account for
the strong instrumental perspective. In this context an instrumental perspective implies
that there is more attention paid to the physical sides of the process, like the moving of
machines, the logistical process, and the material side of production. Little attention is
paid to less tangible issues. This is for instance exemplified through the process of es-
tablishing the new plant in Poland. The general assessment of this process was that not
enough attention had been paid to issues related to socio-cultural factors. This resulted,
for some time, in a level of anxiety and stress among the workers at the plant, as well
as problems related to the move of production from Sweden to Poland. In general there
was too little emphasis put on the recruitment of new employees, the knowledge transfer
from Sweden to Poland and on the development of the organizational structure at the
new plant. The instrumental perspective may also be illustrated by the strong appreci-
ation of formalization and standardization where the fallibility of such mechanisms has
rarely been questioned.
The development of the company hinges on a closely-knit central management team.
As a result of years of experience working together and the small size of the company,
the central management team and others at the head office have been able to become
united in their views of the overarching principles of how the company should be man-
aged. Some employees have criticized the head office for reserving access and career
possibilities to those who are considered insiders. Insiders are here seen as those who
share the same views on management as the head office, and perhaps more importantly
agree with the central management.
3.4.5.1 Rhetoric
Between 1999 and 2002, the central management heeded phrases like “thrifty house-
keeping”, “focused innovation” and “Kongsberg Automotive’s way”. However, based
on reactions from the different foreign units who were not familiar with the history
of the company, from 2002 and onwards several from the central management stated that
these phrases were perhaps not suitable anymore. While deemphasizing these phrases,
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the central management has maintained a strong emphasis on a rational-analytic orien-
tation, and on a culture characterized by individual responsibility and straight-to-the-
point communication. The attempts the company has made to implement such policies
and norms in the foreign units include the management courses discussed above, the
use of expatriates who have long experience within the company, as well as through
an intranet website and the Kongsberg Automotive’s internal newspaper.
The internationalization process in the company has been presented as an integration
process. Integration is by the central management presented both as necessary in terms
of control and as a cause of standardized production. Integration is at times presented
as a goal in itself. Disintegration of the organization is viewed as a danger in that it
will cause difficulties for control and coordination. In some situations the company is
presented as an almost idealistic project. The president of the company has used the
phrase “International companies are peace keeping forces”, suggesting that the value
of integration is associated with a mission that goes beyond regular business purposes.
The argument is that cross-cultural communication within the company is important for
wider purposes than merely coordination of resources and deliveries. Underlying this
policy, and stressed on various occasions, is the view that human beings are essentially
equal, emphasizing the equalness rather than the differences. This has been presented
as: “do not accept that ‘we are different’”, stressing that cultural difference may be used
as an ‘excuse’.
Alongside these efforts to identify a universal approach which could be shared by all
the units, there are also efforts to “let local stuff be local responsibility”. This is related
to the understanding that it is important to allow for a certain diversity, and to the view
that “differences are assets, not problems.” However, this is a focus which surged after
some years of experience with establishing the different foreign units, in 2002. These
views received increased focus during the summer of 2003 through an encompassing
survey attempting to find certain basic values that all the units in Kongsberg Automotive
may identify with. The efforts to maintain a closely integrated organization and construct
a shared identity around common values is further reflected in the “family”-metaphor,
which is used extensively - not only within local units, but also regarding the relations
between various parts of the organization.
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3.5 Kongsberg Automotive within the theoretical framework
In the presentation above I have identified how Kongsberg Automotive may be charac-
terized according to the variables discussed in chapter 2. The company is in a global
industry – the automotive industry - which in earlier research has been identified as more
prone towards centralization than other industries. In the automotive industry there are
few narrow local markets, car manufacturers relate to large regional markets such as
North and South America, Asia and Europe. It is therefore to be expected that the sub-
sidiaries in Kongsberg Automotive are less dependent on local resources, and that the
head office exerts a pressure for standardization across the units. The nationality of the
company and its administrative heritage is that of a small company founded by former
employees and managers at Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk. The ‘family’ metaphor which is
used extensively by the central management illustrates a company which has relied on
personalized responsibility and close informal contacts. This has been combined with
a rational analytic approach with a strong focus on goals and results. The family meta-
phor is also extended to include the production workers, emphasizing participation at all
levels and the restricted use of unnecessary positions which may provide status to some
and not others, e.g. the foreman position. The international experience of the company
is limited. Even though the first foreign unit was acquired in 1996, the extensive in-
ternationalization process may be said to commence in 1999, only five years ago. See
Table 3-1 below. Earlier research has been inconclusive as to the effect of international
experience, and I expect that if time is a relevant factor, this can more readily be said
to affect how the bilateral relationships between the head office and each local unit has
developed in the past years. This, more so, than the approach of the company towards
internationalization as such.
Below I will move on to the different local units which have been a part of this
study, that is; the units in the U.S., Mexico, Poland and South Korea. I will identify their
differences on the structural variables discussed in the last chapter, and further specify
what I expect to find in terms of local adaptation and the use of control and coordination
mechanisms. First, a table showing some of the characteristics of the different units in
the company.
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Table 3-1 Key numbers of units in Kongsberg Automotive, 31.12.20033.
Locations Country Business Area # Em-
ployees
Type of
establishment
From
date
Kongsberg Norway Head office 99
Reynosa Mexico Seat Comfort 304
New
establishment
1999
Detroit USA Sales / Seat comfort 16 Acquisition 1996
Buzan
South
Korea
Truck systems 33
Merger -
acquisition
2001
Hvittingfoss Norway Truck systems 325 1957
Rollag Norway Truck systems 1957
Mullsjö Sweden Gearshifts
Seat Comfort 707
Acquisition 1996
Åmotfors Sweden Seat Comfort Acquisition 1996
Pruszkow Poland Seat Comfort 287
New
establishment
2000
Jundai Brazil Truck systems
Gear shifts
11
New
establishment
1998
Aldershot England Seat Comfort 50 Acquisition 1996-2002
Burton England Seat Comfort 224 Acquisition 2003
Germany Sales 6
New
establishment
1998
France Sales 3 Acquisition 1996
Total 1897
3) Annual Report 2003. http://www.ka-group.com
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The characteristics of the U.S., Mexican, Polish and South Korean units will be
discussed below according to the variables identified in chapter 2. The variables were:
·
Local manager
·
Method of founding of the subsidiary
·
Age of subsidiary
·
Size of subsidiary
·
Local dependency
·
Dependency on parent company
Recapturing the discussion in chapter 2, these variables may be seen as an operation-
alization of the interest, power and institutional dependency that affect the vulnerability
of the local subsidiaries to push for local dependency, and to resist centralized control
and standardization from the head office. These have in earlier research been seen to
affect the extent of differentiation and isomorphism in local subsidiaries (Rosenzweig
and Nohria 1994; Egelhoff 1988; Porter 1986; Prahalad and Doz 1987).
3.5.1 Farmington, U.S.
The U.S. unit was an acquisition from Scandmec, bought by Kongsberg Automotive in
1996. At the time it was a unit with 115 employees, but one which was struggling because
of a high cost level development in the U.S. The production was thus moved to Mexico
in 1999, and only 16 people remained in a prototype, design and sales division. Age,
size and method of founding have been theorized to affect the vulnerability of local units
to pressure from the head office, and their own interest in pushing for local adaptation.
As an acquired unit it is to be expected that the U.S. subsidiary will have the power
and interest to push for local adaptation. However, the fact that the organization was
significantly changed in 1999 – 2000, and their size was reduced to being the smallest
of the production units, makes it plausible that the method of founding and its age have
little effect today. However, their local dependency may be said to be high as the unit
is in close contact with customers in the North American market, and as far as there are
differences between customer preferences in the U.S. vs. Europe, it is to be expected
that the unit will have a high interest in complying with its local environment. On the
other hand, the dependency on the parent company is also high; supplies, machines, in-
frastructure and support are provided by the head office and the Mullsjø plant in Sweden.
Furthermore, alterations on designs in the U.S. need to be approved in Sweden before
put into production. The local leaders of the unit have varied. As I will have a closer
look at below, in chapters 5 and 8, there have been three different managers in the unit,
54
3 Kongsberg Automotive ASA
first a Scandinavian with little experience from the U.S., second a Belgian with long
experience of the U.S. and in the automotive industry, and finally a Scandinavian with
long experience in Kongsberg Automotive but with less experience in the U.S.
It is expected that the U.S. unit will have a high interest in adapting to their local
environment. This is a local environment which may be said to concur with the insti-
tutions of the automotive industry. The ability to comply with the expectations of the
customers has a significant effect on the unit’s ability to perform; in sales, design and in
prototype production. On the other hand, there is less reason to expect that the unit will
have much power to push for local adaptation faced with the head office. It is a small
unit and its former local embeddedness as an acquired and older unit was significantly
changed when production was moved to Mexico. None of the local managers were from
the U.S., but all spoke the language, and the Belgian manager was highly familiar with
the local environment both in terms of expectations from employees as well as external
actors. To assess how these managers affected the unit’s interest and ability to push for
local adaptation demands a more extensive discussion and will be addressed in chapter 8.
3.5.2 Reynosa, Mexico.
The production unit in Mexico is a greenfield establishment from 1999. The establishment
took the form of a move of equipment from the former factory in the U.S., while employ-
ees and managers were mostly hired in the local area. The Mexican subsidiary is fairly
large, counting today 304 employees. Their age is fairly similar to other units, such as the
one in Poland. Their local dependency is low, while producing for the same customers
as the U.S. unit, the only other factor affecting their need to be locally embedded is the
employees recruited in the Reynosa – Rio Grande area. On the other hand, there is an
abundance of workers in this area. Furthermore, the unit was set up under the so-called
“maquila” program, which demands compliance with a number of regulatory measures,
that is, standard contracts and specifications as to wage levels, health and safety require-
ments and reporting to the Mexican authorities, if the company is to profit from the duty
free access to Mexico. These requirements however, can be seen as highly international
requirements and not specific for the local environment in Mexico. The U.S. unit provi-
des the Mexican unit with technical specifications and prototypes, as well as customer’s
specifications and orders. The unit receives their material, machinery and support through
the head office and the Mullsjø unit in Sweden. The Mexican unit has had two differ-
ent local managers; the first production manager was Swedish, while the one employed
since 2001 is Mexican. The former had experience from Kongsberg Automotive, but did
not speak the local language nor had experience from the area. The second has a lot of
experience from the area, speaks the language and is familiar with the automotive industry.
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It is expected that the Mexican unit, in alliance with the U.S. unit, will have an in-
terest in complying with the requirements of their customers in the U.S. market. They
also have an interest in complying with the local environment in terms of expectations
from employees and the maquila program. Their size is relatively big compared to other
units and they may therefore be expected to have more relative power in relations with
the head office. On the other hand, they are highly dependent on the head office and
its resources in the form of supplies, machinery, infrastructure and support. The two
managers who have led the unit are remarkably different. One may expect that the lat-
ter manager have more resources to understand and exploit the local environment, and
therefore also more power and interest for pushing for local adaptation. However, this
is a discussion which deserves a more thorough analysis in chapter 8.
3.5.3 Pruszkow, Poland.
The Polish unit was established greenfield in 2000, and is a fairly large unit counting 287
employees. Its local dependency is low as it produces to customers in Europe, the same
as the units in Scandinavia, and has no local suppliers of much importance. The other
factors affecting its local embeddedness are expectations from local employees and the
need to comply with Polish regulations. Polish regulations can be said to divert some
from those in Western Europe. The availability of manpower in the area is abundant;
however, there is a lack of employees with the technical skills and know-how needed at
the plant. The dependency on the parent company is high as most supplies, machinery,
infrastructure as well as support is provided by the head office and the Mullsjø plant in
Sweden. The Polish unit has had two different managers, a Swede during the project
phase of establishment and a Pole who took over when regular production started. The
Swedish manager lacked knowledge of local conditions as well as the language, but had
long experience within Kongsberg Automotive. The Polish manager lacked experience
from the company, but had substantial experience from the automotive industry through
working for U.S. companies in Poland. He also knows the language and is familiar with
the local institutional environment.
While its size may affect the unit’s ability to push for local adaptation in a positive
direction, its local dependency is low, and its dependence on the parent company is
high. The unit does have an interest in pushing for local adaptation because of the need
to comply with the expectations from local employees and Polish authorities, but these
are also the only reasons why local adaptation may be seen as important. I expect that
the differences between the two managers will affect their interest and power in pushing
for local solutions. The Polish manager who knows the local conditions and speaks the
language I expect will have more power and interest in seeking local adaptation.
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3.5.4 Buzan, South Korea.
The South Korean unit was established in 2001. It is a small unit counting 33 employ-
ees. The unit is the former automotive division of Jung Ang, and while a move to new
facilities occurred in 2002, no other major changes have been undertaken. Its local de-
pendency is high. The unit still produces mainly the same products as earlier, to the same
customers in the Asian market. Supplies and machinery are mostly provided locally,
and the specifications from former customers are the same. There is an abundance of
manpower in the area, also of people with the technical skill and know-how for hig-
her positions. The local institutional environment also affects the local dependency as
South Korean traditions and norms are strongly coupled with structures and processes
in work organizations. Because of the many differences between the norms and ways of
a Korean organization and that of a Western organization, one may speak of a distinct
Korean Management System (Chang and Chang 1994). The unit’s dependency on the
parent company is lower than for the other units discussed above. It relies on the parent
mainly for investment and to some extent for its technological infrastructure. The unit
also depends on the parent company for future development as new products and in-
creased competitiveness are expected to be supplied from the head office. There have
been two different local managers in the unit. First, a Korean who was very familiar
with local conditions and the automotive industry in Asia, and second, a Norwegian with
experience from Kongsberg Automotive, but with no experience from South Korea or
Asia and who did not speak the language.
As an acquired unit which is highly dependent on the local environment, it is to be
expected that the interest and power to maintain local adaptation is high. Also their rela-
tively low dependence on the parent supports this. The approach of the two managers
is expected to be very different. The Norwegian manager is expected to be less capable
of and interested in preserving local adaptation.
3.6 Summary
The history and development of Kongsberg Automotive is important for an understanding
of how a fairly small company embarked on an intensive internationalization process.
The fact that the company may be said to have been re-established in 1987, by former
employees and managers in the auto division of Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk has influen-
ced the organization up to today. It is a closely-knit company where personalized and
informal relations have been important. Most managers in Scandinavia who have taken
part in the internationalization process of the company have many years of experience
in the company, and depend on close social networks in their daily work. When the pro-
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cess of internationalization began this was still the main manner of how Scandinavian
managers worked together. However, this became increasingly difficult as the organiz-
ation grew from 469 employees in 1995 to 1900 in 2003. With time, a policy for the
internationalization process was developed and some important principles were estab-
lished. These were for example, the replication of structures and production processes
from Scandinavia, and a need for swift decision making. The presentation of Kongs-
berg Automotive made it possible to discuss this empirical case within the theoretical
framework presented earlier.
The various foreign units were discussed, and while there are differences among them
it is mainly the South Korean unit which distinguishes itself. This is because it is an
acquired unit and it is situated in a cultural context largely unfamiliar to the company.
I will later in this thesis present these units in greater detail, and discuss the variance
between them.
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4 Research method
4.1 Introduction
The following thesis is based on empirical studies carried out in Kongsberg Automotive
ASA and its different subsidiaries from 2000 to 2004. In close cooperation with a fel-
low Ph.D. student, Sigrid Damman, I have followed the company’s internationalization
process at home and abroad during this period. We have been given free access to
the organization and its employees and have participated in and contributed to differ-
ent projects in the company. The data material we have gathered during this period is
extensive.
The methodological approach I have applied in this study is based on constructivist
grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin 1994; Glaser 1992; Charmaz 2000; Guba and Lin-
coln 1985, 1989; Silverman 2001; Seale 1999). I found it appealing when venturing into a
subject matter as complex as an internationalization process, to choose a method which
allowed and even recommended to approach the research subject without detailed pre-
conceptions and expectations. It was appropriate to employ such an approach as my
initial focus was on understanding and learning as much as possible about the challenges
involved. To be able to gain a comprehensive understanding it was essential to allow my
respondents and observations explore the subject matter without a rigid research plan
which could eliminate issues deemed important by those concerned.
To gain access to an organization such as Kongsberg Automotive one is also de-
pendent on establishing trust and cooperative relationships. In order to do so I found it
crucial to have an approach demonstrating a willingness to learn from their experience.
This implied that I attempted to approach the research with an open mind, limiting my
own preconceived ideas and expectations as to the research findings. Silverman (2001)
holds such an approach to be fruitful in moving from what he calls ‘how’-questions to
‘why’ questions. Research which first explores how respondents experience their reali-
ties and which, grounded in these data, develops explanations as to why these realities
are constructed is seen as the most appropriate method for understanding and explaining
real life phenomena. On the other hand, I also made it clear to the company that my
interest was on understanding the organization as a social system and how institutional
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and cultural constraints affect the integration of the different separate organizations. To
establish this focus as a boundary was important in preserving the integrity of the research
study when faced with the demands and interests of stakeholders in the organization.
I will below specify in closer detail the collected material and how the simultaneous
research process proceeded. I will include discussions as to the credibility of this study
and specify the various techniques I have used to fulfill the research criterions applied
within a constructionist grounded theory approach. Detailed specifications of my data
material are below included in a discussion about the qualities of both the data collec-
tion and theoretical analysis. This is to done to reflect that the data collection process
and the development of a theoretical framework occurred simultaneously, as advocated
in grounded theory (Charmaz 2000).
4.2 Research process – Analytical strategies based on
grounded theory
My ontological position in this thesis is one of ‘constructed realities’ as discussed by
amongst others Guba and Lincoln (1985), and Charmaz (2000). It is a position which
emphasizes that it is dubious whether reality exists and can be described as an objec-
tive truth. Realities are rather seen as constructed in the minds of individuals and in the
social interaction between these (Berger and Luckmann 1966). As there are numerous
individuals there is also an infinite number of constructed realities, and hence multiple
realities. None of these realities are exactly similar to one another. For the researcher to
be able to explain a phenomenon which has truth value for herself and others a theory of
consensus needs to be approximated (Hesse 1980). It is intersubjective agreement as to
the constructed reality presented by the researcher which determines the extent of ‘truth’.
Such an ontological position also holds that objectivity in its true form is unattainable.
Not only do the subjects of the inquiry hold multiple constructed realities, but reality
is also constructed in the interaction between the investigator and the investigated. The
interaction between these may cause a biased version of the research findings. How may
the researcher employ analytical strategies and techniques in order to produce a valid
interpretation?
In grounded theory Charmaz (2000) and Guba and Lincoln’s naturalistic inquiry
(1985; 1989), the development of the theoretical framework and subsequent analysis is
viewed as an interplay between the collected data and theory. Within this tradition the re-
searcher approaches the inquiry with a minimum of preconceived ideas and questions to
allow the analysis and theoretical framework to emerge and develop in accordance with
the collected data (Glaser 1992). This stands in contrast to a more traditional approach
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where the theoretical framework, research questions and categories are to be specified
as much as possible before embarking on the data collection. Within grounded theory
the criteria for deeming research findings as trustworthy are credibility, transferability,
dependability and confirmability (Guba and Lincoln 1985; 1989). Guba and Lincoln see
these as corresponding to more conventional criteria such as internal validity, external
validity, reliability and objectivity.
According to Guba and Lincoln, in order to demonstrate credibility I will need to
show that I have represented the multiple constructions of reality in my material ad-
equately. That is, they need to be credible to those who constructed the reality in the
first place; my respondents. The criterion of transferability has two aspects, that of
generalizability and applicability. I need to discuss how the findings in this study are
generalizable to larger populations. My burden of proof as to applicability is limited to
providing thick descriptions (Geertz 1973) of my material and of the time, context and
place of the study. The extent to which this study is applicable and similar to a new
future research setting is then judged by future investigators attempting to replicate the
study. The dependability criterion is met by demonstrating that my research findings
are consistent, that is, that other researcher would arrive at the same conclusions when
conducting the same analysis and data collection. The final criterion of confirmability is
met by providing accounts so that both the source of the data itself and the logic used to
analyze them can be inspected and confirmed by outside reviewers of the study. Below
I will describe how these criteria apply to the research presented in this thesis. In order
to meet these criteria different techniques for data collection and analytical strategies
have been applied.
4.2.1 Credibility
I have sought to increase the likelihood that my findings and interpretations are found to
be credible by applying different techniques in the data collection. I have also attempted
to control for credibility during the process of data collection and analysis. Below I will
discuss the various techniques I have employed and how these may be seen to affect
the credibility of my research. When doing so I will specify in detail both the research
process and the collected data material. I will base the discussion on Guba and Lincoln
1985; 1989, Charmaz 2000 and Seale 1999.
4.2.1.1 Persistent observation
Persistent observation is one of the techniques advocated by Guba and Lincoln (1985;
1989). It involves making sufficient observation and gathering of data to identify the
salient issues which are relevant for the focus of the research. Charmaz (2000) discusses
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the data collection in more detail, emphasizing the usefulness of coding, comparisons
and theoretical sampling. Before I move on to discuss how we applied these techniques,
I will describe in more specific terms the material collected.
Data material
The basic method for our data collection was semi-structured interviews. From December
2000 – September 2003 we1 conducted interviews in Mexico, South Korea, USA, Po-
land, Sweden (2 production units) and Norway (2 production units and head office). We
also conducted a survey based on questionnaires in the South Korean unit in September
2003. We have completed a total of 165 interviews in these units at various levels of the
organization, ranging from the president of the company to production workers in the
different units. In all units we were given unrestricted access to those respondents we
wished to interview. The table below provides an overview of the number of interviews
and the units where they took place.
Most interviews lasted from one to one and a half hours. Each interview began
with an ethics statement which informed the participants of the purpose of the study,
assured them that their participation was voluntary, and provided a guarantee of indi-
vidual anonymity. We also told the respondents that they were free to refuse to answer
any questions they were uncomfortable with. As we were two people present on most
interviews, we were careful to not appear intimidating to the respondent, and we felt that
most interviews were conducted in a relaxed atmosphere. We had predefined roles and
took turns in who led the interview while the other observed and sometimes supplied
additional questions at the end. Since we were able to conduct interviews at most units
several times, the data reflects the development at the plant since the initial interviews.
The interviews were conducted in English, Norwegian/Swedish and Spanish. In Mex-
ico, South Korea and Poland some of the interviews were conducted with the aid of
an external translator. The translator was given information about the company and the
study beforehand so she would understand the context and aim of the interviews. How-
ever, we stressed that her purpose was to translate and asked her to be conscious not
to include interpretations on her own. During the two rounds of interview in Mexico I
was able to understand the conversation between the respondent and the translator and
became assured that the work of at least these two translators was highly satisfactory.
1) Sigrid Damman, social anthropologist, and Gudveig Gjøsund, sociologist, who participated at some of the
interviews in Norway and Sweden.
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Table 4-1 Interviews and questionnaires.
Respondents Norway1 Sweden2 Mexico USA Poland South
Korea
Interviews Dec 2000 Febr 2001 June 2002 Jun 2002 Oct 2001 July 2002
Office workers 7 6 8 5 5 8
Prod. workers 9 11 11 3 12 5
Total 16 17 19 8 17 13
Jun 2001 Aug 2001 Aug 2003 Aug 2003 Jun 2003
Office workers 2 3 7 4 9
Prod. workers 2 4 1 10
Total 2 5 12 5 19
Mar 2002 Jun 2003
Office workers 2 7
Prod. workers 4
Total 2 11
Aug 2003
Office workers 6
Prod. workers 6
Total 12
Questionnaires Sept 2003
Office workers 7
Prod. workers 8
Total 15
Management survey 57 50 2 2 1 1
Total interviews (165) 24 33 31 13 36 28
Total respondents
in questionaires and
survey (113 + 15)
57 50 2 2 1 16
1) Norway includes 2 factories as well as headquarters.
2) Sweden includes 2 factories.
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4.2.1.2 Coding and comparing
Charmaz (2000) recommends that data is coded and compared as it is gathered, and
through these techniques the process of analysis and development of a theoretical frame-
work beins. Within grounded theory one should be prepared to change ones conceptions
and research questions throughout the process and attempt for a continual cycling back
and forth between theory construction and examination of data. As recommended, we
attempted to approach the research with an open stance as to what we would find and
what our respondents would tell us. On the other hand, it is unavoidable to have some
expectations. The test of the matter is whether such preconceptions may be seen to be
altered during the data collection and analysis. The goal is to allow the data to speak
for itself and have the respondents identify what is significant.
At the outset of our investigations my research focus was simple. I wanted to under-
stand how a Norwegian company went about internationalizing and establishing local
units abroad. I expected that there would be challenges involved as they were establishing
organizations in areas unknown to them, socially, culturally and politically. However,
even with such an open focus I also had some expectations as to what our findings would
be. I expected that the company would have difficulties at establishing themselves abroad
as they lacked knowledge about local conditions. I further expected that they would
have a fairly narrow focus on production related issues, and that other more intangible
issues such as culture, social conditions and communication with the local unit would
receive less focus. Such issues would cause difficulties as the company lacked experi-
ence and focus to handle them. I expected that categories such as local culture, political
situation, national laws and regulations would be significant in ordering the challenges
the company faced.
These expectations were to some extent altered as we engaged in the data collection.
The difficulties the organization faced as they established new units abroad were smal-
ler than I had expected at the outset. The lack of knowledge about local conditions was
a smaller obstacle than I had believed beforehand. And while lack of communication
was a problem in the organization, they found means of increasing their communication
through time. And when respondents identified what they found to be most difficult in
the establishment process, the categories they used were related to internal conditions
in the organization such as autonomy, control mechanisms, local initiative, training,
lack of procedures and so forth. This was a different set of categories than what I had
expected to find.
These alterations in my original expectations came forth as a result of coding and
comparing the data. During each round of data collection in a unit we found ourselves
including and omitting issues in the interviews as a result of the emphasis our respon-
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dents had. We discussed and compared the interviews in the afternoons, and sometimes
made alterations the next day in order to follow to a greater extent what the respondents
themselves found significant. The coding and comparing of the data occurred simul-
taneously with the data gathering. After each round of interviews at the various units, the
interviews were transcribed and a more systematic comparison and coding were done.
The coding was then based on what Charmaz call selective or focused coding. We
identified issues which appeared frequently in the material. We also included issues which
only a few people spoke about, but which were considered important either because
of the issue itself or because of the respondents. Some respondents had more experi-
ence of certain areas than others and their statements were therefore considered to be
of greater significance. The comparison of the data was done between the respondents
(organizational positions, functional position, time working in the company, gender and
statements), and situations and incidents (e.g. frequent, seldom, internal to the organiz-
ation locally, related to the relationship with head office). The coding of the data was
conceptual and did not include line by line coding which we found to be too detailed
considering the final data collection of 165 interviews.
When concluding a study in one unit, the data was compared across the different
units, identifying issues which had relevance for more than one unit. We were also able
to compare across time as we did interviews at four of the units (Poland, U.S., Mexico
and the head office) more than once. In South Korea we did a questionnaire survey
which allowed us to compare some of the issues across time. The second round of in-
terviews made it possible to interview some of the respondents twice, and allowed for
comparing their statements across time. This also allowed for what Charmaz (2000) calls
theoretical sampling. We were able to go back to refine the data on issues which were
unclear to us or which we suspected might change through time. As Charmaz holds, a
grounded theory perspective cannot be produced in one-shot interviews. We were also
able to rely on central people in the company (HR Manager and others) to clarify issues
for us both during the data collection and the analysis process. Considering my initial
focus for the research study; understanding the challenges involved in an internation-
alization process, the techniques and activities described above allowed for a refinement
of this focus grounded in the actual experiences of the respondents. It is the categories
which our respondents used which I have attempted to represent in the narrative stories
presented later in this thesis. However, there are also limitations in our approach which
should be acknowledged.
We collected data over a period of three years, and we were able to be present in the
various units at different stages of their development. This gave us an opportunity to study
the development of the company during this time and to gain a greater understanding
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of the challenges the units faced at different stages. I am reluctant to characterize the
research project as longitudinal since three years is a limited time period. To study the
company for a longer time could have revealed more as to how the organization devel-
oped in a longer term perspective. The problematic aspect of studying the local units at
different stages in their development is that our respondents may have been influenced
by the present situation and challenges, and were thus less unable to make reflections
unbiased by present concerns. A comparison between the units may suffer to some
extent because of this. We were not able to analyze and compare the units in terms of
categorizing the different stages they went through and whether there were similarities
or differences between the units on certain stages.
A different limitation concerning the comparison between the different units is that
we did not distinguish between functional areas in the organization. In former research
on the use of control mechanisms in companies, a finding has been related to differ-
ences between functions and departments within the organization. Gates and Egelhoff
(1986) found that the extent of centralization varied across functions. In particular, it was
marketing that was found to be centralized in the automotive industry. I have omitted a
comparison between departments and functions in this thesis as the focus has been on a
more general level: headquarters – subsidiary relationship. However, a closer comparison
between departments could have revealed more as to how the use of control mechanisms
differed between functional areas within the company. This could also have suggested
whether the development of control mechanisms varied between departments in the or-
ganization and whether the use of certain mechanisms was favored in some functional
areas while not in others.
4.2.1.3 Prolonged engagement
Guba and Lincoln (1985) recommend prolonged engagement at the research site. This
is to increase the likelihood that the researcher understands the context of the research
subject and builds trust between herself and the respondents. It is also a means to test
for misinformation induced by the researcher herself or the respondents.
My involvement in the Kongsberg Automotive organization was not merely restric-
ted to conducting interviews at specific times. Before embarking on collecting the data
which is applied in this thesis, we conducted a separate study which involved visiting
the head office and two production units in Norway and Sweden. While the subject mat-
ter – work situation and training needs among production workers2 – was not directly
2) Damman, Sigrid, Gudveig Gjøsund and Tonje Osmundsen (2001): Arbeidssituasjon og opplæringsbehov
hos førstelinjeledere i Kongsberg Automotive. Arbeidsrapport nr. 2/2001, Studio Apertura, NTNU. 50 p.
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relevant for this thesis, it allowed us to gain knowledge about the organization and to
become familiar with people who later became central to our investigations.
Also after we started on the data collection for the thesis, we continuously partici-
pated on other arenas. Our participation at the management course ‘Interdal’ allowed
us to meet with the various Business Area managers, the manager of the Finance De-
partment, the owners (FSN Capital), representatives from other functional departments
(Purchasing and After-Market) as well as the different participants in the course. Some
of these gave presentations which I have been able to use to supply my data. During
the course we were able to spend time with the participants both in the sessions, in the
groups they formed and after hours. We observed the different discussion these partici-
pants had, and were also able to pose questions and initiate discussions ourselves. During
the five weeklong seminars we also visited five of the units in the company (Head office,
Rollag, Hvittingfoss, Pruzkow and the Sales Department in France). Included in these
seminars were also presentations and visits to suppliers and customers in France and
Poland. The observations made during this course have been kept as field notes.
Within the project “Organization and management within the new industry”, (Organ-
isasjon og ledelse i den nye industrien) we have organized a number of seminars where
Kongsberg Automotive and other companies have participated. The agenda in these sem-
inars have been these companies’ challenges related to organization and management
issues. The seminars have allowed us to discuss our findings and interpretations in a
larger forum, and allowed the representatives from the companies to put their interests
on the agenda.
In relation to the investigations in South Korea, we conducted interviews in five
other Scandinavian owned companies. The aim of these interviews was to assert whe-
ther Kongsberg Automotive’s local solutions could be considered standard for other
companies in the area. The material from these companies allows me to have a wider
comprehension of the challenges of foreign companies when faced with South Korean
culture and society (Osmundsen and Damman 2003; Damman and Osmundsen 2003).
Through these activities we gained considerable information about the company and
its organization, and about contextual factors such as the local sites, industry, market
and history of the company. We were also able to build trust with a large number of
people both in Scandinavia and abroad. These people later helped us in our investi-
gations either directly as respondents or in vouching for us in the different units. When
arriving at new units or meeting with new people, we were at times told that they had
heard about us from others, and we found that our role and research study was viewed
positively.
However, despite this, it is impossible to provide a guarantee that our material is
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not flawed with misinformation. Our respondents may have distorted the information
they gave us both intentionally or unintentionally. They may have tried to please us
by giving answers they felt we were searching for, or they may have deliberately tried
to conceal information. It may also be that we ourselves had expectations, values and
preconceptions which introduce distortions in the material and analysis. We have at-
tempted to check for such distortions through other techniques which will be described
below.
4.2.1.4 Triangulation
Triangulation is another technique recommended by Guba and Lincoln (1985), even
though its usefulness for guaranteeing credibility also is disputed (e.g. Seale 1999:
56 – 61). To use various sources, methods or investigators does not make truth any
less constructed within a constructionist approach, and the technique of triangulation
may therefore not serve as a guarantee for a more truthful approach. On the other
hand, to use different sources, methods and investigators in the research study may
help to avoid systematic biases resulting from one type of method, investigator or
source.
While I have relied strongly on respondents as sources in this study, I have also
based the analysis on various informal discussions, telephone conversations, and ple-
nary discussion. Most of these have been recorded as notes. I have had access to
a number of relevant documents such as implementation plans, internal newsletters,
reports, and to a certain extent, minutes from board meetings and other gather-
ings. Kongsberg Automotive is a company which has been in the focus of the
media in recent years and I include various newspaper articles as background infor-
mation. Surveys concerning employee job-satisfaction conducted in 2002 and 2003
encompassing most units in the company are also included. These surveys were cre-
ated and conducted by internal employees in the organization. In March 2003, a
Bachelors student from Studio Apertura (Allforsk3), Roar Bovim, conducted a quan-
titative survey among 113 managers in the company in March 2003. The subject
area was communication and reporting routines in the company worldwide. This
material will serve as background information for the following empirical analy-
sis.
The methods for collecting the data have been mainly based on interviews and ob-
servations as described earlier. In a thesis emphasizing negotiation-processes between
3) Allforsk is today a part of NTNU Social Research Ltd., a research center owned by the Norwegian University
of Science and Technology.
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the central management and the local managers, closer observations of actual nego-
tiations could have been in order. The data material employed provides statements
and descriptions of negotiations rather than actual conversations between representat-
ives from the head office and subsidiaries. Observing the situations where negotiations
took place could have revealed more as to the arguments and approach of the ac-
tors. On the other hand, this would have brought the analysis on a too-detailed level
as my perspective has been on results of the negotiations and development over
time.
I have mainly relied on qualitative data in this study. The analysis and the con-
clusions I draw could have benefited from additional quantitative data. The different
structural variables included in this thesis could have been measured more accurately.
The units’ dependency on the parent company for instance could have been measured
by including amounts of investment, goods transferred and time spent on support
from Scandinavia. However, limitations in time and funds hindered the collection of
such data. Also, the great similarities between the subsidiaries in Kongsberg Auto-
motive suggest that even more accurate measurements would not have revealed much
difference between the units. However, in a similar study including a comparison be-
tween different MNCs such data would have been necessary in order to compare more
accurately.
We were two investigators who did most of the interviews and parts of the data
analysis together. This collaboration allowed for discussions continuously during the
data collection and analysis which revealed misunderstandings, preconceptions and
our different interpretations. An important aspect of the usefulness of these discus-
sions was our different theoretical background from social anthropology and political
science. To collaborate with a peer in such a manner has similarities to a differ-
ent technique which Guba and Lincoln call ‘peer debriefing’. This allows for testing
out the findings and for making explicit the tacit and implicit information the re-
searcher may possess. Even though these authors hold that the peer used for such
debriefing needs to be a person who is not involved in the research, I will still ar-
gue that such cooperation is important for testing out different interpretations and
for arriving at a more mature understanding of the research findings. On the other
hand, Guba and Lincoln warn against emphasizing too much the usefulness of
different investigators as the findings are produced in interaction between the in-
vestigators and the investigated. One may therefore not expect that two or more
researchers can serve as a validation for each other. However, using different in-
vestigators may increase the credibility of the findings as the researchers keep one
another ‘honest’ (Guba and Lincoln 1985: 307). And as argued above, collaborating
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with a peer allows for testing out a greater variety of interpretations and theoretical
perspectives.
Member checks
The most crucial technique for establishing credibility is held to be member
checks (Guba and Lincoln 1985). Member checks allow the respondents to re-
act to the analytical categories, interpretations, and conclusions which emerge
during the research process. We have applied this technique on a number of
occasions.
My colleague, Sigrid Damman, and I wrote internal reports to the company after
each round of interviews. These reports are aggregated summaries of the interviews,
written to provide the head office in Norway and other units in the company with
more information about challenges and problems in the organization while protecting
the identity of our respondents. In addition to a presentation of the interviews and the
statements of our respondents, we have also provided the company with suggestions
for improvements and our interpretations as to the challenges they face. The reports
are considered confidential reports. While these 230 pages of summaries and quotes
from the interviews will serve as background material in this thesis, they will not be
made public without prior consent from Kongsberg Automotive. The reports produced
are:
Damman, Sigrid, Gudveig Gjøsund and Tonje Osmundsen (2003): KA's verdiprosjekt. En
studie av bedriftsinterne verdier og forventninger innen Kongsberg Automotive i Norge,
Sverige, Polen, Sør-Korea, Mexico og USA. Arbeidsrapport 1/2003, Studio Apertura,
NTNU. 43 p.
Damman, Sigrid and Tonje Osmundsen (2002): Culture, Cooperation and Job Satisfac-
tion. Preliminary findings from a study in Kongsberg Automotive, Korea. Arbeidsrapport
nr. 4/2002 Studio Apertura, NTNU. 27 p.
Damman, Sigrid and Tonje Osmundsen (2002): A cultural encounter between Scandi-
navians and Koreans. Arbeidsrapport nr. 3/2002, Studio Apertura, NTNU. 16 p.
Damman, Sigrid and Tonje Osmundsen (2002): Local, global, or…glocal? Report
from a study of current organizational challenges within Kongsberg Automotive Inc.
Arbeidsrapport nr. 2/2002, Studio Apertura, NTNU. 37p.
Damman, Sigrid and Tonje Osmundsen (2002): Kongsberg Automotive’s establishment in
Poland – a process evaluation. Arbeidsrapport nr. 1/2002, Studio Apertura, NTNU. 58 p.
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Damman, Sigrid, Gudveig Gjøsund and Tonje Osmundsen (2001): Arbeidssituasjon
og opplæringsbehov hos førstelinjeledere i Kongsberg Automotive. Arbeidsrapport nr.
2/2001, Studio Apertura, NTNU. 50 p.
All the reports were presented to Kongsberg Automotive. On most occasions this
involved the HR Manager, the President of the company and representatives from the
local unit where we did the study. On other occasions, a larger audience received the
presentation as was the case when we presented the first report on the Polish unit to
the Interdal participants at the seminar in Poland. We received comments on the reports
which concerned both factual mistakes and disagreements as to our interpretations. Fac-
tual mistakes were corrected and in some cases we made some changes as to how a
situation or incident was presented.
This thesis has also been presented to representatives from the company and been
approved as a credible construction and representation of their realities. In addition to
these formal member checks, we were also able to use more immediate and informal
checks during the course of the interviews and while we were visiting the different units.
This allowed us to test our interpretations, and gave the respondents opportunities to
offer additional information or to correct errors.
4.2.2 Transferability
The discussion of qualitative case studies and their generalizability is extensive, see
Seale 1999 for an overview. I follow Guba and Lincoln (1985) in arguing that I need
to provide as thick descriptions of my material as necessary to ensure transferability to
other research settings. This is according to Seale (1999: 108) sufficient to meet threats
to the ‘transferability’ of research findings. Chapters 3, 5, 6 and 7 in this thesis provide
detailed descriptions of the context of my research.
Even though the material is collected from seven different units in the organization
and these units are compared in the analysis, I have not been able to compare with other
international companies. The organization of Kongsberg Automotive may therefore have
certain particularities which have affected both material and subsequent conclusions.
The applicability of my conclusions to a greater population may be questioned. On the
other hand, the research focus I apply in this thesis is concerned with the relationship
between each unit and the head office and is as such a comparative study between the
four different foreign units.
In a more conventional tradition, conditions for randomization and sampling are seen
as central to a discussion of external validity, or what Guba and Lincoln refer to as
transferability. Following these principles in our choice of respondents we aimed for a
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representative sample based on organizational positions, gender, functional area and ex-
perience working for the company. This was seen as essential since the research focus
was to uncover the challenges various internal actors experienced during the internation-
alization process. The perspectives our respondents had were also strongly dependent
on these characteristics. Production workers had much to tell us about challenges related
to the local unit and how they experienced the various organizational structures and sol-
utions in their local work setting. Respondents on a managerial level were in addition
able to offer perspectives related to the cooperation with other units and the head office.
The selection of respondents was based on us choosing who we wished to speak
from a chart of the organization. Administrative personnel then helped us in contacting
these people and asked whether they wished to participate. At the end of each round
of interviews we supplied our sample with additional respondents if we found that we
were lacking respondents of certain characteristics (organizational position, functional
area, gender or experience).
4.2.3 Dependability
The dependability criterion has, according to Guba and Lincoln, other properties than
the more conventional criterion of reliability. Their argument is that while alterations in
methodology and design during the research process would render reliability suspect,
such changes are not seen as threats to dependability. While research in the quantitative
tradition relies on standardization in order to produce reliable results, standardization is
not necessarily a part of the method in qualitative research. Guba and Lincoln choose
to introduce “dependability” as a concept replacing “reliability” because this latter con-
cept is associated with standardization of tools and methods, an approach which these
authors are sceptical towards. In fact, within this methodological tradition alterations
in design and methods during the research process are expected as the researcher de-
velops her inquiry in an interplay with the data. On the other hand, to ensure that the
data may be judged as dependable the logic of the research process and the decisions I
made underway needs to be accessible for others. I’ve already described some of these
changes above, see “Coding and Comparing”.
Another manner of improving the dependability of my research is, as advocated by
Silverman (2001), to have the original raw data available for future replications of my
study. All interviews were thus tape recorded, and these were carefully transcribed. Most
interviews were transcribed by ourselves, but some were done by audio-typists who
we hired. The transcripts were checked afterwards against the original tape recording.
Both tapes and transcripts have been archived to allow for replications. Even though
Silverman (2001) argues that the presentation of my material should include extracts
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of the data, such as statements, I have in this thesis limited the use of statements from
respondents. This has been done to economize the text. On the other hand, the reports
we have earlier produced will be available upon request, even though this will depend
on authorization from Kongsberg Automotive. In addition to this documentation of my
material I have kept field notes when visiting the different units and when engaged in
observations such as during the management course, Interdal.
A different technique proposed by Guba and Lincoln (1985) is that of an inquiry
audit. This has not been applied in this thesis, as this is deemed as too comprehensive
and time consuming for the resources available.
4.2.4 Confirmability
The confirmability criterion concerns the research process and the conclusions I have
drawn. This to assure that my interpretations and findings are results from the research
context and respondents, and not from my own imagination. While replication of the
research has been seen as a plausible assessment in other methodological traditions, it is
viewed as unrealistic in a constructionist paradigm. As this study is concerned with the
development of the internationalization process of an organization it is unrealistic to go
back in time and conduct the same research process over again. It is most unlikely that
the research setting would be same if one were to conduct a new study in Kongsberg
Automotive.
As argued by Seale (1999) a more realistic alternative in order to make sure my
research is confirmable, is to provide an account of procedures and methods. As Seale
holds, this “enables readers imaginatively to ‘replicate’ studies and also helps to ensure
that claims are supported by adequate evidence” (1999: 157 – 158). The descriptions
provided so far in this thesis as to the ideas and theories that informed the study and
of the context of Kongsberg Automotive should make it possible for my readers to
‘imaginatively’ replicate this study.
4.3 Conclusion
Based on the discussion above I will argue that I have met the criteria of credibility,
transferability, dependability and confirmability as advocated within grounded theory
(Guba and Lincoln 1985; 1989; Charmaz 2000). These have been met by relying on a
number of techniques.
I have increased the credibility of my findings through persistent observations which
included a large number of interviews as well as other methods of data collection.
Persistent observations allowed me to study the organization in-depth while the use of
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prolonged engagement in the organization allowed for a comprehensive understanding
of the organization and its context. Triangulation was applied in terms of using different
methods, sources and investigators. While this increases the credibility of my findings
it should also be seen as a way of improving the objectivity of the research as it is also
included as one of Guba and Lincoln’s techniques for achieving confirmability (p. 319).
Member checks are seen as the most crucial technique to produce credible findings
within grounded theory. While not all my respondents were given the opportunity to
respond to my interpretations, a large number of respondents were, and I was able to
make alterations based on their reactions. Based on the discussion above I may safely
conclude that the research finding and analysis produced in this thesis may be seen as
highly credible.
Transferability is another of the criteria proposed within grounded theory (Guba and
Lincoln 1985; 1989). It may be discussed to what extent I as an author am responsible to
prove that my material is transferable to a different, new, and for me, unknown research
setting, but I will follow Seale (1999) in arguing that to provide thick descriptions is
sufficient to meet threats of transferability. Through this chapter, and especially chapters
3, 5, 6, and 7 my research material is described in detail. In addition, I have presented the
material in a number of reports and even if these are considered confidential, they may
be made available upon request. I have also adhered to more conventional traditions fol-
lowing conditions for randomization and sampling in the choice of respondents. Based
on these characteristics of both process and data material I hold that there my material
is sufficiently generalizable and transferable.
The dependability criterion has similarities to what is earlier termed reliability. While
reliability in conventional research is seen as dependent on the stability of the research
design over time, the dependability criterion is rather met by making explicit the changes
occurring during the research process. These have been discussed above. To strengthen
the dependability of my research also involves making the raw data available for future
replications, in this case; tapes, transcripts, field notes and other documents. Having fol-
lowed these techniques I may conclude that my research presented in this thesis meets
the criterion of dependability.
The final criterion of confirmability is met by providing accounts of the research pro-
cess and methods so that my readers may be able to imaginatively replicate this study.
I have through this chapter and to some extent also elsewhere in this thesis, provided
such an account to ensure that my research may be confirmable.
Are my research findings trustworthy? I will argue that both the material which has
been collected and the manner in which it has been analyzed and presented should be
deemed as having truth value for the research questions posed in this thesis. It has truth
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value for the context of Kongsberg Automotive during its period of internationalization
and for a theoretical understanding of how the relationship between head office and
subsidiaries develop in international companies. The criteria for making such an as-
sessment have here been specified in accordance with grounded theory. These criteria
correspond to more conventional measurements such as internal and external validity,
reliability and objectivity. On the other hand, one may still argue that there is room for
improvement. As discussed above, an inclusion of more quantitative data could have
improved the comparability of this study to earlier research on head office – subsidi-
ary relations. It may have allowed for stronger assessments as to the implications of
my findings on prevalent theories. Also, if I had been able to study the company for a
longer time and included other companies undertaking an internationalization process,
my research could have revealed more as to internationalization processes and how such
developments affect different types of organizations. This could have allowed for a com-
parison between stages of internationalization and its effect on head office – subsidiary
relations. As it is, these are shortcomings which should be amended in future studies as
I have been limited by funds and time to do so here.
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5 The local organizations in Mexico and the U.S.
5.1 Introduction
The proceeding chapter will focus on the U.S. and Mexican unit in Kongsberg Auto-
motive. In order to do so, I will present the organizations in Mexico and the U.S. as
distinct entities, but their development is intertwined and needs to be seen in a larger
picture involving the relationship between these two units, as well as to the Norwegian
headquarters and the R&D and Purchasing departments in Sweden. The U.S. and the
Mexican units together form Kongsberg Automotive’s North American operations, here
referred to as Kongsberg Automotive Inc. The following material is based on two visits
to both units, in 2002 and 2003, as well as discussions with representatives from these
sites on other occasions. Representatives from the head office in Norway have also been
interviewed.
While the US unit was earlier part of Scandmec which Kongsberg Automotive bought
in 1996, the Mexican unit was established greenfield in 1999. The US unit which had
formerly employed 115 people was in 1999 – 2000 reduced to 15, and the Mexican unit has
increased from approx. 80 employees to over 300 in 2003. The strategy for establishing
the Mexican unit was to carbon copy production processes and organization structures
from the US unit and well-established units in Scandinavia. However, attempts were also
made to adapt these processes and structures to a local context. Both units have been
headed by different managers through the past years and they have demonstrated differ-
ent approaches towards the local employees and in their relations with the head office.
While the main emphasis in both units have been to manage the daily business at the
local site, there have also been important challenges related to coordination of supplies
from Europe, technical support from Sweden and the cooperation between the US and
Mexico. Below, I will outline the development of both units in terms of how internal
conditions have changed, and how their relationship to other units in the company has
evolved.
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The U.S. unit of Kongsberg Automotive Inc. includes a design department, prototype
department, sales and accounting functions which support those existent in Mexico. The
sales department relates mainly to the Business Area Seat Comfort, but also to a cer-
tain extent to Gearshifts. Sales to the North American market amounted to 164 million
NOK in 2003, a growth of 84% from the previous year. This is mostly due to increased
market share in the US for seat heating. The Mexican unit is a production facility for
seat heaters. The plant is situated in the Rio Grande area on the border between the US
and Mexico, profiting from the duty free customs regime in the area. The plant receives
its orders, as well as prototypes and designs from the U.S. Both units cooperate closely
with the central purchasing department and R&D centre situated in Mullsjø, Sweden.
The main suppliers for both units are situated in Europe, while the main customers are
US car manufacturers in Mexico or the US.
The U.S. unit was acquired in 1996, when Kongsberg Automotive decided to buy one
of its competitors, Scandmec, who had established themselves in Sweden and the U.S.
The U.S. unit had been established six years prior to the acquisition. The prospects for
the unit were promising at the time of the takeover, but after three years the plant was
running at a loss. This situation continued up to 1999, when Kongsberg Automotive
got new owners, Industri Kapital, who were prepared to make significant changes in
the organization. In 1999, Kongsberg Automotive Inc. had lost US$1.4, and the cen-
tral management in Norway decided that some radical change would have to be made;
otherwise they were prepared to close down the US business.
The Mexican unit was thus established in 1999. The production in the U.S. was
transferred to the Rio Grande area, leaving design, prototype development and sales in
Mexican unit
U.S unit 
Norwegian HQ R&D, purchasing, 
Sweden 
Figure 5-1 Kongsberg Automotive Inc.
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the U.S. The manager of the U.S. unit retained the main responsibility for the Mexican
operations and the Scandinavian plant manager in Mexico reported directly to him.
5.2.1 Moving production to Mexico
The major reason why production was moved to Mexico was the cost level development
in the United States. Workers’ wages had been steadily increasing. This was creating
difficulties for the whole automotive industry, and increasingly companies were forced
to either close down or shift their production to cheaper areas.
However, the losses were not caused by external factors alone. Respondents claimed
that there was a level of mismanagement within the U.S. unit, which was seriously ag-
gravating its problems. The top management was mainly recruited from Sweden, and
was seen to have only limited knowledge about how to do business ”the American
way”. Some respondents also indicated that the US had been a “dumping ground” for
Scandinavian managers who were of limited success, but who could not be fired due
to Swedish work legislation1. According to the respondents, the conditions in the U.S.
plant before 2000 were somewhat chaotic. While the management was enjoying ex-
tensive personal privileges, they failed to follow up, both when it came to customers
and to internal conditions. We were told that parts of the management came in late in
the morning and left early, and failed to give proper supervision to their subordinates.
1) Our respondents are here describing the time-period where Scandmec owned the local unit, and to some
extent conditions after the take over of Kongsberg Automotive.
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Take over of 
Scandmec. 
Scandinavian 
management. 
Establishment of the 
Mexican unit. 
Scandinavian 
management. 
New top-manager 
in the U.S. 
Mexican 
plant 
manager in 
Reynosa. 
New Scand. 
top manager 
in the U.S.  
Expansion of  
the Mexican 
plant 
From a 
’push’ to a 
’pull’ 
system in 
production
Figure 5-2 Timeline of development in Kongsberg Automotive Inc.
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Differences in customer expectations and the manner of doing business in the U.S. vs.
Europe were also seen as plausible explanations as to why the Scandinavian managers
had limited success. Several respondents described the “U.S. way” of doing business as
less ethical and less trustworthy than in Europe. Payment terms was used as one example
where American customers would look for excuses for not paying on time, and that
they would seize on anything – make unreasonable complaints about e.g. quality and
delivery time – as a reason to delay while Scandinavians would tend to respect their
contracts. According to the respondents the Scandinavian managers failed to recognize
this difference and it had affected their customer relations negatively - sometimes with
loss of opportunities and unnecessary problems as an end result. It was also indicated that
American customers often expect a different kind of “packaging” than their European
counterparts. Image and major goals were seen as more important than exact details.
Some respondents felt that this was something the Scandinavians should pay closer at-
tention to, both when it came to face-to-face interaction and production of brochures
like the annual report. Furthermore, it was claimed that because Scandinavian managers
were used to follow-up with customers through the internet and on the phone due to
the distances in Europe, they did not realize that since the U.S. customers were in rela-
tive proximity in the Detroit area, these customers expected interaction in the form of
meetings and visits at their plants.
5.2.2 Developments in the U.S. unit
In 1999, one of Kongsberg Automotive’ most important suppliers, TRW2, had moved
their production to Mexico, with promising results. And as soon as the new owners of
Kongsberg Automotive were in position to give the go, the transfer process started. In-
itial decisions and contracts were made in April, and by August-September the company
started its production in Mexico. The production in the U.S. was gradually reduced, and
at the beginning of 2001 it was closed down. Only prototype production remained. A
unit which once counted as many as 115 people was reduced to 15, whereas 4 remained
as production workers in the prototype department.
The move to Mexico also entailed larger changes in the U.S. unit in terms of manage-
ment. A new manager for Kongsberg Automotive Inc. was hired, this time from outside
of the company through a recruitment agency. This was unusual as the company nor-
mally relies on internal resources. The new manager was a person with long experience
from the automotive industry and from earlier turn-around operations in other companies
2) TRW Automotive is a North American company supplying electronic components. See also: http://www.
trw.com
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around the world. He was by birth Belgian but had lived and worked in the US for many
years. With the shutdown of production, the management group was naturally reduced.
In addition the new local manager found it necessary to replace certain people, because
of the alleged lack of discipline. New managers were hired, all with experience from
the U.S. automotive business. They were also seen to have the ambitions and discipline
their predecessors had been lacking. Four to five months after these changes Kongsberg
Automotive Inc. started breaking even.
According to the respondents, the change in management had an important influence
on the internal environment at the U.S. unit. The new top-manager brought in a more
visible leadership style than earlier and the former complaints as to a larger empha-
sis on customer relations seemed to have been resolved. Even though, the respondents
maintained that they felt their colleagues in Scandinavia and the central management in
Norway did not fully understand the differences of doing business in the US. Since the
Scandinavians were no longer a part of the internal organization in the U.S. the continu-
ous barrier towards “an American way” to do business was now seen to come from the
Norwegian headquarters. The argument was that Kongsberg Automotive was still too
“Scandinavian” in their strategies, meaning too cautious and not willing to recognize
the potential in the North American market. The management group in the U.S. could
be seen to engage in a unison mission to bring their message across to the head office,
pushing for company growth in the U.S. As stated earlier the new local manager in the
unit had brought more visible leadership and this was followed by increased commit-
ment to the company in the U.S. management group. This was a commitment which was
visible both in terms of a common perception of the challenges the unit faced in relation
to the Norwegian management and owners, but also in terms of a personal engagement
and ownership in the future of the U.S. unit.
Regarding internal relations, several of our respondents described themselves as a
“family” and referred to the informal atmosphere and a sense of togetherness among
the employees. However, there were also visible conflicts especially between the
small group of prototype workers and the managers. The new emphasis and focus on
customer and external relations seemed to have been followed by a neglect of the
internal environment in the organization. Specifically the prototype workers felt ig-
nored by the local manager in the sense that he did not show involvement in their
work, and they did not feel free to approach him. There had been cases where em-
ployees felt decisions concerning their jobs had been made without due consultation
or notice, and where they felt that their opinions and suggestions were not valued.
The local manager emphasized customer relations and was engaged in the estab-
lishment of the new production unit in Mexico. However, this was time consuming
81
Kongsberg Automotive Inc.
and problems with internal communication and internal relations in the U.S. unit
ensued.
5.2.3 Establishing the Mexican unit
The establishment of the Mexican unit was a parallel process to the changes within the
U.S. unit. The transfer of production from the U.S. to Mexico was undertaken by North
Americans and Scandinavians, and the main strategy was to carbon copy the production
processes and structures from the unit in the U.S. and those in Scandinavia. The new
unit was set up under the so-called “maquila” program.
5.2.3.1 Maquila-program
The maquila program is a special customs regime which allows the participating company
– the maquiladora – to temporarily import into Mexico on a duty-free basis machinery,
materials, parts and other items needed for the assembly or manufacture of goods for
subsequent export. The original purpose of the maquiladoras was to absorb excess labor
along the US-Mexican border, and to encourage Mexican exports. Today, the foreign-
funded maquila industry is considered to be the most important factor in the Mexican
economy, with an annual growth rate that has been sustained at 10% for the past 10 years.
In 2001, there were as many as 3450 maquila companies, employing several hundred
thousand workers. Top maquiladoras include major electronics companies, like Sony,
Philips, and Samsung, as well as key actors in the automotive business, such as Delphi,
Lear and Ford. For most of the foreign parent companies it is a framework whereby they
can take advantage of relatively inexpensive Mexican labor, while remaining in close
proximity to the US market. In order to take advantage of the duty-free access to Mexico
the maquiladora needs to comply with a number of regulatory measures. The maquila
program includes standard contracts and specifications as to wage levels, health and
safety requirements, reporting to the Mexican authorities etc. Kongsberg Automotive es-
tablished themselves in short distance from one of their most important supplier, TRW,
and was in some areas able to draw from their experience.
5.2.3.2 Transferring production
Interviewed in retrospect, members of the management both in Norway and Mexico
indicated that several fundamental mistakes were made during the transfer. This was in
part attributed to the Scandinavian in charge of the move who did not follow advice
from the head office, as well as other mistakes related to the attempt to carbon copy
the production system. Still, the overall impression was that the transfer of production
to Mexico was relatively smooth and occurred without major delays with orders. The
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Scandinavian in charge of the move and of the Mexican unit after establishment had
limited knowledge about Mexico. On the other hand, he was supported by the advice of
TRW situated close by. The central management in Norway stated that they felt confi-
dent that local conditions were well handled. In addition the maquila program provided
standards and contracts which reduced the uncertainty in terms of salaries, health and
safety and other requirements.
The establishment of the Mexican plant was to a large extent viewed as a move of
production from the U.S. unit, and the strategy was to use the same machines and pro-
duction processes as earlier. Also, the technical infrastructure was copied, mainly based
on the SAP system that is in use in the totality of the company. The system allows for
standardized reports on a number of areas in production and accounting, and provides
information to the individual subsidiary about the other units.
5.2.3.3 SAP and administration systems.
Few problems seemed to be associated with the implementation and use of SAP in
Mexico. While several respondents held that the formal training they had received on
the system had been inadequate, the system was still seen as an efficient and useful tool.
All respondents said they were able to utilize the system for their everyday tasks without
much problem. None of the respondents felt the system hindered or complicated in an
unduly manner how they performed their tasks, but rather they argued that the system
saved time as it could easily provide them with the information they were in search of.
However, they also held that when they had questions regarding the functioning of the
system, no one in the Mexican organization had sufficient knowledge to provide support.
At times they were able to solve the problems by consulting people in the U.S. organiz-
ation, but the employees in the U.S. was also seen to be lacking in-depth knowledge of
the system. They were therefore dependent on consulting colleagues in the Scandinavian
units, and in particular those working with the SAP system in Mullsjø. However, time
differences could at times complicate the matter as these people were not necessarily
available when the difficulties arose.
While SAP was used to improve the communication flow between the Mexican and
U.S. unit, it was not seen as sufficient for their interaction as later events illustrates. It
could not replace the usefulness of an intranet which employees in both units argued they
were in need of. An intranet was therefore later implemented without the knowledge of
the central management, but I will get back to these issues farther below.
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5.2.3.4 The local organization.
During the first months of establishing the plant, resources for technical support and
training were provided from U.S. engineers and operators who went to Mexico on several
occasions and stayed for weeks at a time. The initial training of the production workers
took place in groups. Since one of the operators from the U.S. was Mexican-American
this reduced some of the language problems.
In line with a well established policy in the company, production in Mexico started
under a manager with ample experience within the company, and with close relations
to the central management in Norway. The central management argued that it was
necessary to have an initial leadership who could exert a certain control and secure that
Kongsberg Automotive’s policies were well established in the subsidiary. In the case
of the unit in Mexico this meant that both the plant manager and the controller were
Swedes. The production workers were mostly female, young and uneducated Mexicans
who had moved from poorer regions in the south to find work in the north. Neither the
plant manager nor the controller was able to speak Spanish. Hence, there was a serious
language barrier. This limited the Swedish manager’s ability to oversee and control the
work, and hindered the communication between the management and the production
workers, who hardly spoke any English.
The structure of the new organization was less ‘lean’ than what the central management
in Norway had wanted, but it was considered a necessary adjustment to local conditions
to have more of a “hierarchy” than in Norwegian or Swedish plants. The Scandinavian
plant manager had two production managers answering to him. These, in turn, were in
charge of four supervisors, who also were considered parts of the management group.
While the transfer of production was considered to run fairly smoothly, allowing for an
initial period of adjustment, with time it became clear that the productivity and quality
was not reaching the expected level.
Explanations that were given for this situation centered on communication problems
between the foreign managers and the Mexican employees, as well as on how certain
middle managers handled their responsibilities. The language barrier between the local
manager and the rest of the employees caused problems. The failure to speak Spanish was
seen as a part of the reason for why examples of mismanagement were not discovered
early enough. These examples include embezzlement by a middle manager and a bad
working relationship between workers and managers. Both Scandinavian and Mexican
respondents stated that certain middle managers had been reluctant to do tasks they con-
sidered below their position, and this caused difficult relations between the managers
and production workers. However, the argument presented to the central management in
Norway was that managers in Mexico would lose authority if they got too involved in
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production and did menial tasks. On the other hand, most of the Mexican respondents we
interviewed stated that they lacked trust in the capability of these managers and argued
that their attitudes created a gap between the workers and the management.
To the central management, the failure to reach expected results had been explained
by referring to the production workers. Most were unskilled women, with limited edu-
cation. Many were also migrant workers, who had traveled to the border area from
poorer regions, like that of Vera Cruz in the south. Because of their background, they
were considered to lack socialization into an “industrial culture”, and to be of limited
capacity when it came to training and the need for quality improvements.
In addition, the company experienced very high turnover, a problem well known in
the maquiladoras. People would quit on a very short notice and many would not show
up after major holidays. As the central management saw it, there was a high turnover
because many of the women were migrant workers who were firmly tied to their home
communities which they visited on holidays. It was also argued that these workers did not
feel loyalty to their contracts or to the company as such. In the eyes of the local Mexican
management, workers also had attempted to hide mistakes and scrap in production and
that a focus on production improvement did not have the desired results. In response to
these problems the local manager decided to consult the workers and simply ask what
they felt could improve the situation. The suggestions from the workers concerned wel-
fare arrangements and internal communication at the plant. In direct response to these
suggestions free transportation to work was provided, the canteen facilities improved
and more men were hired (!). However, little was done to address the communication
problems and the social relations at the plant.
The high turnover continued, but as argued by several respondents this is a common
problem to all maquiladoras. There is an abundance of work in the Rio Grande area as
most maquiladoras are situated here, and while the standards are set by the maquila pro-
gram, there are some differences in salaries and welfare arrangements. The introduction
of the welfare arrangements mentioned above brought the company in line with other
maquiladoras but there were no major advantages of working in Kongsberg Automotive
Inc. that distinguished the company from others in the area. There are few advancement
opportunities for workers in most of these companies, and workers may gain a slightly
higher salary or better benefits by shopping around in the different maquiladoras. Fur-
thermore, many workers in the Rio Grande area have migrated from Vera Cruz, one of
Mexico’s poorer regions in the south. Several of our respondents were young girls who
had left their children behind with their mother, and migrated 15- 16 hours to the north to
find work. As most workers had only 5 days of vacation each year they were seldom able
to see their families, and when they did go home some were of course reluctant to go back.
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In addition, it was argued by the production workers that the company did not seem
like a proper maquiladora. There were few employees compared to other companies,
and the physical premises were small and untidy. It seems that some of the workers
doubted the seriousness of the company and preferred to find one which they believed
would be around for a longer time.
5.2.4 Changes in the Mexican unit
When the new manager was hired in the U.S. unit he also initiated changes in the lo-
cal management of the Mexican unit. A Mexican plant manager was hired, replacing
the Swedish manager. The new plant manager had ample background from the auto-
motive business and was considered an expert when it came to quality and improvement
techniques. Other middle managers were also replaced.
5.2.4.1 Altering the production processes and organization structures
The local management who were in place at the time of our study had other explanations
for the initial problems with productivity, quality and turnover. The above mentioned at-
titude of certain managers was considered a plausible explanation, as well as the language
barrier between the Mexicans and the foreigners. Still, the most important explanation
according to these respondents was that the organization structure and the production
system did not accommodate the education level and social situation of the production
workers. The organization structure had two levels of managers between the production
workers and the plant manager. The Mexican local manager argued that this hierarchical
structure had complicated communication and the flow of information in the organiz-
ation. Neither did the production system imported from the U.S. and Scandinavia as a
carbon copy have the desired effects in the Mexican context.
The system copied was a so-called “push”-system. The machines situated at the be-
ginning of the production line were set on the basis of abstract calculations as to what
and how many parts one must produce per hour in order to achieve the target. Hence,
the pace set by the initial machines is supposed to determine the tempo further down the
line, where operators and equipment adjust to follow up and present the right amount
of high-quality products in the other end. There is a relatively high amount of work-in-
progress, since you have to be on the ‘safe side’ vis-à-vis problems that may crop up
as the unfinished part is received down the line. In contrast, a so-called “pull”-system
is one wherein the production schedule is the customer requirement itself, which is
given to the final process supervisors in the assembly. This group, then, will somehow
act on the customer’s behalf, ordering for ‘supplies’ from their lines. These orders are
carried ‘backwards’ in such a way that each operator must request a certain number of
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approved items from the prior station, in order to be answerable to the ‘customer’ who
is next to him or her along the line. This requires less administration, in that orders are
passed directly from each chain in the production to the next. According to our Mexican
respondents it may make for better quality, in that the end producers set the time and
numbers, and it is associated with the concept of “just-in-time”, since you are likely to
have less work-in-progress than in a regular “push”-system.
According to the local manager, the “push”-system had been less effective in the
new unit in Mexico, because it required more administration and made for less owner-
ship and participation from the workers than a “pull”-system would do. The language
barrier and the lack of education and work experience within the Mexican organization
made the introduction of a “push”-system extra difficult. And the lower degree of own-
ership and participation that followed was to no advantage when it came to turnover
reduction. The poor living conditions and poverty among the production workers made
it difficult to implement the same procedures and production system as in Scandinavia.
As the top manager explained, Mexican workers had difficulties concentrating on their
job because they would worry about how they would get money for food for the family
the same day, while Scandinavian workers would not have the same basic concerns.
Hence, the production system and the procedures in Mexico would be better adapted
to these conditions if one were able to prevent mistakes from happening than relying
on documentation and training that would demand full concentration from each worker.
Hence, quality issues needed to be handled in a different manner than in Scandinavia.
In cooperation with the local manager in the U.S. unit, the new manager in Mexico
introduced the “pull”-system and changed the organizational structure. Two of the for-
mer organization levels were eliminated and team leaders recruited from the production
workers themselves replaced the former supervisors. According to the production work-
ers these were positive changes, which also entailed improved communication and social
relations at the plant. Furthermore, the small size of the organization was now viewed as
an advantage in that it allowed for advancement opportunities for the workers, something
uncommon in most maquiladoras.
5.2.4.2 A different management style
The new local manager also introduced a different management style. The Mexican
respondents, production workers as well as managers, stated that the fact that the plant
manager was Mexican had improved the situation. He not only spoke their language
but was also familiar with local cultural codes. In addition some respondents stressed
that other factors such as personality and use of different communication forms also
were a part of the picture. In contrast to the previous manager, he was often seen in the
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production hall following up on production. He advocated an open door policy encour-
aging the employees to come with positive or negative feedback directly to him. As
mentioned above, new practices when it came to participation and responsibility from
the workers were also introduced, both through the “pull” system and the recruitment
of team leaders. Also, opportunities to increase their salaries by passing exams or tests
were introduced. Other, more symbolic efforts included a photogram of the organization
with pictures of all the employees, and improved ‘canteen’ facilities with free lunch for
the workers. Several respondents also made reference to a mutual "flexibility", whereby
workers accepted to work extra hours when the need arose, and the management in turn
was flexible when it came to advance payment in times of need, sick leave, and the
like. This implicit agreement which developed as the communication and trust between
managers and workers gradually improved, allowed for more time allocated to quality
improvement, and amongst other things, the development of a new testing machine.
This machine was locally developed and according to our respondents able to detect
more quality errors than its Swedish forerunner, and better suited to the conditions at
this particular plant. However, the head office did not approve of such locally developed
solutions as more variations in technical solutions made it difficult to provide support
and service to the various subsidiaries.
5.2.4.3 Cooperation with other units
At the time of the second study, fourteen months later, drastic changes had occurred in
the Mexican unit. Six months earlier they had expanded the plant facilities to double
size, and hired 150 new employees. This happened as a result of increased orders from
customers and was considered necessary to meet these orders. However, it had been a
chaotic time period where too much had happened at once. Because of the war in the
Middle East, customers in North America increased their orders to have a buffer in case of
anticipated logistical problems. This came on top of already high volumes. The war also
affected transportation of supplies to the Mexican plant and caused delays in shipments
from Europe. There was no time to train the new employees above a minimum level, and
quality issues ensued with delayed deliveries to important customers. At the same time
both the Mexican and the U.S. unit underwent an audit in relation to the certification of
the QS9000 with a disappointing result. They failed in the contract review, the auditor
discovered incomplete specifications on several customer contracts. At the time of our
study, Kongsberg Automotive Inc. was on probation with the QS9000. These problems
had seriously put the relationship between the U.S. and the Mexican unit at a test, and
the central management in Norway had intervened by replacing the local manager in
the U.S. unit.
88
5 The local organizations in Mexico and the U.S.
Our second study took place after the major summer holidays in Scandinavia and for
most of the respondents in Mexico and the U.S. this had caused severe delays in their own
work. They stated that when the plant in Sweden is to be the “center of excellence” and
they have to rely on them for support, it became difficult when this ‘center’ is practically
shut down for four weeks. Besides the problems with summer holidays in Scandinavia,
most respondents said that the logistics between the various units were not too difficult.
However, because of the high orders and the following challenges during the first half
of 2003, earlier problems with logistics now came more to the fore. Some respondents
held that there were wrong specifications on orders and problems as to shipments. We
were told that because the different people who were involved in making the orders were
situated in Mexico, U.S. and Sweden, the coordination was not always at its best and
that this could cause misunderstandings and wrong orders. These problems were made
worse by the fact that when materials arrived it was often too late to take corrective
actions as new supplies would take too long to get.
There had been initiatives to search for North American suppliers. These initiatives
were motivated by the need to reduce the costs of production in Mexico. Use of local
suppliers would reduce the transportation costs, as well as time and risk of delays, so
that one could run the plant with smaller inventories. While the policy was to use the
same suppliers for all units this was considered more important in terms of materials for
production than for example for tools or machine parts which were bought in smaller
quantities. Even so, at the time of our second study, there had not been much progress in
this area. Still, notwithstanding the improvement potential when it came to inventories
and supplies, most respondents claimed that the most serious coordination challenges
evolved around deliveries. Here, too, lack of updated specifications seemed to form part
of the problem. Although some of this responsibility had been transferred to the US,
most major revisions were still to be handled in Sweden. From there, we were told that
they are not always communicated on to Mexico in time.
Some respondents, both in Mexico and the US, held that it was at times difficult to
attain the support they needed from Sweden. It took time to get the support and they
used too much effort to obtain it. Some felt that internal politics was the main reason for
this. According to one respondent, there had been a marked change in attitude: In the
past, the unit in the U.S. was not perceived as a competitor to the Swedish production
plants, but as a unit established mainly to serve the American market. Now, the expan-
sions in Poland and other parts of the world, and the success in Mexico could appear
threatening for the Swedish employees. Hence according to some respondents there was
a tendency to push foreign subsidiaries towards the lower end of the priority list, and
serve domestic needs first.
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It is important to note, however, that others did not agree. While indicating that a
trace of protectionism might be present among the production workers in Sweden, other
respondents stated that support might be more difficult to obtain for foreign subsidiaries
simply because the Swedes, like all people, would prioritize those who were physically
present and that it was easier to ignore an e-mail than someone standing in your office.
Another result of what was seen as internal politics was that the “Center of Excellence”
status of the plant in Sweden positioned this production unit as the best, and conferring
the message to the other plants that they “have to follow” Sweden and “cannot act
without their approval”.
Several respondents felt that the problems of coordination and communication be-
tween the units could be alleviated if there was more interaction between the respective
departments, for instance if a representative from purchasing could spend more time
in the US and/or Mexico. This way, prospective local suppliers could also have been
evaluated more effectively. A recently established “core manufacturing team” was by
the respondents considered a more promising development than the “Center of Excel-
lence”. The core manufacturing team is a forum where the respective plant managers
within the business area meet every six months, with the purpose of exchanging ideas
and experiences. This forum is considered promising precisely because it can allow for
exchange on more equal terms, while also facilitating exchange on a more informal
basis, so that problems and ideas may be dealt with at the very moment they arise. On
the other hand, at the time of our first study some respondents also related the supply
and delivery problems to an acknowledged lack of resources in the Mexican materials
department. This department had been strengthened by one more person only a few
weeks prior to our first visit, but at the time of the second study the problems seemed
to have continued. Now, our respondents had other explanations for the problems than
what they had offered earlier and they were now emphasizing cultural differences as
the main explanation. I will describe these problems as I later discuss the relationship
between these two units, first some additional notes on the development of the internal
organizations in Mexico and the U.S.
5.2.5 The expansion of the Mexican plant
While denied by the management, there were indications from production workers that
the very high increase in new employees has caused a larger distance between workers
and management. Whether this was only a result of the high increase in new employees
is hard to assess. But the expansion of the plant facilities, the high orders and the short
time left for training of new employees had demanded full efforts from both workers
and managers. And according to both production workers and managers, there were
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some employees among the white collars who did not fulfill their responsibilities and
in a time period with much stress this had become more visible. Indirectly referring
to these people, the plant manager said that in the maquila industry many people had
been trained by U.S. companies whose tendency is to provide specified directives to
the Mexican managers, leaving little room for initiative. According to him, it was less
interesting for a company like Kongsberg Automotive to hire such people because they
were dependent on having people who had initiative and could work independently.
A few weeks prior to the second study, a Swede had been employed as logistics
manager and logistics were the one department who had had the greatest difficulties
during the last months. He had already employed a new manager who was going to
replace one of the people who allegedly did not fulfill his job. So at the time of our
study, measures had already been taken to improve the situation internally, and we were
told other changes were also on the way. According to the Swedish logistisc manager
and others among the white collars, the time when the local plant manager could have
complete overview over production and be involved in most decisions had changed.
The unit and the production were now too large and there had to be changes involving
better coordination through scheduled meetings and more delegation of responsibility
to lower level managers.
Despite the difficult period which had passed there were few complaints among the
production workers, most of them were positive to the enlargement of the plant and the
fact that it increasingly seemed as more of a ‘proper’ maquiladora, indicating that the
company had a serious and long-term perspective. Discussing the high increase in new
employees most of the production workers were concerned about the lack of training,
but this was a problem also acknowledged by the local management who were prepared
to provide more training as soon as it was possible. According to the local manager,
earlier new employees had been trained by the team leaders, but during the expansion
period their capacity was not sufficient so operators who were considered good and ex-
perienced had been promoted to trainers. On the positive side, the expansion had led to
a strengthened focus on HSE3 and a nurse had been employed at the plant. While lack of
time and resources had characterized the last half a year, the former ‘open door’ policy
between workers and managers had been preserved. Like before, the team leaders would
approach the management on behalf of workers in their team and our respondents agreed
that they were taken seriously and that the management would listen to them. Despite
having gone through several months of high orders and turmoil at the plant there were no
major complaints about internal conditions. However, several stated that a major reason
3) HSE; health, safety and environment.
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for the problems during this time period had been lack of resources and time, but this
had mostly affected the relationship between the U.S. unit and the Mexican plant.
5.2.6 Changes in the U.S. unit
The local manager in the U.S. unit left his job a couple of months prior to our second
study. This was due to communication problems and divergent opinions between him
and the central management in Norway. These problems concerned especially what was
referred to as an “extreme customer orientation”. After the period of expansion and the
problems that ensued, he was now considered the wrong man on the job. He lost the
responsibility of the Mexican plant in November 2002, and the Mexican unit thereafter
reported directly to the Business Area Manager in Sweden. Only a few days prior to
our study a new local manager had arrived to the U.S. unit. He was a Norwegian with
long experience within Kongsberg Automotive. He had until recently had the responsi-
bility for the Business Area Truck and was considered to have more strength in terms
of technical expertise than the former manager.
There had been other changes in the U.S. unit as well, the design department had
been strengthened in terms of two new employees and some other employees had been
replaced. This is a change which can be seen as a result of the ongoing pressure from the
U.S. unit that the products demanded by North American customers needs to be different
than those in Europe. The design department had more resources to accommodate the
specifications from their North American customers and was less dependent on the R&D
department in Sweden. The six months prior to our second study had been a difficult
period for both the Mexican and the U.S. unit. There had been delays and mistakes on
the deliveries to the customers, and in both units a part of this problem was explained
by lack of procedures and work instructions. As a result there had been efforts to trans-
late and adapt instructions from Sweden to a North American context. However, our
respondents recognized that this had taken a lot of effort as much of the instructions
and procedures needed much adaptation before they could function properly in the new
context.
Few of the employees had been able to talk to the new Norwegian local manager
yet, but were positive to the change and seemed to have high expectations. One of the
issues the production workers in particular, were focusing on was that they hoped that
internal relations in the plant could now be improved. As mentioned above, this was
an area that had been partly neglected by the last local manager in the U.S. This was a
neglect which according to our respondent had deteriorated and was now also seen to
affect the quality of the design of the products. While the design department had been
strengthened, the communication between the prototype workers and the designers had
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deteriorated, and was seen as one of the reasons as to the problems between the Mexican
and the U.S. unit. The production workers hoped that the technical expertise of the new
manager was going to be helpful in improving the communication between them and the
designers because, as they argued, an important reason for the problems the past half a
year were related to designs that were too difficult or impossible to mass produce. Also
other employees, who were not part of sales or design, felt that the internal relations
at the plant could improve. These people felt that they were not involved enough or
did not receive adequate information. However, also according to these respondents the
most difficult issues the past months were related to communication and the passing of
information between the Mexican and the U.S. unit.
5.2.7 Relations between the Mexican and the U.S. unit
At the time of our first study, the respondents in the US unit saw difficulties with ship-
ments from Mexico as a major problem. According to these respondents shipments from
Mexico to customers were delayed, sent to wrong customers, with wrong parts and wrong
specifications. As mentioned above, several respondents from the US unit felt that lack
of support from Sweden attributed to this problem, but a majority still indicated that the
root of the problem was to be found in Mexico. This was explained by too few resources
in the Mexican unit and that time pressure and stress caused these errors. At this time
nobody questioned neither the competence of the Mexican employees nor their willing-
ness to cooperate. Rather the argument was that if the Mexican unit had more resources
and hence, also time to visit customers and build relations directly with the customers,
the situation would improve. A desire to get more in touch with the customers was also
expressed by people from the Mexican materials department themselves.
In the Mexican unit, most respondents felt that limited coordination between the U.S.
and the Mexican unit was the major cause of the problem. People in the different places
were responsible for different tasks, and many of them felt that they were lacking time
and/or means to link together, to create a well-functioning totality and meet customer
demands. In general it seemed that because the coordination was based on impersonal
communication through e-mail or phone there were a number of misunderstandings, and
that lack of time and resources further deteriorated these problems. Language differen-
ces were also considered an explanation for the misunderstandings. Several said that it
was only when they had a chance to meet in person that they really felt they reached a
complete understanding. The attitude of most respondents was that this would improve in
time and that it was a learning process where they gradually would find solutions to their
problems. Although it sometimes complicated the workdays, especially for management
in higher positions, most respondents felt that these challenges were manageable.
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One attempt to improve the communication between the units was the development
of an intranet. A project initialized by the head office to develop an intranet for the
whole company had long been delayed. In secrecy, the US unit had develop their own
intranet to be used in the coordination between the US and Mexico, as they felt they
could not wait any longer for the project from Norway.
5.2.7.1 Cultural differences
At the time of our first study few respondents indicated that cultural differences between
the units were an explanation for the coordination problems. Although some US respon-
dents felt that it was difficult to get clear answers from their Mexican colleagues, this
was not presented as a major problem. According to these people’s statements, Mexican
colleagues repeatedly gave the impression that they agreed to do things, like to return
phone calls or to send stuff, but in the end they often failed “to work as they are asked.”
On the Mexican side, there was a feeling that Americans from time to time were too
harsh in their way of approaching people. While Swedes were described as “quiet” and
“soft”, “nice people, but not too active”, some respondents described their colleagues
from America as people who “talk fast and too much”. Despite these attitudes cultural
differences did not seem to be applied as the main explanation for their coordination
problems. However, at the time of the second study this had become a common expla-
nation for most respondents. As mentioned above, the second study took place after six
months of difficulties in the company. It was apparent that what had earlier been referred
to as minor coordination problems, were now seen by both units as the main cause of
their problems. In both units the problems were attributed to lack of competence, and to
a lack of understanding in the other unit. Cultural differences where the U.S. employees
were described as too willing to give in to the customer, and where Mexican employees
were described as failing to understand the need to accommodate the customers was
now a recurrent theme in the interviews. However, respondents still discussed lack of
resources and of interaction between the two units as a cause of the problems. The div-
ision between the tasks undertaken in the U.S. and those in the Mexican plant was, by
both units, associated with frustration. The social, cultural and geographical distances
between designs and sales in the U.S. and production in Mexico were now perceived
as large obstacles towards cooperation and coordination. In both units there was a call
to get more engineering resources in the Mexican plant, but this had not happened and
was according to our respondents not likely to happen in the near future.
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5.2.7.2 Support from Scandinavia
As seen above, the central management decided that the Mexican unit was to report di-
rectly to the Business Manager in Norway from November 2002, and the manager in
the U.S. unit was fired in the beginning of the summer 2003. In addition, at the time of
our second study, new procedures imported from Sweden were introduced. These were
directed towards coordination of customer orders. The new local manager brought in
from Norway was also seen to have more of a technical understanding of the production
process than his predecessor, as well as a tougher attitude towards the demands of the
customers.
On the other hand, for many respondents neither the central management nor the
business area manager were very visible. Several felt that the business area management
did little for their cause; that they showed limited enthusiasm for ideas and suggestions
from the U.S. and Mexican units and took a relatively passive stance vis-à-vis problems
and conflicts which arose. When problems occurred between the U.S. and the Mexican
unit the first half of 2003, several respondents said they had expected a more active
approach from the business area management to attempt to solve these problems, but
were disappointed. The meetings with the business area manager during this time period
were described as superficial. On the other hand, as described above, the central man-
agement did intervene by first removing the responsibilities of the local manager in the
U.S. unit for Mexico and later replacing him. According to some respondents, the central
management did react, but stated that the reaction came late, and was followed by too
few resources to aid the situation. According to one respondent, they only caught the
attention of the central management when they needed to rent planes to fly in supplies
from Scandinavia to Mexico in order to fulfill their obligations to the customers.
One of the new procedures which was imported from Sweden, the AR 147, was ex-
pected by several respondents to better define the responsibility between the two units,
and improve the communication. Most respondents found that the difficulties they had
experienced prior to our second study had been frustrating because the same problems
were seen to be reoccurring time and time again. Respondents in both units stated that
they felt the reasons for the problems they had experienced the last half a year had not
really been solved. Everybody had improvised to fix problems on a short-term basis,
but nobody had been able to remove the “root cause of the problem” as one said. Most
respondents agreed that there was a need to implement better procedures for coordination
between the units. However, there were complaints that the head office had not provided
them with the procedures, and that the manuals they recently had received were difficult
to adapt to their needs. The respondents stated that they felt there had been a lack of
support from the central management on these issues.
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5.3 Summary
When Kongsberg Automotive bought the U.S. unit from Scandmec AB in 1996, the cost
level development in the USA made it difficult to have profitable production in the area.
The situation was worsened by what has been implied to be a level of mismanagement
at the unit at the time, so when the new owners of the company were in a position to
decide the establishment of a factory in Mexico, the U.S. unit was downsized from 115
to 15 people in less than a year. The new factory in Mexico, situated in the Rio Grande
area, profits from the duty free customs regime of the maquila industry. Supplies are
imported to Mexico without tax, manufactured by cheap Mexican labor, and exported
to the USA again without any additional costs.
When Kongsberg Automotive established the Mexican plant the main strategy was
to carbon copy the production processes and organization structures from the U.S. and
Scandinavia. The first attempt to adapt to local conditions involved a more hierarchical
organization than what was considered the norm in Scandinavia. The distribution of tasks
and responsibilities in Mexico also allowed middle managers to demonstrate that their
positions had a higher status than employees on lower levels. However, after a while
it became clear that neither the Mexican nor the U.S. unit was meeting expectations,
and managers in both units were replaced. Instead of relying on managers who had
experience from Kongsberg Automotive, two managers who were familiar with local
conditions and had experience from the global automotive industry were hired.
Both of these approached their tasks and local organization differently than their
predecessors. The manager in the US gave a new boost to the local employees who for
a long time had called for an increased customer focus. The local Mexican manager
altered the production system which had been copied from the U.S. and Scandinavia. It
was changed towards a different logic which demanded less training and concentration
from the local employees. He also initiated the development of a new testing machine
that was better adapted to the local conditions and local employees than alternative
solutions within the company. Both were considered successful in their endeavor, and
had achieved positive results at the units. However, the U.S. manager had an approach
which some called "extreme customer orientation", which finally led to his departure
from the company.
While having extensive communication with the head office in Norway, the units
of the U.S. and Mexico are highly interdependent and need to maintain a high level of
coordination and communication between them. During the winter of 2003, their orders
and production volumes increased and both units came under a higher pressure than ear-
lier. The next months revealed flaws in their coordination, and an audit for the QS9000
demonstrated incomplete specifications on customer contracts. During the summer of
96
5 The local organizations in Mexico and the U.S.
2003 employees at both units were blaming each other for the problems, and cultural
issues had now come to the fore as explanations for the other’s behavior. While the head
office intervened in this situation by replacing the manager in the U.S. and the reporting
channels for the Mexican manager, several respondents said they had expected a more
active and interested approach from the head office. The new top-manager in the U.S.
is a Scandinavian with long experience within the company, and who is expected to
have a better chance of balancing between the demands of production and that of the
customer. This is a focus which respondents in the Mexican unit also asked for.
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6 The local organization in Poland
6.1 Introduction
The following chapter will focus on the establishment of the Polish factory, from the
early planning phase to the regular production phase. This chapter is based on three
visits to the factory, in October 2001, April 2002, and again in June 2003. During the
first and last visits we conducted interviews, while during the second one we were able
to have informal talks with managers who had been involved in the establishment in
Norway, Sweden and Poland. During the autumn of 2001 we also interviewed members
of the project management, Swedish trainers, and other involved personnel in Åmotfors,
as well as at the head office in Norway.
The factory was established in Pruszkow, Poland in 2000. Kongsberg Automotive
leased a building in Millennium Park, an industrial park outside Warsaw, and refurbished
the building to make it suitable for the production of seat heaters. The establishment of
the Polish factory can be described in three phases; the project phase, the regular pro-
duction phase and an expansion phase. The project phase was under the leadership of
a Swedish manager, the regular production phase started in March – April 2001 when
production had moved to the permanent factory and the Polish managers took over, and
finally the expansion phase was initialized with the construction of a new factory and
the recruitment of approx. 100 new workers.
The internal conditions at the plant in Poland became strongly characterized by the
differences in approach between the first Swedish manager, and the later Polish manage-
ment team. The workers interviewed in 2001 and 2003 described an internal atmosphere
which was tense and where information and communication lacked between the manage-
ment and the production workers. The development in Poland was also largely dependent
on cooperation with Åmotfors, the Swedish plant producing seat heaters, and with the
Norwegian head office. As I will look at below, the cooperation between these units had
a large bearing on the results.
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The figure above posits the main events of the development in Poland at different
points in time. As the discussion below will reveal, the development may be seen as
a process where both the internal organization as well as the cooperating units in the
company have needed to adjust to find workable solutions. The main units which were
central to the development of the Polish unit are illustrated below.
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Search for 
location, and 
business plan 
for Poland. 
Project phase 
Recruitment 
Regular 
production phase  
Polish 
management team 
Low 
productivity 
Layoffs  
Insecurity 
among 
workers. 
Poland II 
Expansion. 
New products 
New 
training 
programs, 
quality vs. 
quantity 
focus 
Figure 6-1 Development of Kongsberg Automotive Sp. zo.o., Poland
Polish unit
English unit 
Norwegian HQ Åmotfors, R&D, 
purchasing,  
Sweden 
Figure 6-2 Units cooperating with the Polish plant
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6.2 The project phase
Kongsberg Automotive started the first investigations to find a suitable place to establish
a factory in Eastern Europe during the first half of 1999. A desire to lower production
costs and to be close to the markets in France and Germany were the main reasons why
the company wanted to establish themselves in Eastern Europe. Most of their competi-
tors in the German market had established themselves in the region and were able to
benefit from the low labor costs in the area. In addition, because of increased orders
there was a need to increase the total production capacity in seat heaters. The existent
factory in Sweden was already running at its fullest capacity and the factory in England
was not meeting expectations and was running at a loss. When Industri Kapital bought
the company in 1999, they also brought the decision-making power to move forwards
with establishments abroad.
A project group was established which investigated a number of different sites in
Eastern Europe. It was headed by a Swedish manager who had previous experience
from establishing production units abroad, both within KA and from other companies.
The other project members had less international experience, but were key personnel in
their respective fields.
The different locations that were considered most closely were Poland, Slovakia,
the Czech Republic and Hungary. These sites were considered based on a number of
criteria such as labor costs, infrastructure, unemployment, education level, proximity to
the German market and whether there were other companies they could cooperate with
and draw experience from. Suitable sites and buildings were located and contacts estab-
lished, but some of these contacts were opting for a joint venture, which KA wanted to
avoid. Other areas could offer lower costs like the economic zones in Poland, and for
example Slovakia because of its salaries.
The most promising alternative, however, was finally Pruszkow on the outskirts of
Warsaw. A major supplier to KA, TRW Automotive1 was already established in Mil-
lennium Park in Pruszkow, outside Warsaw, and was ready to share their experience
with KA. Millennium Park is an industrial park, but also a historical site that was used
by the Nazis during the Second World War to detain jews before they were sent to
concentration camps. Production facilities were available in the park, even though some
refurbishment was necessary and that due to its history, the building was under restric-
tions as to outside changes. It was also considered easier to recruit management in this
area of Poland.
The final decision was taken by the company’s board and was based on information
1) TRW is a North American company supplying electronic components. See also: http://www.trw.com
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gathered by the project manager, who had consulted the Swedish Trade Council, the
Swedish Embassy and other companies such as Volvo and Scania who were present in
Poland. The criteria mentioned above were considered, as well as national legislation.
The decision was based on economic calculations as well as access to suitable facilities.
The board was presented with a business plan for the establishment and approved it in
June 2000.
During our interviews in September – November 2001 some of our respondents
criticized the planning phase for not being detailed enough and for relying too much on
the information from one person, the project manager. These respondents argued that
a more informed decision could have been taken if there had been closer cooperation
with Poles who had knowledge of the region and the automotive industry in the area.
The business plan was also seen to be lacking detailed plans of how the factory was to
be set up. Especially our Polish respondents who were frustrated over what they saw
as unnecessary problems, which they believed could have been avoided with a more
thorough planning process. However, the central management found it more important
to get started and rather be prepared to handle the problems as they appeared. As one
argued, even if you have a detailed and expensive planning phase you will never be able
to avoid problems. Rather it was considered important to be flexible and be prepared
to change. Other respondents recognized that a more thorough planning process would
have been advantageous, but doubted that it could have been possible because of the
relative small size of the company and its limited resources. It would have been too
expensive to conduct a more detailed planning process.
The establishment in Poland consisted both of transfers of production lines from the
factory in England as well as the Åmotfors plant in Sweden. The production lines trans-
ferred from Sweden were those requiring the most manual labor. It was their so-called
Flex production which was difficult to run economically in Sweden. The Flex production
is labor intensive and the machines are old. In addition to the Flex production, several
products named Sinus were moved. The Sinus production requires other machines and
production processes than the Flex – products. Not all the Sinus products were moved
and this caused split production chains between Åmotfors and Pruzkow. After some
time the Polish factory also started to produce cable mats for other units in the company.
During the first year over a hundred different products were moved from England and
Sweden to the Polish factory.
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6.2.1 Establishing the factory
As in the case of the establishment in Mexico, the company was able to rely on the
advice of one of their most important suppliers, TRW, when establishing the plant in
Poland. TRW who was already established in the industrial park in Pruszkow provided
copies of their contracts and in various areas Kongsberg Automotive was thus able to
blueprint their work. Kongsberg Automotive relied heavily on the support and advice
from TRW. With the aid of a Polish lawyer, the building was rented through Millennium
Park. In retrospect, the Polish respondents, however, were critical to the advice and
support provided by TRW and the Polish lawyer. It was argued that the lawyer had not
acted independently as she also had Millennium Park as clients and TRW’s advice was
criticized for being misleading because they were seen to be deliberately concealing
information and because the situation in the two companies was not comparable. There
was speculation as to whether TRW were trying to avoid pushing up the salaries in the
area and therefore provided smaller figures than what they themselves were paying. The
important conclusion for the Polish management was that they believed the head office
in Norway should have been more reluctant to copy the advice from TRW, and been
more open to make modifications more suited to their own needs.
6.2.1.1 Recruitment
The recruitment process started in July 2000. The managerial positions were advertised
in a Polish newspaper, and a local agency was hired to aid with the recruitment of oper-
ators. The Swedish manager of the project group was leading the recruitment process,
but was soon assisted by the first Polish employee, the present administration manager.
She came recommended by the local city council in Pruszkow, where she was a mem-
ber. The HR-Department at the head office was also involved in these processes, both
when it came to selection criteria and in interviews for the managerial positions. Also
managers in corresponding positions in Norway and Sweden were acting as advisors
when selecting appropriate candidates in Poland.
As it turned out, Kongsberg Automotive had advertised the managerial positions at
a very fortunate time. General Motors had shortly before decided to move from the
central region around Warsaw to the southern part of Poland, and managers who were
not interested in moving to the south were now looking for new positions in the Warsaw
region. The three candidates who were selected for the positions as plant-, logistics-
and quality-manager had extensive experience from the automotive business and from
international companies. In addition we were told that they also were selected on the
following criteria:
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·
Good knowledge of English
·
Experience with SAP
·
Interpersonal skills
·
Knowledge about continuous improvement techniques in production
It was also argued that they expressed a willingness to personally dedicate them-
selves to creating the new factory in Poland. The plant manager was later described to
us as a particularly strong and goal-oriented person, who could achieve things with a
strict discipline. Together with his background, he was considered likely to fulfill the
enormous task of establishing the factory and to reach the expected goal of profitable
production within less than a year. However, it was acknowledged that he was perhaps
not so strong when it came to personal warmth and closeness. As we will see later, his
interpersonal skills became a problem in regards to the employees later in the process.
The three managers started working in September - October 2000.
By this time 15-16 operators had already started working. The Swedish project man-
ager participated in some of the interviews with candidates provided by the local agency,
but it was mostly the administration manager who was in charge of these recruitments
because of the language barrier. Most of the regular operators who were hired were un-
skilled, with no educational background above elementary school and most were women.
In the fields of maintenance, repairs and electricity skilled workers were employed. The
aim was to find people with backgrounds from industrial work even though they did
not have the formal schooling. Another criterion was that a workforce from the local
community would provide a more stable work force. Few of the candidates had former
experience from industrial work, and experience with handicrafts, like embroidery, was
therefore sought after. This was considered appropriate experience since the work con-
sists of assembly work requiring a certain handiness. There were few other requirements,
and because of the high unemployment rate in the area it was relatively easy to find
suitable people.
According to the Polish respondents, the wages offered were low, but the promise of
a raise after six months was considered an important incentive. The majority of these
female workers had been unemployed, in school or at home before they took the job,
and had been desperately looking for a source of income. Their expectations towards
their new job were simply to earn money, but they had thought it would be physically
lighter and less stressful than what it turned out to be.
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6.2.1.2 Scandinavian living-room2
When these operators started working, the factory building was being refurbished and
an intermediate workshop had been put up in a nearby building. The operators started
practicing soldering and assembly tasks, and their work was being led by the Swedish
project manager. Workers from the Åmotfors factory in Sweden were brought down and
functioned as trainers for the Polish operators.
The respondents involved at the time described the initial phase as a very positive
period. There was a feeling that everybody was cooperating and that managers and
workers were equally important in creating something new. Several said they had been
personally involved and committed to the task, and felt they had an equal say in how things
were to be. The rooms had been crammed, and the gas heating had created smoke and
unpleasant fumes, but it was the physical closeness within the group that the respondents
emphasized. The Swedish project manager was referred to by the workers as a friend,
and there had been an informal and friendly atmosphere. This feeling of equalness and
warmth was by these workers contrasted to the later phases when production moved to
the permanent building, the Polish managers were in place and more people had been
employed. On the other hand, respondents from management in Norway referred to this
period with disdain and said the Swedish manager had created an atmosphere which
was too relaxed and friendly, referring to the intermediate workshop and the mentality
the manager had created as a “Scandinavian living-room”.
Production was moved to the permanent building during December – January 2001,
and the production of large series began. However, the plant lacked material and the
production almost stopped for two weeks after the transfer to the permanent facility.
Shortly after, the plant received a lot of materials and was expected to produce high
volumes of very many different article numbers. The organization was not prepared for
this. According to the respondents the friendly atmosphere was also somewhat lost in
the move, and employees at every level of the organization felt an increased pressure
from the customers and central management in Norway. During the first months at the
permanent building, productivity was lower than expected. According to the respondents
there were different reasons for the problems. The orders were higher than earlier ex-
pected, the range of products transferred to Poland was wider, and there were problems
with material supplies from Åmotfors. Some respondents also explained the low pro-
ductivity by referring to the competence level of the Polish operators. They had limited
experience with industrial work and were therefore perceived to lack an understand-
ing of how important quality was. In addition, these respondents stated that there was
2) The term used by the respondent was in Norwegian ‘Skandinavisk varmestue’.
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confusion because of the different approaches of the Swedish project manager and the
Polish management. While the Swedish project manager aimed to motivate the work-
ers through participation and friendliness, the Polish management emphasized a stricter
authority, discipline, clear expectations and demands. Because of these contradictory
signals it was claimed that the workers were confused and did not know how to behave.
More people were hired to aid the low productivity, but this did not have the expec-
ted results. Rather, it aggravated the problem since experienced workers now became
occupied as trainers for newcomers and did not have time to produce themselves.
6.2.2 A closer look at the problems
Both the transfer of products, materials and machines from England and Sweden, and
the transition between the project management and the Polish management resulted in
unforeseen problems. According to the respondents these were mostly related to the
competence level of the workers and their training, the product range that was trans-
ferred, the logistics involved, the communication between Sweden and Poland, and the
Polish organization.
6.2.2.1 Competence level
Even though the workers who were recruited at the first stage had little or no experi-
ence of industrial work, there were no complaints as to their competence level in the
beginning. They were described as highly motivated and fast learners. But when new
employees were hired during the fall of 2001 our respondents seems to agree that these
had lower competence than the first group. Several workers stated that they lacked mo-
tivation and understanding of how to do their work during this period. They were also
described as somewhat passive and subservient in comparison with their Scandinavian
colleagues. The workers recruited at this time were younger, had little work experience
and fewer had family obligations. These might be some of the reasons why they were
less motivated and less disciplined than the first group of employees. On the other hand,
they also received less training and were employed at a time were many new products
were introduced in the factory.
Training
The first group of workers who were recruited were able to train in the intermediate
workshop. Trainers from the factories in England, USA and Sweden came over and
there was time set a-side for practice. During this period, the different products were
introduced one by one. To alleviate language problems an English language course was
offered, which most of the Polish workers participated in and said they appreciated. Still,
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the training was complicated by language problems. No translators were hired, and even
though managers helped from time to time, there were frequent misunderstandings. In
addition, it turned out that the English, US and Swedish trainers had different opinions
as to what the quality standards were. The various units had different quality standards
based on variation in customer demands. The result for the Polish workers who were
under training was confusion and increased insecurity as to the quality of their work.
Few of the trainers who were in Poland had any experience with teaching, and in
addition not all had much experience from the production line. In Sweden for example,
the workers with most experience had not been willing to go to Poland because they were
not offered compensation or help with child care and other family obligation. Hence,
several of the trainers were young and fairly inexperienced. The trainers were in Poland
to demonstrate how they themselves performed the tasks, but it was difficult to explain
and communicate the practical skills they themselves took for granted. There had not
been any discussion nor preparation for the trainers before they left which could have
helped prepare them for their roles as teachers.
These problems were acknowledged in retrospect both by the trainers themselves and
by people in the project group. In addition, the specifications and technical drawings
transferred from England and Sweden were not updated or detailed enough. The trainers
did not have authorization to change the drawings, even though they could identify the
mistakes and lack of updated information. The middle managers in Poland, who were also
attempting to learn the production, were therefore constantly checking with colleagues
in Åmotfors to confirm changes or investigate mistakes.
As more and more workers were employed and the expectations to reach an acceptable
level of productivity rose, the time left for training was drastically reduced. Respondents
hired in February – March 2002 stated that they had received two-three hours of training
and were thereafter expected to produce.
Respondents in Sweden and Norway stated that one of the major problems at the
factory in Poland was that the workers lacked an understanding of the industrial culture
and the demands of the automotive industry. However, there were no attempts at ex-
plaining or introducing the workers to these issues during this period. According to the
Polish workers we interviewed, one of the issues they were insecure about was what the
company expected of them. The product range introduced to Poland aggravated these
problems, as a great variety in products made training even more difficult.
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6.2.2.2 Product range
Many of the products transferred to Poland were ‘problem products’ to begin with. They
were based on old technology and the demand for them was so small that it was hard to
make a profitable production. In addition, a very high number of products were trans-
ferred, which resulted in a great variety in supplies, technical drawings, machines, spare
parts, assembly operations, production lines and so forth. While the Flex- production
was old and hard to make profitable, another concept, the Sinus, caused a split in pro-
duction chains and required close cooperation between Pruszkow and Åmotfors. The
logistical challenges involved brought additional problems. Furthermore, the computer
system, SAP, which was to support the production and the interdependency between
Sweden and Poland were not adapted to the Polish language or to local regulations and
laws.
While the transfer of these products caused problems in Pruszkow it was considered a
necessity for the company to move this production. Åmotfors had no longer the capacity
to produce these products and if they had not been transferred to Poland, an intermedi-
ate factory in Sweden would have been necessary to establish. What further complicated
the transfer was that the some of the same products had earlier been moved within the
factories in Sweden, and those people who had the most experience with the products
were not working in Åmotfors. According to the central management in Norway, the
transfer of these products was necessary considering the company as a whole, even
though it complicated the start up in Pruszkow.
6.2.2.3 Logistics
The production in Pruszkow was to a great part dependent on cooperation with Åmot-
fors also after the machines and products had been transferred. Pruszkow received much
of their supplies from Åmotfors, mostly materials but also half-made products for pro-
duction. In addition, the factory in Poland and its production had not yet been approved by
the customers, so products produced in Poland had to be sent back to Åmotfors for qual-
ity checks before they were shipped to customers. This complicated the administration
and made for logistical challenges. According to the local management in Poland the fact
that they were not able to take full advantage of the SAP complicated the coordination
further.
6.2.2.4 Flow of materials
One of the major problems during this period was a delay in materials from Åmotfors.
Even though products had been moved to Poland, Åmotfors had high orders and were
behind schedule to complete their own orders to customers. Because their customers ex-
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perienced delays, the customers further increased their orders to make sure they would
have enough supplies for their own production. In the original plans a safety stock was
supposed to have been produced in Sweden in order to avoid these problems, but this
had not happened at least not to the extent it was supposed to have been.
On the other hand, several respondents stated that the problems with the flow of ma-
terials from Åmotfors could not be explained by external pressure alone. Deliveries from
Åmotfors to Pruszkow were at times late, of poor quality and incomplete. According to
the respondents in Sweden there had been a lack of procedures and responsibilities as
to the deliveries to Poland. In addition, as several had observed, the products sent from
Poland to Sweden underwent a tougher quality inspection than what was customary at
the plant. As some said, the employees in Åmotfors perhaps did not mind if the factory
in Poland had problems. Even though the capacity in Åmotfors had been at a bursting
point before the move and there had not been any layoffs, there was still a fear that
local jobs could disappear to a cheaper country such as Poland. After some time, one
of the production managers in Åmotfors was put in charge of the deliveries to Poland,
and Pruszkow was also able to receive the customer approval for production. These two
factors made for improvement in the coordination between the units.
6.2.2.5 Documentation
Another problem, as mentioned above, was lack of proper documentation. This concerned
technical product drawings in particular, but also manuals for machines and production
processes. The major reasons for these problems were that the factories in Sweden had
produced the products for years, and when customers had demanded changes in the
products the respective drawings had not been updated. This had not been a problem in
Sweden as those responsible knew the changes, but it resulted in difficulties in Pruszkow
when this knowledge was lost. It complicated production and training of the workers,
as well as the customs handling of the products when sent across the Polish border.
Many Scandinavian respondents confirmed this, but some also attributed this prob-
lem to the Polish culture and history. Some described the Poles as bureaucrats who were
not willing to be flexible and who demanded too many specifications before they were
willing to start production. This attitude, by these respondents, was attributed to their
history of communism.
6.2.2.6 SAP and administration systems
As mentioned above, the computer systems which were to support the production in
Pruszkow as well as the cooperation between Poland and Sweden, were not working
properly during this period. The most serious challenges were related to the use of SAP.
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Polish laws and regulations required several types of reports that the SAP could not
provide, and some of these reports had to be provided in Polish, which contains letters
that cannot be run on the same platform as the Roman alphabet. However, these problems
were gradually resolved. Polish authorities offered a dispensation whereby all reports
could be provided in English, whereas SAP was adapted to other of the local require-
ments. For some time there were two parallel systems in use, one which accommodated
the company’s requirements and another for Polish authorities.
While the SAP was not adapted to the Polish language and requirements, there were
also problems related to coordination of logistics between Sweden and Poland. While
some respondents claimed that this was caused by the SAP system itself, others said this
was due to lack of experience and knowledge among the Polish staff who did not know
how to use the SAP. It was argued that the Polish managers had claimed they knew how
to use the system when they were hired, but that this did not hold true. Others, on the
other hand, said the use of SAP had caused problems in other units as well, especially
in the implementation phase.
When the SAP complicated the logistics between Åmotfors and Pruszkow this was
further aggravated by lack of communication lines between the two units and frequent
misunderstandings. The period of transition between the Polish management and the
Swedish project leader also involved its difficulties.
6.2.2.7 Communication
One of the difficulties was the lack of a coordinator in Åmotfors, as already mentioned
above. When someone in the Polish management called Sweden for help it was often
difficult to find the correct person to talk to, mostly because they lacked knowledge of
the organization in Åmotfors. When the Swedish project manager called, he knew who
to talk to, but would sometimes call subordinates in the organization and hence step
outside the established hierarchy. This caused problems because the managers in Swe-
den would not receive the information they were in need of. There was a lack of proper
communication channels between Poland and Sweden in the sense that they may either
have been poorly defined, or may have been inefficient so that people chose to ignore
them.
There were also different opinions between the Poles and the Scandinavians as to prob-
lem definition and the correct way of solving these issues. In general, the Scandinavians
had a more informal approach and resorted to solving problems as they occurred. The
Poles, on the other hand, were asking for procedures and said they felt the company should
be organized better. From their point of view, there was a lack of defined responsibilities
and authorities.
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Educational and cultural background was partly used as an explanation for this. As
mentioned above, the Poles were characterized as bureaucrats because of their history of
communism. The Polish respondents themselves related their concern with procedures
and documentations to their experience in the international automotive industry. The
education level among the Polish managers was higher than the average of their Scandi-
navian colleagues, and the three most central managers had all worked for large U.S.
automotive companies. The Scandinavians had long experience within the automotive
industry as well, but from European automotive companies and Kongsberg Automotive
itself.
In the eyes of the Polish workers there was a big contrast between the high degree
of informality the Swedish project manager handled things with and the ways of the
Polish management. As mentioned earlier, the social climate at the plant deteriorated
when the Polish management took over. These problems came more to the fore as the
regular production phase was initiated in March – April 2001.
6.2.2.8 Organization
The organization in the Polish factory was initially set up similar to other organizations
within the company. As presented earlier, a ‘lean’ organization is a prevailing principle
within the company, avoiding a tall hierarchy and personnel in assistant positions.
Production teams
In Poland, teams for organizing the production workers created initially. These were led
by a team leader who answered directly to the local manager. The team leader were re-
sponsible for providing materials for his team, planning production for the team together
with the plant manager, and for making sure that the team members are cooperating well
and for acting as their spokesperson towards the management. The teams functioned
well initially. However, when all the products had been introduced and when they were
expected to take full responsibility with less aid from managers, the situation became
difficult. According to respondents from the management, the tasks became too com-
plex, and they had expected too much of the teams. The explanation given was that the
workers were not competent and experienced enough to work as independently as the
team model requires. On the other hand, another explanation might be that the changed
management style brought in by the Polish management perhaps did not provide the
necessary preconditions for such a model. As I will have a closer look at below, the
atmosphere at the plant became less characterized by participation, openness and trust
after the Polish management took over.
In order to help the teams, a traditional foreman position for the different shifts was
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introduced. By the Scandinavian respondents this was seen as an intermediate solution,
whereas the Polish managers argued that it was necessary in Poland to have one person
present all the time who was qualified to be responsible for the production. When the
management finished their workday it was considered necessary to have a person in
place during the evening that could be legally responsible for the plant, and authorized
to make decisions about the production. Even so, the Polish management also stated
that in time they were hoping to make the teams more independent so that the task of
the foremen would be to support, rather than to direct.
Hierarchy
Considering the organizational level above the teams, our Scandinavian respondents felt
that there was an unnecessarily large organization developing in Poland. In their view
there were too many middle managers employed. According to the Polish, there were
other tasks that demanded more resources in Poland. One example was the administration
of the payrolls which were seen to be more complicated in Poland due to complex laws
and regulations. They also supported their arguments by referring to the wage differences
between Poland and the Scandinavian countries. On this background they argued that it
was simply not cost effective in Poland to have the managers do secretarial work and
in general, use time for tasks that was less important. This argument was countered by
the head office that held that too many people would also demand more resources for
coordination, and that there are important signals involved related to what one accepts
to spend money on.
Kongsberg Automotive representative
Another of the company’s principles has been to employ somebody with large experi-
ence from the company at each new site. This person is to make sure that the company’s
standards are implemented and understood, and function as a link between the new unit
and the rest of the organization. However, in the case of Poland it proved difficult to
find such a representative. There were no available candidates at the time.
By some respondents and the central management in Norway this was viewed as
the cause of some of the problems they had encountered. It was viewed as limitation
of the plant in Pruszkow that they lacked a clear understanding and knowledge of the
company. This was one of the reasons why the plant manager in Poland was later in-
cluded in the Interdal course which attempted to increase the participants’ knowledge
about the company and its goals. The Polish respondents also wanted the presence of
such a representative in Poland, as they saw the usefulness of having somebody who
knew the organization and who could function as an intermediary between the Polish
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unit and others. On the other hand, they also stated that it was important with time that
such positions are available for all experienced personnel in the company and not be
reserved for Scandinavians alone.
6.3 Regular production phase.
According to the business plan, the project phase was to end on 1st of March 2001, but
there ended up being a transition period from the project phase to regular production
which started in the beginning of April. The Swedish project manager left Poland, and the
Polish management was now in charge of the plant. Even though this can be considered
the time where the regular production started, the plant and the organization were still
very new. As I will outline below, there were still many things that needed to change
or to come into place.
As mentioned above, there was high pressure during this period due to high orders,
introduction and transfer of many new products, and incomplete or lacking deliveries
from Åmotfors. According to respondents there were also very high expectations from
the central management as to productivity and quality. The result was that there was little
time left for information, communication, training, technical support and coordination.
The development in production was considered very fast by the respondents, and they
were able to produce at a certain level. The fast development of the factory and the high
pressure had its consequences though, the productivity was low, the quality was not as
expected and the social atmosphere at the plant grew increasingly tense. In May 2001,
the central management in Norway intervened and gave orders to reduce the workforce
by 20-30 workers. A smaller workforce with fewer newcomers had the desired effects
and productivity rose.
The Polish management also had a different management style, emphasizing discipline
and clear orders. This change, together with the layoffs seems to have caused greater
job insecurity among the workers, and a social climate which deteriorated drastically.
Echoing his colleagues, one worker stated that when the Polish management took charge
they changed the former atmosphere of equality and cooperation. The workers now felt
they were considered as less valuable and viewed simply as manual labor. Their former
participation in decisions related to the development of the factory was no longer asked
for.
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6.3.1 Productivity
According to respondents from all levels in the organization, the productivity at this
time was very poor and far from the original expectations. The Polish management
were concerned and focused very strongly on increasing the productivity. The workers
we interviewed stated that they were nervous and felt insecure about their jobs. Among
the workers there was confusion as to what the standard time of production was and
what was considered a ‘good’ performance. They said they lacked information about
what the expectations were and that they were not able to measure whether they were
going to reach the expectations or not. The management changed the expected level
of productivity every month, in accordance with an expectation that the factory would
improve. But the workers were not able to keep themselves updated on these changes.
It was important for the workers to reach the level of productivity because this was also
linked to a salary bonus.
6.3.1.1 Money incentives
The bonus was introduced to motivate the workers to work harder and to reach the ex-
pected goals. However, it did not fulfill its intentions. The bonus was subject to heated
debate among the workers. One of the reasons was that there was confusion as to what
was required in order to attain the bonus. Another was that the bonus was attained only
if the productivity of the whole plant reached the goal. Some of the workers stated that
they felt they themselves worked hard to attain it, but that other colleagues would not
make an effort. These respondents therefore felt that the bonus was unjust, and that it
should apply to either the teams themselves or to individuals.
According to the Polish respondents the wages offered to the workers were too low 3,
this was compared to other industrial workers in the area. According to the respondents
the low wages made them feel less appreciated and also less focused on their jobs as
they were worried about how to make ends meet. The wages offered at the plant were
similar to the figures Kongsberg Automotive had obtained through TRW when they first
established the plant. However, according to the Polish management these figures had
not been correct, and they criticized TRW for not having been honest. The management
also held that they considered it wrong to expect so much from their workers who were
only paid 6 zlotych (14 NOK) an hour. The Polish management at the time of our inter-
views was planning to attempt to improve the salaries, but said they had not had time
3) According to the Business Area director, the wages that were offered to regular operators when the Polish
factory was established was about 2600 zlotych per month. Later, in the latter half of 2001, a 3% increase
was added, to compensate for price inflation. 2600 zlotych is approximately 4900 NOK, or 590 Euros.
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for it yet, as they felt they had to be well prepared before they started the discussion
with the Norwegian management. In addition, they foresaw higher competition for the
local workforce as new companies established themselves in area, a development which
could help improve the salaries.
All the workers we talked to spoke about their feeling of insecurity in relation to their
job. Many were afraid to lose their work, and extended use of temporary contracts as
well as the layoffs that occurred in May 2001 added to this insecurity.
6.3.1.2 Work processes and proper use of equipment
According to the respondents, even though it had been decided initially to transfer the
work processes from Sweden to Poland wholesale, the project group had decided to do
things differently. This was explained by the limited time frame and the lack of industrial
experience among the workers. However, in retrospect several respondents stated that
this had been partly an act of misunderstood ‘kindness’, to leave these decisions to the
Polish management and partly due to the fact that there had been many people involved
in the transfer and that they had not agreed as to how the work processes should be. The
result was that it was not until the Polish management was in place that the question of
work processes was addressed in a disciplined and uniform way.
Some of the trainers we interviewed in Sweden told us they had been asked not to
mention their salaries or other benefits like “group exercise” during work hours. Later,
when confronting the Norwegian management with this, we were told this was not the
policy of the company, and that such comments were the responsibility of the individ-
ual who had expressed them. However, in Pruszkow, even though it was argued that
the production processes had been carbon copied and transferred from Sweden, subjects
such as ergonomics, physical training or the amount of breaks during the shift had not
been transferred. We were told that such issues were not for the Scandinavians to decide
but something the Poles would decide themselves eventually. However, according to
the workers we interviewed several said they had physical problems from their work,
and that there had not been a focus on such issues. One of the respondents said they
had been shown a movie of Swedish operators who exercised, but that Polish workers
would laugh if this was introduced in Poland.
There were many differences between Poland and Sweden when it came to working
conditions for the workers. The Polish workers were allowed two 25-minute breaks dur-
ing the day, and were required to follow strict rules at work. Social talk during working
hours was not permitted neither was coffee nor other refreshments in the production hall.
They had not been taught how to use some of the equipment, and were not given advice
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as to working positions, which is considered commonplace in Åmotfors. According to
one of the Swedish trainers, there were a number of simple things that should have been
introduced in Poland which could have improved both the productivity and the working
conditions for the workers.
However, half a year later some of these things had been introduced in Poland e.g.
a turning table which allows the worker to work on two pieces at the same time. But
there had not been an increased focus on ergonomics and there was still a big difference
in how the workdays of Polish and Swedish workers were structured.
6.3.1.3 Focus on standard times
The lack of proper work processes was a cause for frustration among the Polish man-
agement as well in relation to productivity. According to these, the productivity is to be
calculated in the SAP based on a standard amount of time. However, as these stated,
the standard time is based on a standard process which was never transferred to Poland.
One of the major tasks for the Polish management during this period therefore became
to attempt to identify the standard process, or more correctly, to create a process which
could accommodate the time set in the SAP. According to the Polish management, how-
ever, most of their time during this period was spent trying to fix reoccurring problems
and they lacked the time to train people, to find the correct work processes and other
issues which could have prevented some of the problems that occurred.
While the Polish management continued to emphasize productivity during the summer
of 2001, a shift came in autumn when the management decided to put a greater focus
on quality. The workers agreed with the management and felt this could allow for more
training and increased understanding as to what was considered a ‘good’ performance.
6.3.1.4 Quality control
During the project phase as well as the first months after the Polish management took
over the overriding concern had been to increase the productivity. Workers and manage-
ment alike considered the call for higher productivity as priority number one. However,
to improve the product quality became a more important issue after a while.
Initially, all quality inspections were to be made by inspectors among the production
workers themselves. What the Polish management gradually found, however, was that
this solution was not optimal. When all the inspectors belonged to the production it was
difficult for the quality department to oversee their work. In addition, respondents from
both management and workers maintained that it was difficult for many of the women
to hold a position where they had to correct the work of their colleagues.
A new solution was therefore established. Most of the inspections were still carried
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out by people from the production, but the final containment inspection was to be hand-
led by three inspectors who were organized under the quality department. They received
specific training for this job from the quality manager and his auditor, and they were
recruited based on their experience and whether they were respected by the other pro-
duction workers. Hence, it was considered important that they were able to give negative
feedback to other production workers.
The Polish management also attempted to consult and encourage the workers to make
suggestions as to how the quality could be improved. However, according to the man-
agement they did not receive many constructive suggestions. A common answer was
to put the blame on a different team or a different shift. The management therefore in-
troduced individual stamps so that pieces could be tracked back to the operator who had
done the job. This was done to avoid a situation where everyone attempted to blame
someone else. The workers on the other hand resisted these changes as they felt the
management was controlling and supervising them too much and they felt increasingly
insecure as to their jobs. According to the Polish management the quality was rising
after these measures, but there was still much to improve.
6.3.1.5 Training
The Polish management also systematized the training of the production workers. The
training of the workers had been seriously delayed. New products had been introduced
frequently and the workers had to learn these products in short time and with short inter-
vals. Both management and workers confirmed that training was a great challenge and
that stress among the workers was a well-known problem. An additional explanation as
to why this situation became so stressful was that the workers lacked former work ex-
perience and had little confidence in themselves and their learning abilities. Several of
the Polish respondents said that learning abilities should have been emphasized in the
recruitment process.
The Polish management introduced a more comprehensive training program. This
program consisted of a theoretical introduction, which lasted for 4 hours, and a man-
ual training period over 2 weeks. Naturally, only Polish instructors were used, so that
the communication challenges that characterized the training in the project phase were
eliminated. The workers were positive to the training, and many said they only wished
they could have received it earlier. Fewer of the workers were positive to the tests the
management also introduced. The workers had to pass both a theoretical and a manual test
after finishing the course. According to several respondents the workers had difficulties
understanding the technical parts of the course, and to pass the subsequent theoretical test.
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As mentioned earlier, the workers in Poland had been criticized for not understanding
the industrial culture and the demands of the automotive business. The management in
Poland was well aware that they needed to improve their understanding on these areas.
This included both training related to the safety risks involved for the end customer if
they sent bad quality products, and related to Kongsberg Automotive’s goals and policies.
This need was confirmed by the workers as well.
6.3.2 Information
6.3.2.1 Within the Pruszkow plant
In contrast to the descriptions they made of the early project phase, most of the workers
said they now had the information they needed in order to do their job. On the other
hand, they were lacking information about the company in general, something they ear-
lier used to receive. They held that this was because there was not enough time to be
used on information meetings.
The relationship between different groups within the plant deteriorated during the first
months of regular production. Several of the workers said that when they had questions
about production, machines, or materials, it took very long for them to get an answer.
Several workers presented this as mostly a problem between themselves and the tech-
nicians. The workers doubted the expertise of the technicians and suspected that they
did not know the production well enough. They also felt that the blame for the low
productivity and the quality issues was laid on them solely, and not on the technicians.
The management partly confirmed the problem and stated that the technicians should
have received more extensive training, and gained experience by visiting the plant in
Sweden. Or technicians from Sweden could have been in Poland to train them. It was
acknowledged that because of lack of time in Sweden this had not happened.
Also between the workers and the management there were problems. There was little
direct communication between the two groups. The management confirmed this and
regretted it, but said there had not been enough time. The workers on the other hand,
argued that this was the management style the Poles had introduced. According to what
they called an unwritten rule, information was to pass up and down the hierarchy and
that the management consequently used technicians or others to pass the information
on.
Workers stated that there were no relationship between themselves and the manage-
ment, and that they felt they were treated with lack of respect and as ‘robots’ by several
of the managers. Some of the workers said they had gotten accustomed in the begin-
ning to speak directly to the managers and this was a practice they had continued with.
118
6 The local organization in Poland
However, they acknowledged that many of their co-workers were afraid to speak to the
management and felt badly treated. According to the managers themselves however, it
was argued that they had an open door policy towards the workers. Few of the workers
confirmed this.
According to respondents in Scandinavia as well as among members of the Polish
management, one of the major difficulties was that the Polish plant manager was not very
strong as regards to relational skills. After some time, this became an issue which was
discussed openly with us, and where concrete actions were taken to help the manager
improve his communication skills. The administration manager had frequent discussions
with him in order to explain for him the reaction of the workers to his behavior in dif-
ferent situations. The central management in Norway thought it important that he was
enrolled in the Interdal course emphasizing cooperation and feedback skills.
The consequences at the plant at this time were that the social climate was tense.
The workers were clearly nervous for their jobs and none of those we talked with were
confident that this was a permanent, stable job. To lose the job was considered a very
serious problem as unemployment was high, and locally in Pruszkow there were few
other alternatives at the time.
Still, when they were asked about unions several people said that this would not help
matters. One respondent said that “Our historical Solidarity killed solidarity.” However,
few of the workers we spoke to were opposed to unions as such, but held that people
were afraid to propose it. The Polish plant manager confirmed what some of the workers
said, recognizing that unions were not an issue in Poland anymore after the corruption
scandals of the former labor union “Solidarinoise”.
Many of the workers at this time spoke of how the management used threats of being
fired as a means of motivation at the plant. Most of the workers we spoke to feared that
they would face serious consequences if they made too many mistakes. That the workers
were afraid was also confirmed by Scandinavian respondents. Other respondents said
that this was merely the culture in Poland, and that this was due to a high respect for
authority.
During the course of the interviews we heard many stories about the various con-
sequences people feared if they made too many mistakes or did not produce enough.
However, we also came to understand that some of the stories we were told were myths,
believed by some, but denied by others. It was a situation where limited communication
at the plant allowed for many rumors which nourished an atmosphere of distrust and
insecurity.
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6.3.2.2 Between Pruszkow and Kongsberg Automotive
Lack of information and having to wait for decisions was not only an issue within the
plant in Pruszkow, but also between Pruszkow and Åmotfors. Time pressure was con-
sidered to influence the relationship between Pruszkow and Åmotfors to a significant
degree. The management at the Polish plant themselves felt this, and indicated that they
saw time pressure as an important reason why the information and communication be-
tween the two units was not too good. The issue of having to wait for decisions and
information is linked to questions of authority. For most of the respondents in the Polish
management there was confusion as to the authority structure in Sweden and Norway,
and to what they considered their own lack of authority. They were also wondering why
decisions took so long to be achieved, and to the rational behind decisions they did not
agree with. They felt that it would be more rational if they had more authority to make
decisions and said that they did not think the Scandinavians trusted them.
They were also not pleased with some of the information they had received earlier.
The Polish management had been told to recruit people for simple assembly work, with
no mention of technical competence or ability to read technical drawings. This was
strongly regretted, as the Polish management felt that a more suitable workforce could
have been established if the present expectations of the operators had been spelled out
prior to their recruitment.
On a number of issues the Polish respondents expressed that they had been frustrated
with what they perceived as little knowledge about Polish reality from the Scandinav-
ians. One of the topics several mentioned was that they had not investigated well enough
before starting the plant. Several respondents said that their situation would have been
easier if the company had involved more Polish people earlier in decision-making pro-
cesses and to a greater degree. Even though they now were in charge of the plant they
still felt they had little say in terms of decisions and that it was difficult to explain their
point of view. In their view most decisions were taken in Scandinavia, and they felt they
did not understand the reasoning behind some of the decisions. In communication with
their Scandinavian colleagues, the Poles said they felt the answers to their questions and
suggestions were discouraging at times, and that sometimes they would receive blunt
refusals with no further explanations.
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6.4 Expansion phase
The expansion phase took place during spring 2003. A new factory was built close to
the old one and the Polish administration was now able to partake in the planning and
had decision making authority to make the adjustments they felt necessary. Because of
its historical value, the first building was under restrictions as to outside changes, and
the company was not allowed to install a ventilation system which functioned well. The
lack of such a system led to high temperatures in the production hall during the summer.
In the new building these conditions improved. The number of workers was doubled and
in June 2003, at the time of our visit, 164 workers were employed, with an additional 60
workers on temporary contracts hired through a local agency. New products had been
introduced, which was a consequence of the factory in Aldershot, England being closed.
The production volumes had increased and according to the respondent, as before, there
was a heavy workload on both production workers and management.
Despite the rapid expansion, the conditions at the plant were perceived as more stable
at this time. Workers were more aware of what was expected of them, and the social
climate had improved some. Also the relationship between the management and other
units in the company had improved and there was a greater understanding of the com-
pany’s policies and guidelines. However, there were still problems related to internal
communication at the plant, especially between the workers and the technicians.
6.4.1 Productivity and quality
The productivity at the plant had been steadily increasing, together with the quality. All
the production workers we spoke to were clearly emphasizing the importance of quality,
and seemed to have received much information as to why this was important. Several
spoke of customer requirements and seemed to have a different focus on what a ‘good’
performance was and how to achieve it. The expectations for increased productivity was
still perceived as harsh, but seemed to be less of a concern at this time than it had been
earlier.
The Polish management had taken concrete action to emphasize the importance of
quality. They had developed detailed descriptions of the work processes and made these
available to the workers. They also had time to develop many of those things they earlier
had argued were lacking in the transfer process. They had kept their focus on the need
for clear specifications, defined methods, standard procedures, and had developed these
themselves.
In one specific area, training, the development was substantial. For some posts in the
production, training and exams were repeated every six months. The production workers
said they felt more confident in their work. Also, all new employees received adequate
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training when they started, and were defined as ‘trainees’ until they had received enough
experience and passed their exams. For the management it was a key issue to make
everybody fully aware of their tasks and responsibilities, and to provide the resources
people needed. Even though there were constant changes and new products to learn
frequently, the workers we spoke to knew more about their job, and seemed to tackle
new tasks easier now than before.
On the other hand, the technical support the workers received in production was a
cause for complaint. Like earlier, the technicians were blamed for not having enough time,
and some suspected, for lacking competence. This was also related to the relationship
between the workers and the technicians which I will return to below.
There was also more emphasis on information than before. There were regular
meetings for team leaders, and plenary meetings every month. At these meetings the
production workers received information as to future plans for productions, complaints
from customers, the current level of productivity and general quality issues. In addition,
the level of absenteeism was presented, and the names of the five people who had been
most absent were posted. Among the workers, the latter information was not appreciated,
and they felt it was not right to name these workers. The meetings in general were ap-
preciated, even though both workers and management acknowledged that the meetings
consisted of presentations and lacked dialogue.
The administration manager in Pruszkow perceived herself as the employees’ rep-
resentative, and had pushed for changes which could improve their working conditions.
A social and health representative had been appointed among the workers. This rep-
resentative mostly received applications for loans from individual workers which she
presented to the management. While the management made the final decisions there was
a social fund available for these applicants. However, many of the workers we spoke
to doubted that this representative was able to make much difference at the plant. A
suggestion box had also been posted which allowed the workers to complain or propose
ideas.
The central management in Norway had arranged an internal management course
for the management in Pruszkow during which the emphasis was cooperation and team
work. This had been appreciated by the participants, and some argued that closer co-
operation within the management could also improve the relations in general at the
plant.
Even though many new employees had been recruited, the teams seemed to be more
integrated and autonomous than earlier. The positions of foremen had been preserved,
but the teams were working more independently now with increased experience. While
most of the workers we spoke to said there was good cooperation within their team,
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some said the cooperation was bad and it was due to many new members who were not
well acquainted with their colleagues or their work. Apart from this, there had not been
other changes in the organization structure.
In general, conditions at the plant seemed to be perceived as more predictable than
earlier. The work load was heavy, there were long working hours and the salary was low,
but workers stressed that they were paid on time, the environment was nice and clean
and there was more emphasis on safety than in other Polish factories. The numbers also
confirm the positive development at the plant. From 2002 – 2003 the productivity in the
Polish unit increased by 20%, while the staff grew by 60% and the variety in number of
articles produced by 63%. In 2003 the unit was producing all the cable mats for internal
production in Europe.
6.4.2 Social atmosphere
The majority of the workers we spoke to seemed more at ease with their job, and felt
more secure and confident. However, there were still a number of complaints as to the
social atmosphere at the plant. The management also seemed to be more aware of these
problems now, and had attempted to improve the situation. Some of the members of the
management had explicitly worked on their personal approach, attempting to make the
workers more comfortable relating to them. According to the management, the subject
of internal communication was also more challenging now because of the expansion and
the many new employees. But, like before, this area tended not to be prioritized due to
time pressure and the need to consider the daily business first.
The relationship between the workers and the technicians was still problematic. Ac-
cording to the workers, the technicians were supposed to instruct them every time a
new part was to be produced, but the technicians were not always available. When they
were not available, the production still needed to proceed, but if there were mistakes, it
was the production workers who were blamed. Several complaints had been made about
several of the technicians but few changes had occurred. Some of the technicians as well
as members of the management were criticized for treating the employees with a lack of
respect and disdain. This was also confirmed by the administration manager who said
some members of management did not consider the workers as “human beings”, but
saw them foremost as a an asset for production. The workers suspected that they were
viewed as less valuable than people higher up in the organization, and that their opinions
counted for less. For many, it was considered important that managers greeted them and
spoke directly to them. But a number of workers said this rarely occurred. In addition,
they stated that their work was rarely appreciated. In summary, most of the workers we
spoke to claimed that they were not recognized by members of the management. Their
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opinions were rarely asked for, their good performances rarely recognized and they felt
they were treated with less respect.
6.4.3 Pruszkow – Åmotfors and Kongsberg
With time the Polish management seemed to feel more integrated and involved with
other parts of Kongsberg Automotive. There were also indications that the level of
trust between the local management and the company’s central management had grown.
The Polish management argued that since they had proven themselves now they also
received more trust and authority from the top-management. The flow of information
had improved and the top-management were perceived as more open than earlier. This
was partly explained by more familiarity with procedures and routines so that more in-
formation was readily available to them. Also, some of the former contacts in Sweden
and Norway had been replaced with people with a more open attitude.
Several said they felt the general attitude towards the Polish unit had improved. They
felt they were more respected now than earlier, and that their advice was sought after
to a greater extent. However, even though they felt they had the authority they needed
now, they still felt left out in the planning phases, and that they were not included early
enough in the decision-making processes. As earlier, they still felt they needed to be very
well prepared if they were to argue for changes. Detailed plans or long lists of arguments
were developed when they wanted to address a problem that needed to be solved. In
summary, the Polish management still expressed a desire for increased involvement or
participation as to the decisions taken in Scandinavia.
6.5 Summary
As early as June 2001, a member of the steering committee and central management in
Norway described the production in the Polish factory as normal. Some products were
still sent to Sweden for inspection before reaching the customer, but the quality was
reported to be good. In other words, it took about one year from the decision was made
until the Polish factory was operating on a full scale. However, this fast development
had its costs.
Limited resources and a desire for a fast establishment led to a planning phase which
was restricted in time and scope. The view of the central management was that it was
better to be prepared to handle the problems as or if they occurred later, than to prepare
for everything in minute detail. As shown above, the Polish management in particu-
lar opposed this view. They had expected to find detailed plans, specifications, correct
documentation etc., but this was lacking in the transfer to Poland.
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The planning phase was mostly focused on economic and logistical factors, and lacked
a focus on work processes, training and social conditions. These areas needed to be re-
solved eventually as they were causing low productivity, bad quality and a tense social
atmosphere at the plant. When it came to information about the local context, the central
management relied heavily on other companies. As a consequence, challenges related
to internal conditions at the plant ensued. The company’s practice of “lean production”
was not immediately adaptable to conditions in Pruszkow and the Polish management
changed the organization somewhat after a while. The project phase had an emphasis on
participation and involvement of the workers. This stood in contrast to the management
style introduced in the regular production phase, emphasizing discipline, hierarchy and
clear orders. While this change was heavily criticized by the workers, they also became
more confident in the end as to what was expected of them. The differences between the
management style in the Swedish-run project group and the Polish management created
problems that had long-term consequences for the social climate in the Polish unit.
Likewise, difficulties arose when it came to logistics and implementation of the ad-
ministrative system SAP. To operate in a new country involved challenges in itself, and
at times these were aggravated by lack of resources and dedicated personnel. Formal
communication channels did not work properly, and areas of responsibility were not
always clearly defined. In addition, limited documentation and a lack of specifications
from the parent company created problems, as did a lack of support and suspicions of
passive resistance from the units the production was transferred from.
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7 The local organization in South Korea.
7.1 Introduction
This chapter will focus on the establishment of Kongsberg Automotive’s factory in
Buzan, South Korea. The plant was bought by the company in 2001, and the following
material is based on interviews conducted in June-July 2002. We also had the chance to
discuss the development of the unit with representatives from other units who had been
involved with the establishment in South Korea. The material was later supplemented
by a survey study conducted at the plant in August 2003.
The following pages will describe the development at the plant in Buzan from the
time of the Korean owners, through the take-over process and finally to the present
situation with two Scandinavian managers present in South Korea. I will emphasize
the experiences of the local employees when faced with the changes introduced by the
new owners, and see how the organization developed as a cause of these changes and
subsequent adaptation by local employees and foreign management. A timeline for the
historical development is presented below.
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Agent office 
handling 
sales in 
Buzan, South 
Korea.
Plans for 
establishment in 
South Korea 
Acquisition Jung 
Ang, Korean 
manager 
Scandinavian 
manager  
Stronger 
Scandinavian 
presence. 
New 
factory  
Figure 7-1 Development of Kongsberg Automotive Ltd., Korea
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The plant in Yangsan is controlled and supervised by the head office in Norway.
Even though the South Korean plant is to produce its own Korean products for the first
years, and is therefore less dependent on centralized functions such as purchasing and
R&D, the unit is still dependent on maintaining close relations to the head office and
the unit in Mullsjø, Sweden. When it comes to computerized coordination and control
systems, the Yangsan plant is expected to implement the same systems as elsewhere
in the company. The central IT-department is situated in Kongsberg, and the SAP ad-
ministrator in Mullsjø. To implement these systems and adapt them to the local Korean
conditions there is close contact between personnel from these units and the Korean
factory. In daily activities there is also close contact with the finance department at the
head office.
7.2 The acqusition of Jung Ang
Kongsberg Automotive was present in South Korea through a local sales agency for a
number of years. The agency handled sales contracts and dealt directly with the cus-
tomers on behalf of the company. However, in 2000 it was decided that they needed
a stronger presence in Asia and establishing production in South Korea was seen as a
feasible alternative. Two representatives from the sales agency were given the respon-
South Korean unit
Head office, 
Norway 
Hvittingfoss,  
Sweden 
Figure 7-2 Units cooperating with the South Korean plant
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sibility of exploring options in the area. In Yangsan City outside Buzan in the south
of the country, a well-established Korean factory, Jung Ang, was for sale. Jung Ang
was a steel manufacturer established in 1972 as Yangji Metal Co. Ltd. and had been
producing clutch servos since the middle of the 1970s. The main item was a clutch
booster especially designed for the Korean market. In 2001, the automotive division of
the company stood for around 80% of the company’s production, while the remaining
20% consisted of military production, where foreign ownership was not wanted. The
two agents from the agency handled most of the negotiations and paperwork prior to the
acquisition, and Kongsberg Automotive bought the automotive division of Jung Ang in
April 2001.
Our respondents estimated that Jung Ang had a market share of about 70% for the
clutch booster, and that they were highly competitive on other products as well. On the
other hand the respondents also stated that while it was a main actor in the market, the
company was running with low productivity, the profits were meager and the owners
lacked capital for the necessary investments. Both Jung Ang and Kongsberg Automotive
were producing clutch actuation systems, but they had different products and were not
in competition. Most of Jung Ang’s products were copies of former Japanese products.
According to the respondents, the basis for the Korean economy had been to copy Ja-
panese products. The problem was that the Koreans had rarely invested to further develop
these products and were now suffering in competition with more up-to-date Western
products.
Most of the Korean employees viewed the acquisition of Jung Ang by Kongsberg
Automotive in a positive light. Even though it was foreign ownership it was seen to
represent more capital and more opportunities for the future. In addition, most of the
employees had high expectations as to improvements in working conditions, salaries
etc. as a consequence of new ownership.
7.3 Jung Ang and “the Korean management system”
Jung Ang was a Korean company, and its organization was based on a traditional Ko-
rean system. The organizational hierarchy, its remuneration systems, and the production
system were in line with a traditional Korean company. Several of the respondents de-
scribed Jung Ang as old-fashioned and rigid, but also as an organization where there had
been a sense of mutual responsibility among the employees. The working conditions
had been bad and some of the tasks hard, but on the other hand, there had not been too
much pressure on the individual worker.
The organization had been based on a strict hierarchy, where all employees were
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ranked in terms of super and sub-ordination. The criteria for advancement were based
on education, age, experience and gender. Performance based remuneration was not ap-
plied in Jung Ang. Apart from two production workers, all employees had been males.
The system of seniority had been upheld, in terms of authority, salaries and hierarchi-
cal positions. The organizational hierarchy as well as a detailed system of titles offered
guidelines for proper behavior. Proper professional behavior was to maintain order and
harmony in the organization, and was based on respect, obedience and patience. Parallel
to these behavioral norms was also a sense of collectivism and the management was ex-
pected to treat the workers with consideration. The relationship between super and sub-
ordinate was based on patriarchism. In the same vein, the company organized a number
of activities for the employees outside working hours. On these occasions management
and workers could meet on more equal terms in social contexts. These were considered
important events because they allowed for improved contact and relationships between
workers as well as management. As such Jung Ang represented a traditional and fam-
iliar organization for the Korean employees. Many aspects of this organization changed
when Kongsberg Automotive took over, but not at once. The plant was led by a Korean
manager the first six months.
When it came to the products the factory was to produce, no changes were antici-
pated for the first few years. Jung Ang’s former products were still sought after in the
Korean market, and while Kongsberg Automotive’s products were included alongside
Jung Ang’s former products these were still to be produced in Norway. During the first
few years the already existent production was to be improved, but the introduction of
new products was not to happen for some time yet.
7.3.1 Korean management
After the acquisition, Kongsberg Automotive hired one of the before mentioned agents
as the local plant manager. It was argued that he knew Korea, the customers and
the local conditions, and that he was familiar with the company. With foreign own-
ership, the local employees expected to see changes in terms of renovation of the
facilities, salary increases and improved working conditions. Also the young and well-
educated employees anticipated improved career opportunities and a greater disre-
gard for the seniority system. However, none such changes came about during the
first months. Furthermore, the changes that occurred were mostly perceived as nega-
tive by the local employees. By his former colleagues, the Korean manager was
criticized for not cooperating with the rest of the management, and was described as
reluctant to listen to advice. The production workers expected improvements, but the
results were layoffs. In the production, it was decided to outsource some smelting
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tasks which were too expensive. This resulted in lay-offs of 7-8% of the production
workers.
Kongsberg Automotive had hired the Korean manager because he was seen to be
familiar with the company, but it turned out that his knowledge was limited. In addition,
he did not receive much training or introduction when he started. As a consequence,
many of the company’s routines, procedures and guidelines were not followed. Also,
the central management in Norway had limited knowledge of the details of business in
Korea, and had thus limited control over the unit. The development of the plant did not
meet expectations. Some of the problems at the plant were also due to Jung Ang’s former
customers, who had difficulties accepting that their supplier had changed name and was
under foreign ownership. Because of this, it was decided that Jung Ang’s former logo
would be used for some time together with Kongsberg Automotive’s. Considerable ef-
forts were used towards maintaining the existent customer relations, stressing continuity,
and that the producers and the products were the same as earlier.
In addition to these challenges, it was discovered that the Korean manager had made
a ‘private loan’ on behalf of the company. This was possible because the manager had
the stamps of the president of the company, and Korean banks did not demand any per-
sonal signatures beyond the stamps. The Korean manager was thus fired due to attempts
of embezzlement and soon replaced by a Norwegian manager.
7.3.2 Norwegian management.
In October 2001, the Korean manager was replaced by a Norwegian who had experience
from the company in Norway and Sweden. He was already prepared to move to South
Korea as a production supervisor, but received instead the position of plant manager. He
was regarded as one who could ensure that the company’s policies were followed. Even
though he was young, he had a lot of experience within the company and was seen to
have the right attitude to work in Korea possessing both humbleness and decisiveness.
Putting a young man in charge of the plant was a breach with the Korean seniority
system, but it seems to have been accepted by both managers and workers. This was also
because the former sales manager now received the Korean title of isa – director, and
could thus be perceived as the ‘Korean plant manager’. He had ample local knowledge.
The Norwegian manager approached his task with a humble stance, explicitly stress-
ing that he had much to learn of Korean culture and from the local employees. He saw
cultural knowledge as the key to successful leadership in Korea, and spent the first months
learning as much as possible before he effected too many changes. This was appreci-
ated by the Koreans who acknowledged his eagerness to learn about Korean culture.
The Norwegian manager established a close cooperative relationship with the Korean
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isa and other managers. When changes were to be introduced these were included in
the discussions. He also attempted to approach the production workers, but this proved
more difficult because of language barriers and due to the seniority system. Proper be-
havior from the workers in a seniority system is to speak directly to their own superior
and complaints should not be expressed to someone above the immediate superior.
7.3.2.1 Organization structure
One of the first changes the Norwegian manager made was in the organization structure.
As seen earlier, according to the policy of the company, the organization must be lean,
avoiding unnecessary resources for administration or other tasks. In addition, managers
as well as workers needed to be prepared to step out of their own area of responsibility
and take on menial tasks when needed, for example to book airplane tickets themselves
or other secretarial tasks. At the plant in Yangsan, the management were relatively
few individuals and were, in this sense, lean already. But there was a need to make
for a more flexible organization. The Norwegian manager conducted interviews with
the employees and based on these as well as discussions, he drew a new organization
chart. The traditional hierarchy was broken in the sense that individual managers were
given more autonomy in their respective areas. This also meant that information and
decisions did not need to pass through the whole hierarchy, from top to bottom of the
organization. On the other hand, other aspects of the seniority system were preserved.
Older managers were not surpassed by younger and less experienced ones. Above the
different managers was the Korean who held the title of isa, and he was thus second in
command to the Norwegian manager who was plant manager. Other people also kept
their Korean titles, even if their area of responsibility and the internal authority structure
diverted some from the Korean organization model.
It was considered important to maintain the Korean system of titles1 in the organiz-
ation, even though changes to the traditional hierarchy were implemented. This was
especially important in relation to customers and others. The Korean - isa - had earlier
been in charge of the sales department, and still had an important role to play with
regards to the customers. There was disagreement between the Norwegian and the Ko-
reans about the relationships to the customers. While the Norwegian was arguing that
they needed better payment terms, and renegotiation of some parts of the contracts, the
Koreans were reluctant to do something which they perceived could jeopardize close
customer relations. As the Koreans saw it, it was considered normal to quarrel with
your customers in the West, but not in Korea, here, a good friendly relationship was
1) In a traditional Korean organization the system of titles may have as many as 18 different levels.
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preserved through politeness and harmony. However, the Norwegian manager engaged
in renegotiation with one customer together with the Korean managers and was able to
change the terms in the contract. After this successful negotiation, there seemed to be
more openness between the Koreans and the Norwegian about the company’s strategies
with regards to the customers. In fact, the Koreans realized that in negotiations it could
be advantageous to have a foreign manager they could blame the strategy on whenever
they needed to play tough.
7.3.2.2 Communication and formality
The Norwegian manager attempted to decrease the level of formality in the organization.
As he saw it, the high level of formality hindered the flow of information and coop-
eration between the different parts of the organization. One of the principles in lean
manufacturing is participation. It was therefore considered important to increase com-
munication, especially between the different managers and the production workers. He
attempted to initialize projects where these would work together. He addressed people
by their first names, omitting titles. And he asked that all employees were equally re-
sponsible to do menial tasks, such as preparing coffee. Older managers had earlier left
this to younger or female employees.
An English interpreter was hired, to help with translation tasks between those who
did not speak English and the Norwegian manager, as well as the head office in Norway.
The interpreter was also supposed to hold English courses every morning for employees
on the management level to try to bridge the language barriers on a longer-term per-
spective. Only three people on management level could speak English in the company.
The Norwegian manager had made some attempts to learn Korean on his own, but with
little success. The English courses were not followed through though, as more immediate
business was prioritized. Most participants said their progress in English was slow. In
addition, the interpreter was trained as neither an interpreter nor teacher, and her English
skills were not impressive. There were many translation tasks needed to be done during
the working day, and it was sometimes difficult to arrange for time with the interpreter.
For the reasons above, most of the communication at the plant was in Korean.
For the Norwegian manager himself, the interpreter also functioned as one who could
explain things related to the organization, the culture or Korea in general. He would
ask her for information about issues in the organization that was hard for him to obtain
and she would function as an interpreter of the organization as well as the language. On
the other hand, this was a difficult situation for the interpreter as she came in situations
where conflicting loyalties were at play. After about a year in the job, she resigned,
this mostly due to difficulties related to who she was to report to, and the conflicting
133
Jung Ang and “the Korean management system”
expectations towards her from different people. She was replaced by a new interpreter/
teacher shortly after.
Another change made by the plant manager was to make regular rounds in the pro-
duction hall, either together with a Korean manager who could speak English or with
the interpreter. This was an attempt to make himself visible for the production workers,
and to be open for suggestions and complaints from the workers themselves. The Nor-
wegian manager had experience with the production from the factories in Scandinavian,
and engaged himself in the details of the production at the plant in Korea. However,
few of the production workers engaged in dialogue with the manager, and the manager
himself was unsure as to how they felt about his initiative. Another step he took to
increase the communication with the production workers was increased efforts to pre-
sent visual information. These were graphs and figures posted in the production hall,
representing information about the production, the products, and future plans. He also
arranged plenary meetings with all the staff. In these meetings issues like production
levels, orders, and quality problems were addressed, and the staff was encouraged to
voice suggestions, complaints or other ideas.
In order to increase cooperation between the management level and the production
workers, he also attempted to initialize projects groups consisting of both workers and
managers, on specific areas. Several managers were reluctant as to these groups, but the
Norwegian manager stated that future and pending projects would have to include both
workers and managers if they were to be approved. The argument from the managers
was that the production workers were not ready to participate in a group with open
discussions where they would be expected to raise their opinions freely and perhaps in
opposition to a super-ordinate.
The cooperation between the Norwegian manager and his colleagues on the manage-
ment level was more substantial, despite the language barrier and the constraints evoked
by the seniority system. The Norwegian manager was repeatedly stressing the need for
constructive feedback and critical debate. Some, but not all of the managers were ready
to openly voice their opinions. He used different strategies in order to provoke deba-
tes. He consciously held back his own opinion and suggestions, so that his managers
would not feel obliged to follow the ideas of their super-ordinate. Sometimes, he would
also propose the impossible in order to provoke reactions. Another attempt was to have
personnel from other parts of the company evaluate processes in the Yangsan plant,
and to initiate discussions between the Koreans and the foreigners over the results after
on. While most of the Koreans were reluctant towards these processes, the Norwegian
manager felt they made for useful ideas and solutions.
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7.3.2.3 Relations Korea - Scandinavia
Another, important part of the responsibility of the Norwegian manager was to bridge
the information and communication gap between the Korean plant and the head office.
Kongsberg Automotive’s principles of lean manufacturing and just-in-time production
were attempted introduced step by step. To a large extent this consisted of introducing
the company’s procedures for budgeting, reporting and planning. To the Koreans the
new procedures were more detailed than earlier and involved much more documentation.
The formalization and standardization of the new procedures was a cause for frustration
among the Korean managers. Standard reports to the Korean government and others
were kept in the same format as earlier, and the new reports to the Norwegian head
office came in addition as they also involved other ways of allocating expenses.
While the Norwegian manager had authority to a certain extent, many of the de-
cisions regarding the plant in Korea were now taken by the management in Norway.
Decisions were therefore not taken as quickly as earlier, and the Korean managers felt
they lacked autonomy. The new procedures were also seen to diverge somewhat from
the local needs, and the strict standards that were posed was perceived as a limitation.
On the other hand it was acknowledged that the increased systematization allowed for
improved control in terms of quality, finances or other issues. The other side of the plant
manager’s responsibility was to pass the local Korean knowledge to the Scandinavian
management, and to explain differences and local needs. Two of the Korean managers
were also on visits to their respective departments in Scandinavia in order to get train-
ing and be introduced to the company’s policies and systems. One of the problems the
Korean unit experienced during this period was the timeframes they were expected to
adhere to in the budget- and other processes. While many of these processes were mere
routine in the units in Scandinavia, the Korean unit needed a longer time to create the
process and obtain the results as this was the first time it was done here. This was one of
the issues the Norwegian manager discussed with his superiors in Scandinavia, in order
to create a greater understanding for the specific situation at the plant in Yangsan.
7.3.2.4 SAP and administration systems
During the first year, the company’s SAP system was not introduced at the plant in
Korea. The implementation of SAP started in June-July 2002. Up to that point, reports,
budgets and plans were prepared in Excel and sent by e-mail to the Norwegian head
office. The work on adapting and implementing SAP was initiated with introductory
courses to the various managers at the plant, and with visits from the Swedish SAP-
manager. Also discussions with Korean managers about the specifics of Korean law and
regulations were initiated. In addition to the SAP, the Norwegian manager felt that a tool
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like CEDAC2 was needed, to introduce a more systematic way of working with projects
related to improvements. CEDAC is a tool for improving quality and productivity which
may aid in formulating the important elements of a project and how it should proceed.
CEDAC training for managers and some of the production workers started in August
2002 and by October, four CEDAC projects had been initiated. These projects involved
both managers and production workers, like the Norwegian manager had asked. In line
with the strengthened emphasis on quality, there were also plans to certify the plant in
accordance with the QS9000 quality system. The system was introduced during the fall
of 2002.
7.3.2.5 New facilities
In April 2002 the factory was moved to new facilities within the same town. It was in
an industrial park which offered amongst other things a shared canteen for the various
industrial companies. The new building improved the working conditions in the pro-
duction hall and the office area. There was also a meeting room which previously had
been lacking. Some of the area was renovated before the move. However, the bathroom
facilities were cause for complaints among the production workers after the move3. The
layout of the plant was based on the same principles as in other factories in Kongsberg
Automotive. The production manager had an office in the production hall, and the rest
of the management group was also close by. Based on the principle of just-in-time
production, the stocks of materials and the size of the warehouse were reduced.
Kongsberg Automotive and the new manager emphasized increased productivity to
a greater extent than before. The changes in the production system were focused on in-
troducing the so-called ‘one-piece-flow’ and ‘just-in-time’ principles. Each operating
position was scrutinized to find ways of making them more effective and profitable.
Changes were made which altered the production flow and tasks. Production workers,
who earlier had waiting time between the various items they produced, were now in-
structed to change their working processes in order to limit the passive periods. Whereas
the production earlier had been based on traditional assembly work, where the items
passed from one operator to the next, the new system involved operators doing larger
parts of the production process. As a part of these efforts, some machines were moved
2)
‘Cause-and-Effect Diagram with the Addition of Cards’
3) The bathroom facilities for the production workers and the office personnel were in different locations.
The office personnel had separate facilities for both genders, while the male and female production workers
shared the same bathroom. Neither of the bathrooms was particularly clean. Even though it has been common
in Korea that men and women share the same public bathroom, the employees had expected that a foreign
Western company would provide improved facilities for both genders.
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closer to each other, and tools were placed in close proximity to the operating position.
The idea was that there would be only one operator on each machine and they therefore
needed less space around each machine. However, to some extent the production work-
ers continued to work as they had earlier. In the case of a montaging cell on the line for
clutch actuators, there could at times be as many as five people trying to do the oper-
ations, and at other times the cell would not be in use. Because the production workers
did not adhere to the ‘one man – one machine’ principle the new production area was
perceived as crammed. The reduction of inventories and stocks along the production
lines were introduced, but according to the respondents the most common problem in
production was that they were lacking materials. The changes introduced by the new
owners involved a completely different way of thinking, according to our Korean re-
spondents. The employees in Yangsan demonstrated a willingness to change, but it was
difficult at times to understand the rational behind the changes. Some efforts had been
made to explain the logic behind the changes, but during the first year there was still
confusion and some changes remained halfheartedly introduced.
The Norwegian manager emphasized quality to a greater extent than had earlier
been done. The customers in South Korea were seen to be less demanding compared to
customers elsewhere. When customers received damage parts they saw little problem
in returning these to have them fixed, whereas customers of other parts of Kongsberg
Automotive would demand changes at the plant in order to avoid such problems oc-
curring in the future. The new manager introduced control systems and improvement
techniques which were aimed at avoiding the recurring quality problems. Among other
things, an electronic control system was put to use which allowed for better control than
the previous system.
In other areas related to production there were few changes in the first months. Some
of the workers suffered from strain injuries from many years of production work, and
they had expected that improvement in this area would come with foreign ownership.
As the workers saw it, while there were changes in the production tasks, little was done
to make the operations lighter or less harmful. On the other hand, the changes that had
occurred in terms of ‘one-piece-flow’ production did allow for more variations in work
operations, something which would help on strain injuries. But the production workers
did not see it like this in the beginning. In addition, the management had plans to intro-
duce other changes directed towards preventing injuries, but these did not occur during
this first period as investments were necessary. Even though Kongsberg Automotive
also had plans for changing the product range and machinery at the factory, this was
viewed in a long-term perspective. The plan was to introduce the company’s own pro-
ducts to replace some of Jung Ang’s old products which were of lesser quality. However,
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the head office found that such a change needed to be done slowly and in a long-term
perspective, also dependent on building a customer base in the area for these products.
As a result of the various changes aimed at increasing the productivity, the production
workers experienced an increase in work- and time pressure. To a greater extent, the
pressure for productivity was now placed on each individual worker whereas earlier this
had been placed more on the workers collectively.
7.3.2.6 Remuneration system
The Norwegian manager also wanted to change the remuneration system towards re-
warding the performance of individual employees. The change introduced at this time
was seen as a gradual change of practice, and more was foreseen to change during the
next years. A new model was included in the salary system where employees would be
evaluated annually, and be measured by a certain number of points. These points were
thus the basis for the subsequent wage development and advancement opportunities. The
new model did not disregard completely the former criteria of gender, experience and
age, but still involved a radical change in terms of rewarding performance. In addition,
there were changes introduced in regards to the women’s salaries. The women had been
underpaid compared to men in Jung Ang, as in Korean working life in general. Women
and also some of the young men therefore received a relatively higher increase in their
salaries compared to the older, more experienced workers. The new model also included
negotiations which were followed by individual meetings with the production manager,
and a written appraisal signed by the Norwegian manager. The appraisal included the
reasons for the wage that was offered, as well as advice for further improvement. At this
time the appraisal was based on an evaluation done by the production manager, however,
during the next months they were planning to introduce appraisal interviews with each
worker to be able to discuss with each person how improvements could be reached. This
had never been done at the plant earlier, and diverged from former practices.
The first wage settlement based on the new model was undertaken in May 2002.
Most of the Koreans were positive to the changes, but there were also some negative
opinions. While the wages of each worker earlier had been posted for everybody to
see, this information was now left for each person to disclose in line with principles for
wage settlements in Scandinavia. Some reacted to this and felt the social atmosphere
was poisoned by the secrecy. The move towards rewarding individual achievements was
by some seen to complicate the relations among the workers and made for more com-
petition. The former collective feeling based on order and harmony in Jung Ang was
seen to be challenged by these changes.
Other changes also affected the salaries. During the Jung Ang period, the work-
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ing week was six days, but with foreign ownership and changes advocated by Korean
authorities, Saturday was no longer considered a working day. The Norwegian manager
also reduced the use of overtime in line with the company’s policy. Most of the workers
felt they were required to work harder and produce more than earlier, they had reduced
opportunities to earn extra money through overtime and felt the wage settlement did not
compensate for these changes.
7.3.2.7 Labor unions
The Korean labor unions had not been present at Jung Ang and were not at the present
plant either. South Korean labor unions have a reputation for being militant and politically
radical movements, and their presence is not appreciated by Korean or foreign owners.
Neither Jung Ang nor the present plant in Yangsan was large enough to attract the at-
tention of the labor unions and according to both workers and managers this was good.
Neither missed the presence of unions. On the other hand, the Norwegian manager had
decided that he wanted to establish a forum with elected representatives from the pro-
duction and the office workers in order to enhance the cooperation with the employees.
Starting from July 2002, regular meetings would be held and the company’s finances,
suggestions for improvements and employee’s comments and complaints would be on
the agenda.
7.3.2.8 Symbolism
A large difference between the practices of the traditional Korean firm and a Scandinavian
one is the emphasis on social gatherings, gifts and other such benefits. The Norwegian
manager, in line with the policy of the head office, wanted to limit this practice. The head
office was much aware that gifts to customers, suppliers, employees and so forth could
be mistaken for bribery. It was also seen to involve considerable costs for the company.
While there was a tradition for using gifts to strengthen the alliances between people in
South Korea, the Norwegian management wanted to limit the practice as much as was
deemed possible.
The number of social arrangements and use of gifts at the Yangsan plant was reduced.
The budget proposal for 2002 was 20 million KRW, or 130.000 NOK. This was by the
head office still viewed as a fairly large amount for a company such as Kongsberg Auto-
motive, but represented a drastic reduction from earlier. Gifts were offered to employees
at important life events such as weddings or on the death of close family members, and at
major holidays. Compared to other foreign companies in South Korea, the gifts offered
at Kongsberg Automotive were still considered quite generous. Also gifts to employees
in other, cooperating companies are quite common in South Korea. For example, if the
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man who negotiated the sales contract on behalf of his company experiences a loss in
his family it is expected those who received the contract pays their respect by giving
money to the funeral. Kongsberg Automotive heeded these practices, but limited instead
gifts related to holidays or other events which could easier be understood as attempts
of bribery or corruption.
Most of the employees at the plant expected a certain number of social events to
be arranged by the management. This was viewed as something they were entitled to.
Earlier there had been one-two dinners a month for the various departments, and two
picnics a year for the whole company. So far, under foreign ownership this had been
reduced drastically. One joint picnic for all employees had been arranged, in addition to
some dinners arranged by different managers for their respective groups of employees.
The Norwegian manager was ambivalent about these gatherings as he saw them invol-
ving excessive drinking, and wanted to have such events only on special occasions or
when it meant to reward an extraordinary performance. The Koreans on the other hand,
placed a different value on these events. Social gatherings outside of work meant a great
deal for building relationships within the company. The strict hierarchy of super- and
subordinate could be disregarded to a certain extent at such events, and these were thus
seen as an occasion to talk to someone more freely than you could at work.
A recent trend in Korea at this time was to limit social events which involved al-
cohol, as hiking in the mountains or to go golfing was becoming increasingly popular.
The Norwegian manager was aware of these changes, and attempted to introduce these
at the Yangsan plant as well. Even though such changes were appreciated by the em-
ployees, the Norwegian manager and others from head office were also criticized for
being reluctant to get drunk and in this manner establish friendships with their Korean
colleagues.
The social events were important functions in maintaining and building relationships
among the employees, and the use of gifts was also important in other aspects than
what the Norwegian manager was accustomed to from his home context. While gifts
were used as means to recognize the other, it has a larger significance in Korea, in that
the gift shows your family, friends and others that the company appreciates you. The
exchange of gifts is also means to confirm the obligations that two parties have towards
each other. On this background, the Koreans in Kongsberg Automotive were skeptical
to the Norwegian manager’s attempt to reduce social events and gifts, and especially in
relationships to customers or suppliers.
The Norwegian manager wanted to replace traditional means of appraisals, like gifts,
titles and promotions with remuneration systems acknowledging individual performance.
This also involved a move away from the use of symbols which had been important at
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the plant during the Jung Ang period. Titles, promotions, and gifts, from money to the
company’s t-shirts, were means of demonstrating to the outside world that the company
appreciated you as an employee. Many of the Koreans were especially concerned about
what they called the visual effect, that the appreciation was something one could show
to others, also outside the company.
Because of the visual aspect of symbols, the Koreans were concerned about the clothes
the company offered them, and that these should be clean when they walked outside
the factory. Working conditions, like the standard of the bathroom facilities were also
important in this respect. Others would acknowledge that the company appreciated its
workers if the working conditions were up-to-date, and this was perceived as an important
part of the company’s image.
Even though the foreign owners and management attempted to change certain aspects
of the organization at the plant in Yangsan, much also remained the same. Some things
were not changed as it was considered important to heed local customs and needs, e.g.
the system of titles which customers in particular expected to be in place. Other prac-
tices which were attempted to be changed, proved difficult to alter. The result was that
one year after the Norwegian manager started in Korea, two organizational structures
existed alongside at the Yangsan plant.
7.3.2.9 Two organizational structures
One year after the Norwegian manager had arrived, many changes had taken place, but
much also remained the same. Many practices from the Jung Ang period had been pre-
served despite concrete attempts for change. This was still the case in August 2003, as
much of the below was reconfirmed in questionnaires. While young males and female
employees embraced many of the new changes brought in, the majority, who were ol-
der males were more skeptical and resisted some of the changes. Also, the company’s
employees still related to the same customers and suppliers as earlier, who had certain
expectations towards stability. Alongside the changes introduced by the Norwegian man-
ager and the foreign owners, the former traditional systems of hierarchy, harmony and
etiquette were preserved by the employees. Some of the new changes were therefore
not very substantial as former practices were still heeded.
7.3.2.10 Generation and gender differences
The changes that had been introduced had been received in a variety of ways depend-
ing on a person’s former position in the organization. Some experienced the changes
as advantageous, while others had their former positions and privileges to defend. The
employees at the plant were to a certain extent divided in two groups. The younger em-
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ployees seemed to thrive under foreign leadership, as their efforts were acknowledged
and their initiatives encouraged. They had more opportunities than earlier to develop
and increase their competence, and saw that they were not as inhibited as earlier by a
traditional hierarchic system of promotions. Older employees on the other hand were
more skeptical to the changes and concerned about preserving the traditional Korean
ways. The emphasis on individual achievements and individual responsibility was by
these seen to cause conflict and competition at the plant. This was something which they
feared could destroy the earlier sense of collectivity, order and harmony. The changes
brought in by the foreign management also affected the production workers and office
workers differently.
The production workers had to a greater extent than other groups felt the pressure
for individual achievements, and were the group who were most disappointed with the
new foreign owners. The production workers had harbored great expectations towards
the new owners in terms of improvements of the working conditions and the salaries.
Instead, the great majority of production workers saw little improvement beside the
new renovated facilities. It was the minority of women and younger operators who
had received the largest salary increase, the use of overtime was reduced, and so were
social events and other compensations. Decisions took longer time than earlier, as the
management in Norway needed to be involved. The distance to Norway, the language
barrier and the cultural differences hindered the communication between the production
workers and the management, and made for an impression among the workers that their
influence within the company was reduced.
7.3.2.11 Distorted information
The foreign ownership had made for new challenges related to communication. The
language barrier meant that most needed to articulate themselves in a foreign language
they knew poorly, or to speak through a third person. Even though a translator could be
used, many were concerned that their message would get distorted if they spoke through
a third person. This was also the case for the production workers who felt that their
managers were reluctant to pass their messages up the organizational hierarchy. Several
suggested that certain managers would consciously filter the information. It could be
because they did not want to present their super-ordinate with bad news, or that the in-
formation was negative for themselves. During the summer of 2002 a number of issues
which were seen as related to lack of information were discussed at the plant. While the
Norwegian manager believed the bathrooms for the production workers had been reno-
vated, this was not the case according to the workers. Their repeated complaints had not
been received at the top of the organizational hierarchy. There were also cases where the
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information from the top had not been received among the workers. This concerned es-
pecially information related to the rationale behind the different changes, e.g. the wage
settlements, the changes in production principles etc. Despite these difficulties and the
encouragements from the Norwegian manager, the Koreans did not surpass their super-
ordinates and approach the Norwegian manager directly, because the traditional system
of loyalty in relation to the organizational hierarchy was preserved.
The distortion or lack of information was seen to be related to internal politics at the
plant, but also to cultural differences between the Scandinavians and the Koreans. Most
of the Korean employees emphasized the important role of implicit communication,
and how this was related to preserving harmony and order in the organization. The
foreigners and the Koreans diverged strongly in how they communicated. The Koreans
tended to circumscribe and/or only vaguely mention difficult topics, expecting their lis-
tener to infer the full message. The Norwegian manager in contrast opted for open and
free discussions based on divergent opinions and arguments. The Norwegian manager’s
attempt to introduce joint projects between workers and managers was opposed because
the workers were not seen to be ready to openly oppose their super-ordinates, while the
workers themselves complained that their expectations towards more participation was
not fulfilled. The encouragement to speak directly to the Norwegian manager was well
received among the workers, but the traditional system of loyalty and harmony hindered
them to surpass their super-ordinates. While the Koreans in general were positive to
the changes brought on by foreign ownership, they also saw the rationale in their own
traditional practices.
7.3.2.12 Organizational positions
Changes in the organization structure caused some confusion among both managers
and workers. New positions were introduced, and the old lines of reporting were not
always respected. The solution of giving the second in command the Korean title of isa
– had implications for how the employees related to the Norwegian manager. Most of
the employees could not, or they had difficulties, speaking to the Norwegian manager
because of the language barrier. In addition, he could be perceived as redundant in terms
of the Korean system because there was already a plant manager. The employees at
the factory were more comfortable relating to the isa because of the language, but also
knew that they needed to pay respect to the actual local manager. This was a cause for
confusion among the employees who at times did not know how to behave properly. For
the Norwegian manager who did not speak Korean and who was unfamiliar with Korean
tradition, it was important to have someone who could fulfill the social responsibilities
which follows the role of a plant manager. But while the two people in question seemed
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to agree, the status difference and the division of responsibility between the isa and the
Norwegian were not clearly defined for others in the organization.
Other new roles, like that of the interpreter also caused confusion. The Norwegian
manager expected her to report directly to him, but according to the traditional system
she was supposed to report to a different manager. For some time she therefore received
different orders from different people, and struggled to understand her own position.
The emphasis on a lean organization also caused some difficulties. Different organiz-
ational positions were expected to be more flexible as to which tasks they took on, this
also included menial tasks like brewing coffee. Some respondents found it difficult to
balance between the expectations of the foreign managers, and those norms and values
associated with a more traditional Korean management system. While female employ-
ees at the plant had received a higher salary increase than others, and the differences
between male and female employees in this sense was reduced a bit, these changes did
not affect the treatment of females by their male colleagues. Despite the higher salary
and for some higher responsibilities, the female employees were not included to the
same extent as their colleagues in discussions or projects at the plant.
One year after the Norwegian manager had arrived, two different organizational
structures had developed at the Yangsan plant. Some of the employees were comfortable
relating simultaneously to both, while others felt it was more difficult and struggled with
conflicting norms and expectations, e.g. like the translator. Even though the Norwegian
manager had attempted to alter the traditional Korean organization structure, to a great
extent it was still preserved. He himself had limited access to it as he failed to under-
stand and adhere to the cultural codes and the language, but most of the employees still
related to it as it was the most familiar structure of the two.
The existence of these two structures was a compromise between the changes the
foreign owners wanted to introduce and the traditional Korean management system. The
understanding for how Kongsberg Automotive wanted to have things done had increased
considerably among the Koreans during this time, and it was easier to find workable
compromises as time went by. Most of the respondents were convinced that they in-
creasingly would be able to find compromises in the future, which could accommodate
both local and company needs.
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7.4 Summary
The establishment in South Korea was a challenge for Kongsberg Automotive. The ac-
quisition of Jung Ang was a different endeavor than what they had embarked on earlier.
While earlier factories had been established as greenfields they were now taking over a
fully established organization. In addition, South Korean culture, language and society
were more unfamiliar to them than they had faced before in e.g. Poland or Mexico. The
initial months under Korean leadership showed that it was essential to have somebody
who understood and knew the company to take charge of the new plant. Otherwise they
would not be able to transfer their coordination and control systems, production ideas
and other changes. The main responsibility of the Norwegian manager who was put in
charge was to create a balance between local needs and the expectations of the head of-
fice. He initiated changes in administrative routines which allowed for stronger control
and planning for the head office, but also for the local managers. The local managers
were now preparing two sets of reports, one for local governments and another for the
head office. They expressed frustration over the detailed documentation that they were
expected to produce, but also acknowledged that it gave them new opportunities for
planning. The organizational hierarchy was also changed, especially in terms of areas
of responsibilities and a weakening of the vertical axis of authority. Most appreciated
the changes, but there was also some confusion because some of the changes were not
consistent with the traditional Korean system, and demanded other rules of conduct. This
was also the case for the Norwegian manager’s attempts to introduce open and critical
debates. While most embraced the idea, it was also difficult to implement since these
behavioral norms ran counter to what was traditionally considered proper behavior.
In production an increased emphasis on quality and productivity was introduced as
soon as the factory had moved to new facilities. Also here the changes took some time
to implement, on the other hand, it became quickly visible that the changes affected the
productivity in a positive direction. Because the Koreans saw the improvement quite
quickly, these changes were easier to accept than others. On the other hand, foreign
investments have since 1997 become quite common in South Korea, and together with
the large number of foreign companies there are trends towards change here as well. The
remuneration system the Norwegian manager introduced was new for the former Jung
Ang’s employees, but there is a trend in South Korea towards emphasizing individual
achievements. The change in the wage settlements was accepted by most employees
even though some were concerned that these changes could destroy the harmony and
the sense of collectivity among the employees. And since the changes reduced the dis-
crimination of females, and awarded young employees for their efforts, these groups
were of course the most appreciative. However, all employees were negative to the re-
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duced number of social gatherings and the limitations in the use of gifts. The rationale
behind these practices seemed not to be fully understood by the foreign management,
who thought of these as something ‘extra’, the way it is perceived in e.g. Scandinavian
countries.
Despite the changes initialized by the Norwegian manager, much remained the same.
While many of the changes had been implemented and people adhered to them, there
were also many of the traditional Korean practices still in use. The Koreans behaved
according to these as much as they could without breaching the expectations of the
foreign owners. To behave properly according to both systems simultaneously was at
times difficult, but all our Korean respondents seemed to be positive towards the foreign
management and for the future. As several said, Kongsberg Automotive still needed two
more years to be able to settle properly in South Korea, and to learn about how to do
business in the country. And Kongsberg Automotive itself still has plans to the double
the sales in the area within a five-year period, to bring more products to the factory and
to increase the exports from South Korea to other countries in the region.
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8 Local solutions and local leadership
8.1 Introduction
The question which will be addressed in this chapter is as earlier specified; why is local
leadership crucial for creating local solutions? When faced with the motivations of the
parent company to create a uniform organization, the ability of the subsidiary to create
local solutions is expected to be influenced by the relative power of the unit. But when
it is local leadership which has the central role in translating the interests and needs of
the local unit towards the central management, the approach of local leaders becomes
essential for understanding the local solutions that are created. What role does local lead-
ership have in creating local solutions and what can be seen to influence the approach
of different local managers?
Why and to what extent local solutions were created will be discussed with regards
to the differences between the local units, as well as through time when different local
managers were in charge of the units. I will compare the units on the variables earlier
identified in chapter 2, and discuss their explanatory value. In the last part of this chapter
I will address in more detail why local leadership is crucial for creating local solutions
and what implication answers to this question have for earlier research and theory.
I will focus on how representatives from the local subsidiaries can be seen to push for
local solutions and how their ability and interest in doing so is affected by their social
embeddedness, their interests, power and institutional environment. In new institution-
alism the local manager of a subsidiary has been seen to fight for the independence of
the local unit in opposition to the head office. His capability and interest to do so, has
been found to be dependent on the status of the local unit. A large local unit which is
highly dependent on the local environment and which has organization structures in place
before an acquisition is expected to provide the local manager with more resources to
push for local adaptation than a smaller greenfield establishment which is not dependent
on the local environment. In previous chapters I have identified the different local units
of Kongsberg Automotive and the various local managers who have been a part of their
development.
Social embeddedness was defined in chapter 2 as the effect of social networks. The
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desire and necessity of belonging and adhering to the norms of social networks are
expected to influence the behavior of a boundedly rational actor to choose strategies
which involves other benefits and gains than those merely related to self-interest. A
local manager in a foreign subsidiary acts as the unit’s representative and I expect that
his approach is influenced by how he sees his own role in the local organization and
whether he identifies with having a responsibility for the local workers.
Interests were broadly defined including material goods, as well as ideology, values,
norms and social goods such as status. I expect that a local manager will heed the inte-
rests of the unit in negotiations with the head office. When local adaptation on different
issues is understood as important for the unit and its performance the local manager will
attempt to push for local solutions on these issues.
The power of the local managers to push for local adaptation is relative to the power
and interests of the head office. His capability to choose local solutions depends on how
strong his negotiating power is. His power is depended on the status of the local unit in
terms of size, its dependence on the parent company and the strength of his argument in
terms of how important the local solution is for the unit. A local manager who represents
a unit which is large and less dependent on the parent company will have more power
than a smaller and more dependent unit.
The institutional environment represents regulative, normative and cultural-cogni-
tive systems which influence the local manager in that he will attempt to comply with
rules, norms and beliefs belonging to his institutional environment. I earlier identified
three main institutional environments that are expected to influence the MNC: the local
environment, the parent environment and the global environment of the automotive in-
dustry. The influence of these institutional environments depends on whether the local
leader identifies with and has knowledge of them. A local manager who is familiar with
his local environment is expected to attempt to comply with its norms and rules, but may
also be able to exploit the constraints of the environment. Institutions consist of a myriad
of institutional orders with different reality-systems, and the practices a local manager
chooses do not need to comply with all these systems, but more importantly should not
contradict the relevant institutional orders. Thus, there is not one ‘right’ practice that fits
with one institutional environment, but an indefinite number of alternatives. However,
to be able to find or construct these alternatives, the actor is dependent on knowledge
and experience with the relevant institutions.
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8.2 Local units and local managers
In chapter 3, I discussed the various subsidiaries and to what extent their characteristics
affect whether they have the interest and power to be locally adapted. They are situated
in very different local contexts; the heart of the automotive industry in Detroit USA,
the Rio Grande area of Mexico, a suburb of Warsaw in Poland, and an industrial park
outside Buzan, South Korea. The table below summarizes the differences discussed in
chapter 3.
Table 8-1 The various units
Unit Production Year
Green-
field
Size Parent
Dependency
Local dependency
USA
Sales/proto-
type Seat
Comfort
1996 no 16 High
Medium: customers,
local employees
Mexico Seat Comfort 1999 yes 304 High Low: local employees
Poland Seat Comfort 2000 yes 287 High
Low: local employees,
Polish regulations
South
Korea
Gearshifts 2001 no 33 Medium - Low
High: customers,
suppliers, employees
The interests and capabilities of each unit to be locally adapted are expected to affect
the role of the local manager and his interest and capabilities to push for local practices.
Below I will discuss each of these units and the approach of each of the local man-
agers. I expect that the more familiar the local manager is with the local environment
the more capable and interested he is in pushing for local adaptation. The local leaders
who have been present in the development of each local site vary as to their nationality,
experience, language skills, knowledge of the local site and the extent to which they
are familiar with the local environment, the international automotive industry and the
parent environment. The table below illustrates some of the characteristics of each local
manager.
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Table 8-2 Local managers
Where/Who Nationality Experience w/ institutional
environment
Local language
Local Parent Automotive
1. USA Swedish no yes yes yes
2. USA Belgian yes no yes yes
1. Mexico Swedish no yes yes no
2. Mexico Mexican yes no yes yes
1. Poland Swedish no yes yes no
2. Poland Polish yes no yes yes
1. South Korea Korean yes no no yes
2. South Korea Norwegian no yes yes no
Below I will describe the history from each case and local leader. I will look at how
they chose to adapt to the local context, and fulfill the expectations from the company
and the international automotive industry.
8.2.1 The U.S. unit
As stated in chapter 3, I expect that the U.S. unit will have a high interest in adapting
to their local environment. The local environment of the U.S. unit corresponds with
the international automotive industry since U.S. car manufacturers have been seen to
define many of those rules, norms and shared understanding that are prevalent in this
industry. However, there are also differences in that European car manufacturers which
Kongsberg Automotive in Scandinavia is experienced with have other methods and ex-
pectations. To adapt to the local environment signifies for the U.S. unit to comply with
the expectations of its major customers, something which is considered essential for the
unit’s performance. On the other hand, there is less reason to expect that the unit will
have much power to push for local adaptation. The unit is small and its former status
as an acquired and older unit was significantly changed when production was moved to
Mexico.
There were two different managers in the U.S. unit as we have seen in chapter 5. The
first was a Scandinavian with limited experience of the local institutional environment.
He had earlier worked in Sweden for Scandmec and had experience from the automotive
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industry in Scandinavia and Europe. While he was working in the U.S. unit the unit
was suffering great financial losses. This was due to the cost level developments in the
U.S., but was by our respondents, also attributed to the management itself. Local em-
ployees suggested that the Scandinavian manager was not fulfilling his responsibilities
as a manager, and was not supervising his employees. He was also described as lack-
ing an understanding of how to do business the “American way”. More specifically, it
was stated that the he failed to recognize that business in the US was less ethical than
in Europe, and that this led to unnecessary problems. The head office in Norway also
reacted to the negative figures in the US unit and made for two important changes. The
production was moved to Mexico and a new manager for the US unit was sought.
The first manager in the US unit made few adaptations to the local environment. The
employees in the unit were asking for a different approach towards the customers, but
he did not recognize the need or did not have an interest in changing his own approach
nor that of the company. He spoke the language, but lacked experience from the local
environment, and did not seem to take on a role as a representative for the local em-
ployees. In a way, one may say that he brought norms and beliefs from his own local
environment to the U.S. context, emphasizing a low-key management style, and a lot
of individual freedom to the workers.
Through a recruitment agency, a Belgian with ample experience from the international
automotive industry was hired in 2000. He had lived and worked in the US for many
years, but was also seen to have experience from international and European business
life. He was able to make the US unit break even after only four-five months. He also
brought a different and more visible leadership style to the US unit, emphasizing personal
responsibility and initiative. He agreed with the local employees that the Scandinavian
way of doing business in the US was not aggressive enough and that the Scandinavians
failed to recognize how unethical US business can be. In his dealings with the head
office and board members of the company he emphasized the need to have a different
approach in the US market.
Sales people and others who were working directly with suppliers and customers
were more positive to his approach than others employees in the organization. They
felt his approach in dealing with customers was appropriate for the US market. Those
employees, however, who had a more internal focus with prototype production and de-
signs, were a bit more reluctant. They felt a stronger focus on internal conditions could
be appropriate and were complaining that communication between sales, prototype and
the final production in Mexico was suffering.
While achieving what several local employees had asked for; a stronger customer
focus and turning the US operation around, in the end the new manager seemed to have
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had a too strong focus on fulfilling the expectations of the customer. He did not see eye
to eye with managers at the head office who disagreed with the strategy he was trying to
achieve for the US market. And when Kongsberg Automotive Inc. failed the QS 9000
audit in 2003, this was amongst other things ascribed to a too lenient attitude in nego-
tiations with the customers. The communication issues between the US and Mexico were
now causing severe problems and this was in part ascribed to his failure to understand
the needs of the production unit. During the summer of 2003, a new manager was in put
place in the US, a Norwegian with experience from both the Swedish and Norwegian
units. He was viewed as a manager who would emphasize more strongly the operational
side of the business, and thus one who could make for a more balanced approach in
satisfying both the customers and the internal production.
The second manager in the U.S. heeded what I have earlier defined as the interests
of the unit, complying with customer demands. He pushed for local adaptation on these
issues in negotiations with the head office. This was an approach which took the form
of a collective fight towards the head office, including other employees. According to
the new manager, the rules of the game in the international automotive business were to
be more aggressive and more flexible towards the customer than what the head office
thought. His management style was well adapted to the local conditions, emphasizing
personal responsibility and a visible leadership. On the other hand, his approach did not
meet the expectations of those employees who worked mostly internally in the organiz-
ation; prototype and design workers. While he did succeed to a certain extent towards
the head office, he did not have sufficient power to change the approach of the company
in the U.S. market in the long run.
8.2.2 The Mexican unit
I expect that the Mexican unit has a shared interest with the U.S. unit to adhere to the
expectations of the customers in the U.S. market. In addition, they have an interest in
complying with the local environment in terms of expectations from employees and the
maquila program. While it is a large unit, and this may give them more negotiating
power when faced with the head office, they are also highly dependent on resources from
the sites in Scandinavia. There were two managers in the Mexican unit, first a Swedish
manager with experience from the company and thereafter a Mexican manager.
The Swedish manager was in charge of establishing the unit in Mexico in 1999. He
had worked in Kongsberg Automotive for many years, and was well familiar with the
production systems within the company. He had not worked in Mexico earlier, and did
not speak Spanish. The production system was moved as a carbon copy from the US
to Mexico and the Swedish manager worked closely with both US and Scandinavian
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colleagues in the move. In addition he had one of the company’s main suppliers who
were established close by to assist him. When local Mexican managers were hired they
were able to partake in shaping the organization structure.
The organization structure which emerged in Reynosa was seemingly adapted to a
local Mexican context. Following the advice from Mexican colleagues, and perhaps also
his own expectations as to what a Mexican organization should be like, the organization
structure was more hierarchic than in other units in the company. The argument was that
status and respect for managers in Mexico is achieved by preserving distance between
workers and managers in the organization. Following the hierarchy, the responsibilities
and tasks of the managers were also more defined and separated than in other units in
the company.
Even though this manager had a close relationship with the head office in Norway,
and was well familiar with the company, he was in retrospect criticized for working too
independently in Mexico. He followed through on copying the production process from
the US and Scandinavia, but was later criticized for not heeding advice from either the
supplier in Reynosa nor from people at the head office. The criticism from the head office
was further strengthened by figures showing a high turnover, quality problems and low
productivity. Local employees stated that there had been serious communication prob-
lems at the plant, some due to language barriers as the two Swedish managers in place
did not speak Spanish, but also due to the attitude of both Scandinavian and Mexican
managers. The attitude of some of the managers at the time was described as reluctant
towards engaging in tasks outside of their own responsibilities, and that they distanced
themselves from the production and the workers. The Swedish manager tried to change
the situation by consulting the workers, and received suggestions for improvements.
Free transportation was introduced, the canteen facilities were improved, and in order
to try to induce more workers to return to work after the holidays, a special Christmas
bonus was introduced. However, the problems persevered and a Mexican manager was
hired in 2001.
The Swedish manager can be seen to push for local adaptation in terms of how the
organization structure deviated from the policy and standards of the company, and the
various practices that were introduced for the workers. On the other hand, he seemed
to be heeding too much the advice of local middle-managers who benefited from a
taller hierarchy and who were arguing that it was appropriate in a Mexican context. To
a lesser extent he was able to adapt the organization to the production workers who
felt the distance was too great and that the communication in the organization was not
satisfactory.
The next manager was Mexican. He had not worked in a maquiladora earlier, but
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had previous experience in the area working for international companies and in the
automotive business. He was considered an expert in quality systems, having a cer-
tificate for the six-sigma. Six-sigma is a quality system advocated in the international
automotive business. While lacking any earlier connections to the company itself, he was
well acquainted with local conditions and the international dimension of the automotive
business. As a Mexican he was also fluent in Spanish.
In cooperation with his recently appointed superior in the US unit, he undertook some
important changes at the plant. These were directed towards coping with the severe
quality and productivity problems, as well as with the high turnover. The hierarchy in
the organization was reduced by eliminating a number of managers, and regular pro-
duction workers were offered to advance to positions as team leaders. This made for
shorter distances between workers and managers, and new opportunities for workers to
improve their salaries. He also introduced team leaders in the factory, thus making the
organization structure more similar to the policy of the company. The Mexican man-
ager also changed the production system in a way which was more suited for the local
employees. As he saw it, it was necessary to include poverty in the equation when work-
ing with quality issues in Mexico. One could not expect that the workers were able to
concentrate 100% when they were hungry and worried about how to feed their famil-
ies. He therefore changed the production system from a push to a pull system, a system
which was less vulnerable to quality problems. He also introduced tests or exams for
those who wanted to improve their salaries or take on more responsibilities. This was
done to increase the educational level at the factory and to improve the production in a
longer-term perspective. A new testing machine which could detect quality problems to
a higher standard was brought to use in production. This was a different machine than
what was used elsewhere in the company.
In addition to these structural changes a different management style was introduced.
A style based on closer cooperation between workers and management with a focus on
encouraging initiative both among managers and workers. The turnover improved, even
though it remained higher than in other units in the company1. The Mexican manager
preferred that it was him and not his superior in the US or others who had the direct
contact with the workers, thus avoiding any communication problems that could arise.
While local employees said they earlier felt the factory was not a proper maquiladora
and said this had been some of the reason why workers chose to go to other companies,
1) The maquiladoras have on an average a high turnover (9-10 %) due to the high supply of many similar
jobs in the area, which require few specific skills. With the possibility of gaining a few extra pesos it may be
attractive to change jobs.
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their attitude changed somewhat after these changes. The plant was still seen to be too
small for a maquiladora, but this was now understood to be an advantage as workers had
more possibilities for advancement than in other places. The contact between workers
and managers was now described as good in most cases and few felt they had any dif-
ficulties in approaching their superiors in case of problems. In relation to customers,
the efforts to reduce the production problems had succeeded and the figures were posi-
tive. When problems with the QS9000 occurred in 2003, the head office seems to have
agreed with the Mexican manager that the main problem was to be found in the contract
negotiations in the US unit. And even though a Swedish logistics manager was now
brought in to assist at the Mexican plant, this was not a sign of mistrust to the Mexican
manager. On the other hand, it can be understood as a desire to introduce more of the
company’s procedures and routines, as the Mexican manager had made it clear that he
shied away from too much paperwork and documentation.
The Mexican manager pushed for local adaptation for the unit, but it seems as though
he was better equipped to exploit the constraints of the local institutional environment
than the former manager. The changes he made in the unit deviate from those of other
maquiladoras, but were well received by the employees. He made changes based on an
understanding of the institutional environment, but neither copied the company’s practi-
ces nor those common in other maquiladoras. He also took on a role as a representative
for the local employees, emphasizing their problems with poverty and hence specific
needs as to the production system and advancement opportunities. One may say that
social embeddedness influenced his behavior as he identified with the workers. He said
himself that he considered it a necessity to find the best solutions for the workers while
at the same time fulfilling the needs of the company. His power to make these changes
seems to have been sufficient as his approach was well received by the head office. On
the other hand, he did not unite with the U.S. unit as I expected, in terms of pushing for
adaptation to the expectations of the customers. Rather, he was more prone to agree with
the head office on these issues. This may be seen as a result of the problems the unit
was facing, with designs and prototypes which were not optimal for mass-production.
8.2.3 The Polish unit
The size of the Polish unit may aid the unit in its negotiating capabilities towards the
head office, on the other hand the local dependency is low, and it is a greenfield estab-
lishment which is also highly dependent on the parent. In chapter 3, I found that the unit
is expected to have an interest in pushing for local adaptation as it needed to comply
with the expectations of the local employees and the peculiarities of Polish regulations
and laws. While there have been changes in the former Polish bureaucracy, there are
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still national and local differences which Kongsberg Automotive was unfamiliar with.
There were two different managers in the Polish unit, first a Swede who was in charge
of the project phase of establishing the unit, thereafter, a Polish manager who had earlier
worked for large U.S. companies in Poland and was well familiar with local conditions.
The first manager in Poland was a Swede who was responsible for the establishment
and initial development of the plant. The size of the plant during his time in Poland was
small as this was an introductory period of training and establishment of the factory
before regular production was to begin. This Swedish manager did not have experience
from Poland or Eastern Europe, but was well familiar with the company, especially with
the Åmotfors factory where most of the production system came from.
The local employees who had been hired at this time described this time period as very
positive. Despite the fact that they could not communicate directly with their supervisor,
they described him as a polite, warm and encouraging manager. The local employees
felt they were able to learn much during this period and that workers and managers alike
cooperated closely to establish the factory. Even though the head office acknowledged
that he had done a good job at establishing the factory, they were also critical to the
manner in which he had created a too informal and relaxed atmosphere. He was seen
to be too generous in giving employees responsibilities, and not providing clear orders.
By other colleagues he was also said to be sidestepping standard procedures in his deal-
ings with the factory in Åmotfors, conduct that was seen to cause problems for others.
In retrospect, he and others in Scandinavia were criticized for not establishing proper
procedures and providing documentation during this time period. The problems which
followed in production were attributed to a lack of order, both in relation to training of
employees and in the production system. Neither did he fulfill the expectations of the
company; their procedures were not fully implemented, like for instance the SAP, even
though this was also related to other problems like Polish regulations and language. The
production at the plant was severely behind schedule, and approvals from customers for
producing at the plant were not obtained.
While the local employees clearly appreciated his management style, and the way in
which he shaped the organization, it is hard to argue that he adapted the organization to
the local environment. He imported a Scandinavian leadership style, emphasizing par-
ticipation, a flat organization structure and delegated responsibility. The local employees
seemed to thrive under his leadership, and stated that they felt as if they participated
strongly in establishing the unit. However, his approach was later criticized for not pro-
viding clear enough guidelines for the local organization, and that the unit did not heed
rules and norms in the Polish society.
The Polish manager had a background from the automotive industry, and had been
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managing a division of Delphi Automotive Systems with 1800 employees. He was
also highly educated. This manager had a different focus of how to run the plant than
his predecessor. Much work was done in order to establish procedures, and many of
these were clearly inspired by his and his colleagues’ backgrounds in the automotive
business. Facing the disorder from the establishment period, the main emphasis became
discipline and order, both in the physical layout of the plant and in terms of relations
to the employees. He also criticized the factory in Sweden and the head office for not
paying enough attention to documentation and proper procedures. These were arguments
that the management in Norway, after some time, recognized and appreciated, on the
other hand they also wanted to have a less hierarchic organization and that the Polish
managers would work in a more ‘Scandinavian’ manner, meaning that they should be
flexible as to their tasks and responsibilities. For instance that they should do menial
tasks themselves and not hire secretaries.
Even though he was Polish and well familiar with the local context, the local em-
ployees were critical of the new manager. In contrast to how the Swedish manager was
described, the new manager was described as impolite and that he treated the workers
without respect. The local employees seemed to have different expectations of their
employer, perhaps boosted by their experiences during the project phase. Also during
interviews two years later, the employees were critical. However, now they were less
critical towards the plant manager himself, but more towards lower managers and tech-
nicians. The management style that had been introduced at the plant was one based on
discipline and orders, and most employees aspired for a more cooperative and, what they
considered, a more polite style. The plant manager had changed somewhat between the
two rounds of interviews and it was himself amongst others who said that he had worked
explicitly on his social and inter-relational skills in order to cooperate better with the
employees. It was the administrative manager at the unit that in part made him aware of
the problems. She was more conscious of the need to unite with the production workers
and to create a sense of shared identity and shared goals at the plant.
The Polish manager heeded practices from his earlier experience working for U.S.
automotive companies. He introduced techniques and procedures inspired from the
automotive industry as these are advocated in US companies and seemed to push more
for adaptation in compliance with these models than a more local Polish approach. He
also emphasized a visible management style stressing clear orders, goal orientation and
discipline. The local employees were negative towards his approach, especially those
who had been present during the project phase. Many of our respondents were afraid to
lose their jobs as personal responsibility was highly stressed, and there were different
control procedures directed towards each individual. There were also a high number of
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temporary employees at the plant, since Polish regulations didn’t hinder such practices.
Few of the employees, especially at the first round of interviews, seemed to share his
norms and beliefs as to how to manage the plant. Also, other managers were skeptical.
On the other hand, he also expressed a desire to change his approach in time. He
hoped to increase participation by the workers with time as the team leaders would
become more self-sufficient and the foreman position could be abandoned. In terms of
adaptation to Polish laws and regulations, he was pushing for local adaptation in these
areas. There were numerous discussions with the central management, and the Business
Area Director about the specific needs at the unit of providing various reports, clear
specifications on shipments and in general more thorough and detailed documentation.
The manager was able to make the unit and the company comply with these regulations
and norms.
8.2.4 The South Korean unit
The South Korean unit is an acquired unit which is highly dependent on the local
environment in terms of customers, suppliers and employees. The unit is also less de-
pendent on the parent company than other foreign units. The unit has both the power
and interest in maintaining local adaptation. The Korean manager led the unit a fairly
short time before a Norwegian manager with experience from the company took over.
The first manager in South Korea was a sales agent that had worked with Kongsberg
Automotive for some years. He preserved the practices of the former Korean organization,
and even though he was expected to be familiar with the company and its procedures,
there were few changes in the organization to accommodate the head office. In the eyes
of the local employees he represented a continuation of a familiar Korean organization.
But these, especially females and younger men had other expectations of an international
company. They had expected changes both in salaries, the physical facilities and in the
traditional hierarchic organization structure. The Korean manager failed to meet these
expectations, and when the production results were not improving and there were signs
of misconduct, the head office replaced him.
Even though he was pushing for local adaptation, or more correctly maintained the
structures and practices of an already local organization, the reaction from the employees
was in most cases not positive. They had other expectations towards the management
and the organization because it was now a part of an international company. In addition
he failed to implement procedures and practices the head office deemed necessary, thus
losing credibility in the eyes of the top-management.
The second manager in South Korea was a young Norwegian with experience from
the head office, and from factories both in Norway and Sweden. He had not worked
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in Korea or Asia before, and did not speak Korean. He introduced the company’s pro-
cedures in budgeting, planning and reporting in the Korean unit. He also introduced a
different leadership style and attempted to make his colleagues cooperate in a Western
manner. He brought changes which stood in contrast both to the former organization of
Jung Ang and to the Korean society in general. He imported a Scandinavian or Western
organization model with its adhering practices.
On the other hand, a decisive point seems to have been his approach in introducing
these changes. Changes were introduced incrementally and not in an authoritative man-
ner. He was also seen to use tactics as he searched for ways of implementation by asking
advice for his approach from different persons and by finding alliances. His approach
seems to have been essential for the reaction from local employees who in general were
positive to the changes. The two groups who had most to gain by the changes were also
those who were most positive, women and young men. Some of the changes he introduced
were motivated by a desire to make for more equality at the plant – between men and
women, workers and managers, and older and younger people. The production workers
in general were positive to what they saw as changes towards making the managers
more accountable for their fields of responsibility. On the other hand, older employees
were not pleased with the changes in the salary system and in what they perceived as a
loss in respect and status.
As the unit is highly dependent on the local environment through customers and sup-
pliers, there had been much discussion at the plant about how these would react to the
change in ownership of the plant. In order to make sure that the customers continued to
view the company as legitimate he let the local employees handle the external relations
to a great extent. But there were also advantages of having a foreigner lead the plant.
They came to realize that the customers and suppliers applied other norms and expec-
tations to a foreigner than Koreans. It was accepted as well as expected that a foreign
company would behave differently and with other demands than a Korean company, at
least to a certain extent. This applied to for instance payment terms which now were
adapted to fit with company procedures. A foreigner had thus more room to maneuver
within the institutional constraints of the local environment.
He was having more problems being accepted as one of the local employees. He was
criticized for not “getting close” meaning he did not participate sufficiently in various
activities outside work and in creating close informal relationships to his co-workers.
He did not speak Korean and it was thus difficult to talk to most of the employees, in
addition, his Western background made him reluctant to let his work enter his private
time. The Western norms of keeping a distance between the private – public person, and
between work and pleasure, are much less pronounced in South Korea.
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8.3 Discussion
From the above I will argue that all the factors expected to have an influence on the be-
havior of the different local managers have been present in the various stories. However,
not all are present at once and they take on different forms. Below, I will summarize
and discuss the findings above in relation to the research question earlier posed: why is
local leadership crucial for creating local solutions?
In accordance with my research question, the local manager may be seen as the central
actor in the unit’s and the company’s attempt to create an appropriate balance between
the local institutional environment, the global automotive industry and the institutional
environment of the parent organization. In his efforts to push for local solutions I also
ascribed a number of characteristics of the unit as important factors influencing his in-
terest and ability to do so. The unit’s dependency on the parent company for example
influences the interests of the local manager to maintain a good cooperative relationship
with the head office, and to make sure that the unit has all resources readily available
to them.
In terms of social embeddedness it is difficult to assert to what extent the different
managers were influenced by the social networks they belonged to. None of the man-
agers who were foreigners in the local units can be considered an integral part of the
organization. The reason might be the time period they stayed in the unit. Apart from
the first manager in the U.S. the other foreigners stayed less than two years in their
respective units. None of these spoke the local language. Even though the Swedish man-
ager in Poland and the Norwegian manager in South Korea were viewed in a positive
light by the local employees, they were not considered an integrated part of the local
organization. Social embeddedness seems to have affected the behavior of the Mexican
manager. His attempts to adapt practices to the living conditions of the workers and to
change the structures at the plant allowing for more responsibility among the workers
can be understood as motivated by loyalty with the local employees and identification
with their situation. The Mexican manager was the one who seemed to view his role as
a local manager also as a spokesperson for the local employees and who chose to take
on such a responsibility. The Polish manager stated that he was hoping to increase the
salaries of the workers, because he believed they were underpaid. On the other hand,
this had not occurred and the changes he had made at the plant caused stress and anxiety
among the workers, even though he was also seen to bring the results to a profitable
level.
The various managers above can be seen to be heeding the local interests of their
respective units, albeit to a varying degree. The second manager in the U.S. joined his
employees in a unison fight for practices that would allow them to comply with the de-
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mands and expectations of the U.S. customers. The Mexican manager pushed for local
solutions that would increase productivity and quality while allowing for the specific
needs of the local employees in terms of their living situation and competence level. The
Polish manager deemed it necessary to introduce individual control procedures, systems
for documentation, and more discipline in his plant in order to increase performance and
to adapt the plant to the needs of the workers. The first manager in Mexico attempted
to heed what he understood as the interests of the organization, however, it seems as
though he was foremost a spokesperson for middle-management and others who were
interested in creating positions which could bring (themselves) more status. The first
manager in Poland and the second manager in South Korea can be seen to introduce
a more Scandinavian and Western management style and practices, heeding the parent
institutional environment more than focusing on local interests in adaptation.
It does not seem that the status of the different units in terms of size, age, method of
founding and dependency had much influence on the relative power of the local manager
to push for local solutions. One reason for this might be that my material does not allow
for measuring strength on these variables, and that even though there are differences
among the units, it is difficult to categorize the units in terms of more or less power. The
unit which distinguishes itself is the South Korean unit. Having structures and practices
in place beforehand, and having a high dependency on the local environment mean that
it is also the unit which is most different from the standards of the company. However,
this did not prevent the head office and the Norwegian manager introducing a number
of practices and solutions alien to the organization and the institutional environment.
The local manager’s relative power seems to be more related to relations, rhetoric and
results. The ability to push for local solutions can therefore been seen as a result of the
local manager’s relations with the central management and whether these have trust in
his capabilities. In Kongsberg Automotive two of the local managers were also asked
to leave their job when they were no longer viewed as right for the tasks at hand. These
two may be seen to have lost the trust of the central management. The ability of local
leaders to create local solutions is also dependent on how well the manager is able to
argue for the local need, and ultimately whether the results show that local adaptation
was right. I will come back to these issues in chapter 10.
The behavior of all the local managers seems to have been influenced by the in-
stitutional environment the managers identified with. However, it varied which of the
three environments – the local, parent and global environment – that the local man-
ager was heeding. The foreign managers all seem to have been inspired by the parent
institutional environment in their approach at the local unit. The first manager in the
U.S. used a low-key, participatory management style which can be said to be inspired
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from a traditional management style in Scandinavia. The first manager in Mexico ap-
proached the organization much the same way. He was heeding the advice of the local
employees when creating the organization, and involved managers and to some extent
workers in identifying the needs of the organization and the subsequent solutions. The
project manager in Poland created what was later referred to as a “Scandinavian living-
room”. The Norwegian manager in Korea introduced a number of practices, solutions
and approaches characterized by participation, open discussions and equality. These are
examples of management styles which are more readily related to Norway than the
local contexts of the foreign units. The second manager in the U.S., the Mexican, the
Polish and the Korean managers on the other hand, were more inspired by the local
institutional environment, and some by the global institutional environment represented
by the automotive industry. The second manager in the U.S. approached the unit with
a visible leadership style emphasizing personal commitment and responsibility, an ap-
proach familiar in a U.S. context. He also stressed an approach towards the customers
inspired by the norms and understandings of the U.S. automotive industry. The Polish
manager introduced a number of practices and techniques from his former work in a U.S.
automotive company, and seemed less inspired by a local institutional environment.
8.4 The influential role of the local manager
In all of the units, the local manager has been the central actor in the development of the
local organization. Based on the material above, it seems as though structural variables
may affect the power and interests of the unit, but it is ultimately how the local manager
perceives these interests and his own capabilities to represent them that determine the
approach.
A local manager may choose between different roles and responsibilities, depending
on his interests and capabilities. Most of the managers in Kongsberg Automotive acted as
a translator between the head office and the local unit. They translated the practices and
solutions from the head office to their units and adapted these to the local context. When
doing so they were able to alter the practices and solutions. They were also translators
from the unit to the head office. They were attempting to increase the understanding at
the head office of the specific needs of the unit in terms of the local context. This was
the case for the U.S. unit when arguing for the particularities of the local automotive
industry. Others took on a role involving social responsibility when they were pushing
for solutions and practices which could accommodate the needs of the local workers.
In such cases the local leader can be seen as the representative for the local employees,
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more than for the unit as such. A slightly different version of a role involving social
responsibility was to promote solutions valued in terms of equality and social rights.
Some of the changes made in South Korea were based on such an approach, abandon-
ing practices because they were seen to be unacceptable, and not because they were
necessary harmful or detrimental for the performance of the unit.
There seems to be larger latitude for constructing appropriate solutions and practices
in the local context than the former dichotomy local adaption – centralization suggests.
We have seen above that ‘local’ is not necessarily ‘local’. The Mexican manager in
Reynosa made changes in the organization that were unusual to the local environment,
but which were positively viewed by the employees. It is therefore difficult to advocate
that the appropriate solution in a certain institutional context has some sort of predeter-
mined format. However, a prerequisite for finding appropriate alternatives might be to
have the knowledge and experience of the relevant institutional orders in order to exploit
their constraints and boundaries.
The above material also illustrates that what is deemed as legitimate in an institutional
environment is relative to the situation and actors involved. In South Korea for example,
employees did not maintain their former expectations towards their employer when an
international company bought the unit. Even though an organizational hierarchy based
on age, experience and gender is highly institutionalized in South Korea, there were
expectations among the employees that this system would be abandoned when an in-
ternational company took over. Also, the customers had other expectations towards a
foreign company, and were now seen to be more willing to change their contract terms.
This was a willingness they had not demonstrated before, despite repeated efforts from
the Korean sales people. Even though few of the respondents knew much about the
parent company, they referred to Kongsberg Automotive as an “international”, “West-
ern” and “Scandinavian” company, expressing expectations towards changes based on
these images.
The local leader can be seen to have a lot of influence over the local construction
of meaning, especially in circumstances where there are few linkages directly between
the parent company and the employees in the local unit. To translate solutions and prac-
tices to a new context, involves negotiations with the ones who ultimately deem them
as legitimate. It is foremost the local employees who determine the legitimacy of the
practices introduced by their local manager. Their reactions may be expressed towards
the local management, but are also illustrated in numbers for turnover, absenteeism and
productivity. To introduce alien practices to the local organization seems to depend a lot
on the presentation. Even though the Norwegian manager in South Korea attempted to
make a number of changes that were considered very different in a local South Korean
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context, most of these changes were viewed positively by the local employees. Employ-
ees who gained most by the changes, women and younger men, were most positive,
but also others who did not gain personally were in general positive. His approach in
presenting the new solutions was to some extent based on tactics and good rhetoric and
the solutions were accepted by the local employees. To focus on the acceptance of local
employees may reveal more as to how and when alien solutions are considered legit-
imate in the organization, and ultimately whether such practices can be seen to cause
changes in the private – centralized institutions of the organization.
8.5 Concluding remarks
The local leader has in earlier research been presented as the antagonist who fights for
the independence of the local subsidiary. The relationship between the local unit and
the head office of the company has therefore been portrayed as one of “ever present
tension” (Prahalad and Doz 1981: 191). This emphasis assumes that because there is an
asymmetrical power balance between the head office and the subsidiary, the subsidiary
will tend to resist those practices and solutions imposed from the head office and fight
for local solutions. The extent of local solutions at the local units has earlier been ex-
plained by how vulnerable they are to pressure from the head office. The argument is
that if the local units have characteristics which give it more negotiating power towards
the head office, the unit will heed local interests and implement local solutions. A unit
can be said to be more powerful if it is a large, older and acquired unit. If the unit is also
highly dependent on the local environment and less on the parent company it will have
more relative power. Such a perspective, however, overlooks the effect of leadership
and the interaction of boundedly rational actors.
As shown above, the local manager and his approach in negotiations with the head
office is influenced by how he perceives his own role and the interest of the local unit.
The local managers in Kongsberg Automotive were all influenced by an institutional
environment they identified with – the local, the global or the parent environment. It is
difficult to hold that they were in constant conflict with the head office, but they were
rather heeding the interest of the unit as they perceived it to be, and found solutions that
they thought were appropriate. On some occasions these solutions can be described as
being adapted to the local environment, on others they were clearly inspired from the
automotive industry and its norms and beliefs. Instead of holding that the relationship
between the subsidiary and the head office is foremost characterized by tension, the dis-
cussion above shows that it is more appropriate to describe it as based on negotiations
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where a shared goal is to find appropriate solutions for both parties. In these interactions
the role of the local leader and his perception of the situation are central to the alternatives
which emerge and how solutions are ultimately created or adapted, and implemented
locally.
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9 Governance structure
9.1 Introduction
The research question which will be addressed in this chapter is: why are governance
systems built both upon structural and cultural control mechanisms? The challenge of
central management is to control and coordinate a complex international organization.
Centralized and formalized control mechanisms allow for standardization across the
organization, but is standardization sufficient for handling the differences between the
local units and their needs? Socialization or cultural control mechanisms may allow for
more flexibility and a greater consensus in the organization. How do such mechanisms
comply with the overall goal of controlling the organization and how do these accord
with the use of other types of control mechanisms?
After specifying in more detail the different control mechanisms, I will discuss the
characteristics of the parent company, and the differences between the units. The use
of different control mechanisms will then be discussed in terms of how the governance
system has developed in Kongsberg Automotive and the reactions from the local sub-
sidiaries. The last part of this chapter is a discussion on why different mechanisms were
in use, and finally, what implications my findings have for earlier research and theory.
The theoretical discussion in chapter 2 concluded that, in line with former research,
I expect that the head office of a MNC will attempt to push for similarity across its
various subsidiaries. Their motivation to do so is supported by a need for control of the
units and a result of organizational replication. While former research has attempted
to explain governance structure as a result of different structural variables (Pugh et al.
1969; Blau and Schoenherr 1971; Child 1973; Hage and Aiken 1967; Garnier 1982), I
will include the role of boundedly rational actors and their interaction when discussing
how different control mechanisms were employed in the organization.
Control and coordination has in earlier research been seen as equivalent to stan-
dardization and centralization. A high degree of consistency across the units in terms of
structures and practices is a result of organizational replication, and often seen as a pre-
requisite for controlling the units. As Thompson holds, the solution for controlling and
coordinating a number of subsidiaries is often sought through standardization of pro-
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cesses and structures: “under norms of rationality, organizations facing heterogeneous
task environments seek to identify homogeneous segments and establish structural units
to deal with each” (1967: 70). One of the two most important factors pushing for cross-
national isomorphism within a MNC is therefore the need for control and coordination
(Rosenzweig and Singh 1991). This is based on an efficiency criterion, supported by
former research demonstrating that it is easier to coordinate production across borders
when the subunits involved have similar organization structures and processes (Flaherty
1986). The other factor pushing for isomorphism is the replication of already existent
structures, and reflects the relatively narrow selection of alternatives that managers hold
to be appropriate for a specific organization.
Instead of assuming that an emphasis on control and coordination by the central
management results in a great reliance on centralized control mechanisms across the
subsidiaries, in this chapter I will make a distinction between the different control and
coordination mechanisms available to the organization. Formalization and centralization
mechanisms can be expected to create more consistency across the units, while mechan-
isms such as socialization promote more autonomy to the units and a more differentiated
organization.
It is imperative for a MNC to control and coordinate its various subunits. But control
and coordination is more complicated in an international than a national or local con-
text. Communication becomes more complicated due to time-differences, geographical
distance and language barriers. Evaluation of performance at each site is distorted by fluc-
tuations in currency exchange rates, and the interaction between the units and headquarter
may be affected by cultural, social and political differences. In new-institutionalism it is
argued that the company needs to find some ways to adapt to the local environment. In
the case of a MNC it is argued that this is further complicated because a geographically
dispersed organization is subject to a variety of different and potentially contradictory
isomorphic pulls from the different environments in which it operates. Pressures for
local consistency may run counter to what is considered appropriate by the head office.
How is the MNC thought to respond to such conflicting pressures, and by what means?
The institutionalist answer has been that when faced with incompatible or inconsistent
isomorphic pulls, the organization will set up formal structures to cope with or replicate
the environmental pressure. But when the pressure is incompatible with other patterns
in the organization, the organization responds by loose coupling across subsidiaries. In
some cases the coupling is so loose that it becomes what Meyer and Rowan (1977) call
‘ritual conformity’. However, when loose coupling is not possible, conflict results. Meyer
and Rowan hold that when it is not possible to solve inconsistencies by formal structures
the organization will turn to conflict resolution by individuals and informal structures.
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A thorough review of research on different control and coordination mechanisms
shows that MNCs employ different types of mechanisms (Martinez and Jarillo 1989).
These authors argue that the complexity of the international environment induces
companies to add more informal and subtler mechanisms for control and coordination
to the already existent formal and standardized ones. Such informal and subtler mechan-
isms are more flexible and adaptable, and hence, allow for more differentiation between
various subunits. The outcome of this line of reasoning is consistent with the institution-
alist argument presented above. It does not however, argue that individuals and informal
structures are used because of a failure to solve conflict through formal structures. The
institutionalist assumption is that solutions and practices introduced to the subsidiary
from the headquarters are viewed by the local unit as alien to their situation, needs and
context. Thus, conflict occurs.
To include the role of actors in such a perspective may allow for a different con-
clusion. While structural explanations emphasizing the nationality of the company, its
international experience and the character of its industry may predict how prone the
organization is towards centralization – decentralization, I expect that the ability and
interests of the representatives from the head office also affect their choices of con-
trol and coordination mechanisms. I further expect that their social embeddedness and
institutional constraints also have an effect.
Before I can discuss the development of control mechanisms in Kongsberg Auto-
motive, I need to define the different control and coordination mechanisms that I expect
to find employed in the organization and those structural variables which in earlier
research have been found to affect these types of control mechanisms.
9.2 Defining control and coordination mechanisms
When it is argued that the need for control and coordination in a MNC is a strong pressure
for similarity among the units in the organization, it is assumed that the mechanisms that
are used are centralized and formalized. Control and coordination are hence viewed as
being contingent upon standardized procedures and policies which are employed equally
across the local units. As Martinez and Jarillo (1989) assert, there is a growing inte-
rest among researchers to study more informal and normative control and coordination
mechanisms, and this interest might well reflect that MNCs are increasingly employ-
ing such mechanisms. Normative and socialization mechanisms are seen as providing
autonomy to the local units, and allowing for more flexible and differentiated structures
and processes across the organization.
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9.2.1 Centralization, formalization and socialization
Control and coordination mechanisms may be divided into three main groups; centralized,
formalized and socialization mechanisms. Centralized mechanisms consist of the formal
organizational structure and the hierarchy of formal authority. Formalized mechanisms
are the standardized procedures, rules, and policies as well as reporting and budgeting
systems allowing for impersonal and direct control. Socialization mechanisms are more
informal and indirect, and may be based on creating lateral relations and communication
between individuals, teams and groups, and by emphasizing the organizational culture
and shared values among team members. It is held that ‘centralization’ and ‘formaliz-
ation’ are adequate for rather simple strategies, but that these need to be supplemented
with ‘socialization’ once strategies become more complex (Martinez and Jarillo 1989).
Centralization is defined as the division of decision-making authority between the
headquarters and the various operational units (Garnier 1982). When the decision making
process is centralized it is hierarchically organized with the headquarters often making
most of the crucial strategic and policy decisions. Centralization mechanisms are in two
forms:
·
the formal organizational structure
·
the hierarchy of formal authority
The formal structure follows the principle of labor division as a mechanism of or-
ganizational influence (Simon 1976), and the hierarchy determines whether the locus of
decision-making lies in the higher or lower levels of the chains of command. The use
of authoritative power and sanctions towards individuals and subsidiaries are conserved
within the hierarchical authority structure.
Formalization is the routinization of decision-making and resource allocation (Nelson
and Winter 1982). It is the extent to which decisions are made and resources allocated
according to impersonal rules, routines and procedures. Formalization may take the
shape of:
·
Formalized and standardized procedures, routines and policies, e.g. job
descriptions, rules, standard operating procedures.
·
Standardized systems and processes of strategic planning, budgeting
and goal setting.
·
Different types of behavior and output control through standardized
reporting and direct supervision.
Formalization may be seen to decrease the personalized power of both the central
management and the local leadership at the subsidiary as it constrains the exchange
relation to an impersonal set of rules that often assume a power independent of the
motivations of the actors in the exchange relation (Weber 1968). It has been argued that
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formalization is a means to control the subsidiary in an impersonal manner, in order to
avoid the tension that overt hierarchical control might cause (Nohria and Ghoshal 1994).
The argument is that a subsidiary is more receptive to impersonal rules and procedures.
However, formalization can also be seen to be used because centralization is expensive,
in that it requires more resources on the top-management level.
Socialization and normative mechanism is based on creating domain consensus and
shared values within the organization. However, such processes are seen to be expensive
and demand many resources and take more time to achieve results than the mechanisms
discussed above (Martinez and Jarillo 1989). Socialization is considered the glue that
may hold the organization together despite geographic, cultural, social or political dis-
tances (e.g. Evans 1992; Laurent 1989). These informal and subtler mechanisms may
take the shape of:
·
Lateral relations across departments or units and direct managerial con-
tact in temporary or permanent teams, task forces, cross-geographical teams and
committees.
·
Informal communication and personal contacts among managers at
meetings, trips, and conferences.
·
Socialization by focusing on the organizational culture of known and
shared strategic objectives and values by training, transfer of mangers, career
path management, measurement and reward systems etc.
How do these mechanisms act together in a manner which makes a subsidiary more
or less autonomous? Hedlund (1981) found a clear relationship between centralization
and formalization mechanisms. Formal control instruments are used not as a substitute
for influencing decision in local units, but as a means of exercising such influence.
The factors which affect the extent of centralization, thus also affect the extent of for-
malization and in the same direction. Companies that rely on socialization and informal
mechanisms for control and coordination also give much more autonomy to the local
units. Hedlund’s conclusion was that there was a clear picture of autonomous subsidiaries
and informally managed headquarters – subsidiary relationships. Below I will have a
closer look at those variables which have been found to affect the governance structure
of a MNC and its subsidiaries.
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9.3 Structural explanations
There are numerous structural variables that have been argued to affect the relationship
between the subsidiary and the head office. Organization theorists have found various
types of control mechanisms to be dependent on the size of the company (Pugh, et al.
1969; Blau and Schoenherr 1971; Child 1973), environmental change (Burns and Stalker
1961; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967) and complexity in production or markets (Hage and
Aiken 1967; Thompson 1967). Others have discussed dependency between the subsidi-
ary and the head quarters (Garnier 1982; Hedlund 1981), international experience of
the head quarters (Hedlund 1981; Goehle 1980) and the age of the subsidiary as contin-
gent variables (Garnier 1982). Those variables that seem most relevant for Kongsberg
Automotive are the character of its industry, the nationality of the parent company, its
international experience, and those variables causing variance across the subsidiaries as
discussed in earlier chapters.
The factors which have been shown to have a bearing on the control and coordination
mechanisms in a MNC, can be divided in two main categories; those which are charac-
teristic for the parent company, and those which are particular for each subsidiary. In
contrast to most studies focusing on control and coordination in MNCs, I have chosen
to look at one MNC1. There are therefore a number of variables which are held constant
in my case. They may have a bearing on the particularities of my case, but I’m not able
to make any comparison to other companies, except theoretically.
9.3.1 Characteristics of the parent company
As discussed in chapter 3, the automotive industry, the nationality of the parent company
and the international experience of the company may affect what types of control
mechanisms the company employs. I will recapture.
It is held that companies in global industries are more prone towards centralization
than companies in multidomestic industries (Rosenzweig and Singh 1991; Gates and
Egelhoff 1986). Global industries are defined as where a firm’s competitive position in
one country is affected by competition in other countries, while multidomestic industries
are independent of competition in other countries. Examples of global industries are
automobile and electronic equipment, while multidomestic industries include retailing
and consumer goods. The automotive industry operates to a greater extent with regional
markets, which leaves the different subsidiaries more room for standardization within
larger markets. Greater centralization is a tendency in the automotive industry, especially
1) According to Martinez and Jarillo (1989), 74% of studies on control and coordination mechanisms in MNCs
were surveys based on large samples of MNCs.
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concerning marketing. I therefore expect that the central management have a tendency
to employ control mechanisms that creates consistency across the units.
The nationality of the company has also been found to affect the types of control
mechanisms in use (Hedlund 1981; Egelhoff 1984). European MNCs have a tendency to
be less centralized and employ more flexible and informal mechanisms than MNCs from
other geographical regions. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) argue that the administrative
heritage of a company influences which coordination and control mechanisms it relies
on, also when the organization has become international. The administrative heritage is
influenced by amongst other things the national and local culture, and represents ‘our
way of doing things’. It is therefore to be expected that there will be similarities in
the use of control and coordination mechanisms across the subsidiaries in Kongsberg
Automotive due to the national origin of the company.
The international experience of the parent company has been theorized to have an
effect on the types of control and coordination mechanisms employed. It is argued that
with greater international experience the MNC develops a more cosmopolitan perspec-
tive (Stopford and Wells 1972). However, earlier research has been inconclusive as to the
effect of international experience. In Kongsberg Automotive their experience with con-
trolling foreign operations has increased from the first unit in the U.S. to the acquisition
of the last unit in South Korea in 2001. On the other hand, their extensive internation-
alization period covers a shorter time span from 1999 – 2002. Because earlier research
has been inconclusive as to the effect of international experience, and the experience of
Kongsberg Automotive is limited, I expect that if time and experience affect how they
control the units, this is more related to a model how the relationship between the units
and the head office develops over time, which I will address in chapter 10.
Kongsberg Automotive is a company in the automobile industry, a global industry
which has earlier been found to exercise centralized control and coordination mechan-
isms to a greater extent than companies in other industries. They have a larger interest in
creating consistency across the different subsidiaries as their customers are more hom-
ogenous than in other industries. The nationality and administrative heritage of the head
office is expected to draw towards control mechanisms which allow for decentralization.
European MNCs have earlier been found to employ more informal mechanisms than
their e.g. U.S. counterparts. Their administrative heritage supports this argument as I
have earlier described the company as relying extensively on personalized responsibility
and informal contacts. These latter factors may be described as institutional influences.
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9.3.2 Characteristics of the subsidiaries
Even though the focus below will be on the central management and their motivations
for using different control and coordination mechanisms, I will also need to ask whe-
ther they have chosen to employ these mechanisms differently in each local subsidiary.
Earlier research on control and coordination mechanisms have attempted to predict the
use of control mechanisms based on characteristics of the different units. As discussed
in earlier chapters, there are structural differences between the units in the U.S., Mex-
ico, South Korea and Poland. I will briefly recapitulate the differences I have earlier
discussed.
Parent dependency is expected to affect how interested the head office is in creating
centralized control. Garnier (1982) theorized that the greater the intercompany purcha-
ses are in a MNC, the more centralized would control and coordination mechanisms be.
All the units in Kongsberg Automotive have a high dependency on the parent company,
except for South Korea who relies on locally developed products, local suppliers and
customers. Even so, the future development of the unit is highly dependent on the parent
company in terms of new products, investment and technological development.
Method of founding is also expected to affect the interest and power of the head office
in creating centralized control. Hedlund (1981) argued that the head office encounters
difficulties in gaining control over a unit with an independent history and structure, and
that to gain control by creating centralized structures is considered less important as the
unit is already adapted to its local context. It is expected that too many changes may
have negative consequences for the local unit. Of the units in Kongsberg Automotive
only the South Korean unit can be said to be a truly acquired unit, as the U.S. unit’s
structures and processes were significantly altered when production moved to Mexico.
It is hard to argue that its former status as an acquired unit still effects whether the head
office manages to gain control or is interested in doing so.
The size of the subsidiary has been expected to affect the type of control mechan-
isms employed by the head office. As Picard (1977) argued, the parent company will
grant more autonomy to larger subsidiaries as they have more resources to support a full
management staff. However, other studies have been inconclusive or contradictory to
Picard’s claim (Hedlund 1981; Garnier 1982; Gates and Egelhoff 1986). While the size
of the subsidiaries in Kongsberg Automotive varies, I do not expect to find that larger
subsidiaries will have more autonomy than smaller ones. It is the Polish and Mexican
units which are the larger units of the four subsidiaries.
Age of subsidiary has also been theorized to have a bearing on the control and coordi-
nation mechanisms employed in a MNC. Garnier (1982) held that the older the subsidiary,
the more experience it had and hence, represented less of a risk to the parent company
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who would grant it more autonomy. However, this hypothesis has not been supported
through empirical findings (Gates and Egelhoff 1986). It is the U.S. and Mexican units
which are the oldest of the four foreign subsidiaries.
As seen in earlier chapters, the dependency on the local environment might also
affect the extent of autonomy in the subsidiary. If the subsidiary is highly dependent on
its local environment, the central management may be more willing to grant the unit
more autonomy and employ more decentralized control mechanisms. As seen in earlier
chapters it is the U.S. and the South Korean units which are mostly dependent on the
local environment. Cray (1984) also holds that when the subsidiary’s environment is
substantially different from that of the parent company, the central management will
employ decentralized mechanisms in order to ensure flexibility. The South Korean en-
vironment can be said to be highly unfamiliar to the central management in Kongsberg
Automotive. The table below summarizes the differences across the foreign subsidiaries
in Kongsberg Automotive.
Table 9-1 Structural variables associated with the subsidiaries.
Unit
No. of
employees
Age
Environmental complexity
and dependency
Method of
founding
USA 16 1996
Familiar, long experience. Depen-
dent on local employees, but also
on customers.
Acquired
Mexico 304 1999
International free trade zone, familiar
regulatory environment, unfam-
iliar culture. Dependent on local
employees only.
Greenfield
Poland 287 2000
Familiar with customers in the area,
more unfamiliar with local organiz-
ation and authorities. Dependent
on local employees only.
Greenfield
South
Korea
33 2001
Unfamiliar cultural and regulatory
environment and organization. De-
pendent on local employees, but also
on local customers and suppliers.
Acquired
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The variance between the different subunits in Kongsberg Automotive on the struc-
tural variables discussed above, leads me to expect that the South Korean unit is the
most likely to be subject to decentralization and informal control mechanisms. This is
because of the unfamiliar local environment that South Korea and Asia represents for
the Norwegian head quarters, which is further strengthened by its local dependency on
customers, employees and suppliers. In addition, it is an acquired unit which had or-
ganization structures and processes in place, and which may be difficult for the parent
company to change and control directly. Former research has been inconclusive as to
the effect of size and age, and it is difficult to provide any clear tentative expectations
as to age and size. While Mexico and Poland are the larger units, it is the U.S. and the
Mexican units which are the older ones. However, their age is only a few years more than
the other units. Expecting that these variables may affect how the central management
chooses to control and coordinate the units, it is the Mexican unit which, next after the
South Korean unit, is expected to be decentralized. On the other hand, the administrative
heritage of the company, the automotive industry and their international experience are
factors which are expected to produce similar governance structures across the foreign
subsidiaries.
9.4 Control mechanisms in Kongsberg Automotive
The dilemma between adapting locally and the threat of disintegration of the company
has been discussed among the central management in Kongsberg Automotive. The use
of different types of control and coordination mechanisms has been central in this dis-
cussion. In general, the central management relies on a combination of formalized,
centralized and socialization mechanisms. Below I will describe the various mechanisms
they have employed, the reactions to these from the foreign subsidiaries and the various
changes that have occurred over time.
9.4.1 Centralization
The centralization mechanisms employed by Kongsberg Automotive have been based
both on creating a formal organization structure and employing a hierarchy of authority.
The formal organization structure of the company makes a clear division of labor
between the various production units and centralized functions situated in Norway or
Sweden. The Mullsjø plant in Sweden includes the R&D center, central purchasing de-
partment and marketing. All subsidiaries relate to these centralized functions at Mullsjø
in Sweden. The unit is named the Centre of Excellence, reflecting their position as
the most experienced and qualified. The IT-department is situated at the head office in
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Norway. The US unit is a sales office with a design and prototype department, but all
changes and alterations on design are to be coordinated and approved by the construction
manager in Mullsjø.
Kongsberg Automotive has traditionally relied on a great extent of centralized decision
making. This has been possible due to the relatively small size of the company thus far,
and the closely knit top-management team. The managers in the central management
team have worked together for many years and have close relationships. The leadership
style is based on personalized commitment to the company and its progress. In addition
to the management team, the owners are also actively involved in the company and its
development.
All major decisions are taken by the central management and at the head office, like
for instance the approval of the budget, investments and employment of local top-man-
agers. They also intervene when units are not reaching expectations or when there are
other problems which occur. The head office attempts to balance between an advisory
role and a more authoritarian role. This has for instance been the case for the use of
local bonuses for the employees. The head office and the Business Area managing di-
rectors have been reluctant towards the use of local bonuses and advised against them.
The local units have however introduced several such schemes with varying success.
The head office has been clear on their strategy to transfer production processes and
other procedures wholesale, but other decisions such as the structuring of the work day,
unions and ergonomics at the work place have been left to the local site. In the case
of labor unions, those units who do not have unions have been encouraged to initiate
groups for employee representation in order to heighten employee participation at the
local site.
The centralized decision making structure relies heavily on the use of team reviews
at regular intervals. The Business Area Managing Director visits each unit to review
their results and future plans. The team reviews at each plant are standardized in that
there is a specific agenda which is followed each time at each site. In addition there are
formalized reporting routines and contacts between others at the head office and the unit.
There are financial controllers in Scandinavia who are responsible for following-up the
different foreign units.
At times the head office intercepts in more substantial manners. One example is the
layoffs in Poland during the summer of 2001. The productivity in Poland was not reach-
ing expectations, and the local solution was to try to hire more and more employees.
The argument from the head office was that this was aggravating the problem as less
and less time could be allocated towards training and improvement. Another example is
after the US and the Mexican unit failed the QS9000 audit in 2003, and new reporting
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routines were introduced. The US manager was relieved of his responsibilities and the
Mexican unit reported directly to the managing director. While the head office did in-
tervene the respondents in Mexico held that the reaction should have come earlier, and
that they were disappointed by the support they asked for from the managing director
in earlier team reviews. The team reviews at the time were described as superficial.
9.4.1.1 Reactions and change
There have been reactions against the centralized hierarchy and decision-making struc-
ture in the different foreign units. In the U.S. unit the respondents argued that the
centralization of the R&D department in Sweden makes the company fail to adapt to the
US market and to the needs of the US customers. In Poland, Mexico and South Korea
respondents were negative because the need to cooperate closely with centralized units
was complicated by time and geographical distance. The geographical distance was seen
as an obstacle when the purchasing department was situated far away. It was argued that
the plant in Mexico had to operate with higher inventories than what they wanted.
The respondents in Mexico and the U.S. questioned the rationale behind the centralized
structure. Most found that the geographical distance and the time differences caused
considerable coordination problems. Some also held that their Swedish and Norwegian
colleagues showed little understanding for the situation abroad. What they perceived as
a tendency to down prioritize the foreign units and give slow responses when asked for
support, was also understood as a lack of knowledge and understanding as to the chal-
lenges faced by the foreign units. In a positive light, they acknowledged that a central
purchasing unit could push prices lower for all units, than if the units were to select
suppliers on their own. Also the centralization of design and R&D was seen as useful,
in that technological competence may be developed faster and better when resources
are situated in the same place. Some respondents said they understood that the limited
size of the company made it necessary to have the current level of centralization.
There might have been also other motivations behind the policy of maintaining cen-
tralized functions in Sweden, some respondents saw it as a consequence of internal
politics. Because production had increasingly been moved to foreign subsidiaries, the
Swedish units have been given increased status or importance in return. Especially the
naming of the Mullsjø plant as a “center of excellence” was by the respondents viewed
as a result of internal politics.
There were also reactions against the centralized IT-department. Some of the em-
ployees both in Scandinavia and in other units were asking for more updated systems.
This was particularly the case for younger employees who were accustomed to having
access to all the latest software from other companies or from their schools. Besides
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younger employees, it was especially the US unit who were negative to the restrictive
policy. The US and the Mexican unit were much in need of an intranet to improve their
coordination. The intranet project was delayed in Scandinavia and so the US unit finally
created their own in secrecy. The US employees were also frustrated because there had
been restrictions as to the use of laptops for a long time. The IT department in Nor-
way held that they did not have the capacity to service a great number of laptops, and
the heightened security risk of alien programs and viruses. The US employees on the
other hand held that this was essential in their work, and that the policy restricted their
ability to service their customers. Furthermore, the US employees also argued that the
company needed to become updated on the computerized drawings and that the use of
paper trails was abandoned in the US several years earlier. The restricted policy towards
updated software and computerized tools was especially viewed as negative by the US
unit, but also others held that the IT department was short on resources and staff when
having to service the totality of the company.
However, the reactions have varied according to different situations. During the es-
tablishment of the factory in Poland, the reactions from the new Polish management
were more pronounced. At the time the Polish management felt they had too little local
autonomy. There were restrictions as to the amount of money they could sign for; an
amount which they felt was too limited. Also in other areas the Polish managers felt they
had too little autonomy, and that the centralized decision making obstructed their work.
In South Korea as well, the changes brought in by the new owners caused the Korean
employees to complain that because of the centralized decision making structure they
now spent too much time waiting for decisions to be made.
A consequence of the centralized structure and decision-making was that the company
lacked a focus on inter-unit coordination. The split production chains between Åmotfors
and Pruzkow, and between the US and Mexico caused difficulties. There were challen-
ges related to coordination, as well as to control. The central management was therefore
criticized for not providing the means for more inter-unit communication.
Another explanation given to the use of extensive centralization was that the head
office was too centralized in their manner of thinking. Most of the foreign leaders and
middle-managers said they felt they could have contributed more to the company if they
had been invited, but that the head office and their Scandinavian colleagues failed to
ask for their opinions and to invite them to participate. The foreign units were asking
for a different focus and a change of attitude in line with the now internationalized
organization.
However, there were also substantial changes made while we studied the company.
The different local units gradually acquired more autonomy. The foreign managers de-
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scribed how the relationship with the head office had changed over time. All said they
felt they had to gain the trust of the head office, and as they had proved themselves by
obtaining good results they were granted more autonomy and trust. They also described
how they had to “sell” their ideas to the head office or to departments in Sweden, and
that with time they got easier acceptance for their ideas and felt that their Scandinavian
colleagues listened more to them. The central management was also described as having
a more “international perspective” with time.
Despite the reactions described above, few respondents said that they personally were
lacking autonomy. Some did, however, draw a distinction between the formal autonomy
they possessed, and the degree of autonomy they felt that they were granted informally.
As they saw it, managers within a larger corporation may always wish for more auton-
omy. But a point was made of how the rules of autonomy within Kongsberg Automotive
were in practice not an absolute. There were limitations, but if you stepped across them
in order to do well for the company, you could also be commended for your personal
initiative and courage.
The central management argued that it is most rational to centralize material supplies
in Sweden, because a common purchasing unit is able to obtain the best prices. In 2002
– 2003 a different explanation came more to the fore. It was stated that the company
so far had lacked employees in other units who could search for suppliers closer to
the different factories. The lack of international experience in the company is therefore
also an explanation as to the use of centralization as a mechanism. To search for local
suppliers is today a part of the internationalization strategy.
In order to improve the inter-unit coordination a cross- geographical team was de-
veloped in 2003. It united the production managers from US, Mexico, Poland and
Åmotfors. While the original plan was to have one manager responsible for working
with and transferring “Best Practices” between the unit, this idea was abandoned when
the central management realized the difficulties involved in transferring such practices
by the use of one person.
Another change was that the Polish plant has started to produce cable mats, thereby
functioning as an internal supplier in the company on these products. Comparing the
first establishment of the Polish factory and the enlargement a couple of years later, there
were also substantial differences in how the company organized the projects. Now, when
experienced personnel were to be found abroad, these took a larger role in planning and
implementing new projects.
Also other changes took place that involved the centralized structure and decision
making, but these are also related to use of socialization mechanisms which I will discuss
further below.
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9.4.2 Formalization
The company employs different types of formalization mechanisms; these include for-
malized procedures, routines and policies, standardized systems and processes, and
various types of behavior and output control. As shown in earlier chapters, the initial
plans for establishing the units have been to replicate the processes and production
methods as they have been developed in Norway and Sweden. This also implies to copy
standardized procedures and routines for reporting, planning and control. The majority
of formalized control and coordination mechanisms are computer based.
One of the main tools for formalized control and coordination in Kongsberg
Automotive is the SAP. While many other companies have reported difficulties in im-
plementing and using SAP successfully, Kongsberg Automotive is satisfied with the
program and it is in use in all their units, albeit to varying degrees. To determine the
reasons for the success with SAP in Kongsberg Automotive is beyond the scope of the
thesis, the most compelling reasons seem to be that the system has been incrementally
and differentially implemented. On the other hand, all the functions in a full-fledged SAP
system are not in use in Kongsberg Automotive. The limited use of the system may also
be a part of the reason behind the success of SAP in this company. The SAP is used for
detailed reporting to the head office and to relevant departments in Sweden. There are
quarterly reports for all subsidiaries, as well as continuous reporting through the SAP
system. The local manager reports to the Business Area director (seat comfort, gear shift
or truck systems) for productions/operations and to the head office with financial and
personnel affairs. The SAP system also makes it possible to compare the subsidiaries.
This information is accessible at the head office and at the various units. The budget
process is standardized throughout the company and everyone has the same timeframes
to complete the budget.
All the units are also to be certified within the QS9000 systems as well as other
certification systems deemed as standard in the automotive business. The QS9000 sys-
tem provides rules for training, production methods, quality control, logistics etc. Other
standards in the industry such as lean manufacturing where one of the consequences,
amongst other things is reduced stocks, are also implemented across the different units.
Visualization of production processes at the production hall is also common. In each
production hall graphs and other illustrations are used to demonstrate for all employees
the current quality problems, production volumes, customer complaints, quality issues
and absenteeism among the workers.
This is also related to the layout of the plant which is a standard within the company.
The same rules of order and tidiness are applied everywhere, and the production man-
ager is to have his office on the production floor to ensure that he is physically present
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in production. Apart from the routines and standards above, there are schemes for HSE
– health, safety and environment. In terms of behavioral control, the company exported
job-satisfaction surveys, a 360-degree manager review and used to some extent appraisal
interviews among the employees, reviewing how employees saw the relations at the
plant, their tasks and the support from their managers.
9.4.2.1 Reactions and change
In 1999-2000, due to occasions of fraud, embezzlements and mismanagement by man-
agers abroad, as mentioned in previous chapters, the top management of Kongsberg
Automotive strengthened the financial control of their international operations. They also
increased communication and closer supervision of foreign units. According to some of
the respondents these experiences had resulted in mistrust towards managers abroad in
general. The stricter control by head office was at times interpreted as a sign of mistrust.
However, the extensive use of formalization mechanisms was in general accepted at the
foreign units. The most critical reaction was related to the attempts to move standardized
production systems from Scandinavia and to the foreign units.
The strategy to “carbon copy” the production systems from well established units
to new ones was not without its challenges. There were different reasons as to why
this was at times difficult. In Mexico the local manager saw it necessary to change
from a ‘push’ to a ‘pull’ system in production, arguing that the education level, living
situation and experience of the workers demanded a different logic in production. The
Mexican management also introduced a new tester, which allowed for a different qual-
ity control than in Scandinavia. This was not readily accepted by the top-management,
but was argued to be necessary by the local managers in the US and in Mexico. Also,
U.S. respondents indicated that an earlier attempt to introduce technology in the U.S.
from Sweden had failed because of cultural differences. The technology introduced was
a so-called turning-table where the operator could turn the piece in work away from
her while it was drying, and in the meantime do the same operation on a new piece.
The introduction of these tables failed and was explained by cultural differences, in
that U.S. workers had a different attitude towards work than their Swedish colleagues.
In South Korea, the manager introduced production methods which were standard in
the factories in Norway and Sweden. Most workers and their managers had difficult-
ies understanding the rationale behind the methods, and they were implemented only
partially at first. On the other hand, there were positive reactions as well to the new
and alien procedures. The introduction of visualization methods was well received in
all the units, especially in South Korea. The employees in South Korea welcomed these
methods as it gave them more information on production related matters. However, the
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challenges of moving standardized systems can not be attributed only to differences in
the recipient units.
During the establishment of the Polish unit and in the move of production from Eng-
land and Sweden, the Polish management was frustrated because drawings, manuals
and production methods were either not updated or missing. The Polish management
saw this as a result of insufficient planning. Their demand for formalized procedures
was higher than had been customary within Kongsberg Automotive thus far. The extent
of formalized procedures, routines and guidelines thus became a point for divergent
opinions between the Polish management and their Scandinavian colleagues. The move
from England and Sweden to Poland not only demonstrated flaws in product drawings,
manuals and work instructions, but even more so it demonstrated that much of the
knowledge they were trying to move from was tacit. Earlier, it had not been necessary
to update the drawings because the workers who produced them had produced them for
years, and newcomers would be taught through practice. As one of the Polish managers
said; “the productivity in SAP is calculated based on a process and this process was
never delivered to Poland”.
It proved to be difficult to transfer the quality standard. This became apparent in
the discussion between trainers from the US and Sweden when they trained the Polish
workers. When Swedish workers produced alongside the Polish workers and American
workers were on the quality control, they would scrap the products and vice versa. Even
though the drawing for the heat cover was specified to the last detail and the work method
as well, there was still room to be found for diversity within the same item. The quality
standard differed from factory to factory and was dependent on the various customers.
This also became a matter of divergent opinions between the US and Mexico, where
the prototype department in the US would disagree on the quality produced in Mexico.
Others added that it was difficult to understand how to implement the standards for
production issued for the company, and also what these standards were at times.
All the units needed to obtain customer approval before products could be shipped
from the factory to the customer. In Poland’s case it took some time to obtain the approval
and items were thus shipped via Åmotfors for quality control before arriving at the cus-
tomer. Åmotfors was thus able for some time to review the work of the Polish workers,
and they applied a strict quality control. Some respondents held that the quality control
was too severe, as the workers in Sweden did not have an interest in seeing the Polish
factory succeed. Kongsberg Automotive’s experienced was that it took a minimum of
nine months to acquire the certification at each site.
The use of SAP was seen by the respondents to ease cooperation between the different
units, in that more information and contact opportunities were made available. In the
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US and Mexican unit the SAP is in use with the same functions as in Sweden and Nor-
way. However, none of the respondents we spoke to in these units felt that the program
represented any hindrances in their daily work, and all spoke of positive experiences.
When being asked whether SAP impeded local adaptation, or was a hinderance to how
they needed to run the plant, none of the respondents could confirm this.
As discussed above, the demand for formalized procedures was seen to be higher
in the Polish unit than the central management was used to. This was also related to
the SAP. In Poland the Cyrillic alphabet required implementation of a Polish version
of the software. This did not exist at the time of the establishment of the factory, and
local solutions needed to be found. In order to provide the reports local Polish laws and
regulations demanded, there were for some time two parallel systems operating. The
SAP was implemented in English, but then mostly used for internal reporting to the
head office and for coordination between Åmotfors and Pruzkow. With the aid of an
external accountant a different system produced the Polish reports. The company was
able to obtain a dispensation from Polish authorities which allowed them to provide
several reports in English for a limited time period. Even though the dispensation lim-
ited the number of double reports which had to be made, the management in Norway
felt the Polish bureaucracy demanded too much paperwork. They were hence reluctant
to accept the arguments from the Polish management that all the different reports were
necessary, and interpreted that the demand for detailed reporting stemmed from Polish
culture, and their communist past.
The implementation of the SAP system was on some occasions seen to have been
planned insufficiently. While there had been some discussions between the SAP-group
and Polish employees as to the necessary requirements to consider in Poland, these had
not been detailed enough, and occurred too late in the implementation process. On the
other hand, the Polish employees might also have been too eager to claim experience
in SAP when they were hired, as they were later criticized for not having sufficient
knowledge about the system.
Two years later, when the Korean factory was acquired, the SAP-manager from Swe-
den was better prepared, and the planning process started earlier. Also, the expectations
for a fast and complete implementation seemed to have been lowered. The SAP was
more slowly introduced, and the preparations were more detailed. The Korean plant
used an Excel-based budget and planning system and it was not before one year had
passed that a few functions in SAP were introduced. On the other hand, the implemen-
tation challenges in Korea were considerably fewer than in Poland. The factory and the
production volumes are much smaller, and the Korean factory does not cooperate with
another factory in production. In the case of Poland, the split production chains between
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Åmotfors and Pruzkow demanded a great deal of coordination through the SAP. Sev-
eral respondents said the greatest weaknesses in the system were functions needed for
coordination of split production chains. The system had not been tested on such func-
tions earlier, and no one was prepared for the challenges created by the intercompany
cooperation between Åmotfors and Pruzkow.
A different problem with the SAP system was that it created dependencies within
the company. The expertise on the SAP was centralized in Sweden, and the system
became thus one more issue, together with purchasing, design and technical support,
that the foreign units relied on Scandinavia for, and which was complicated because of
geographical distance and time differences.
The different behavioral controls that were in use were received positively. But it
seems that on some occasions they were not adequately adapted to the local context.
The job satisfaction surveys were transferred in Excel as questionnaires together with
guidelines for implementation. The manager in Korea was considering applying it in the
Korean plant, but decided otherwise as the questionnaires were best suited for people
who spoke English fluently and who lived in a Western context. In Mexico it was used,
but here the guidelines for anonymity and random selection of respondents were not ap-
plied. The information obtained from the foreign subsidiaries may therefore have been
limited and less comparable than what the central management had expected.
It is important to note that while the central management earlier seemed bent upon
standardization, the changes occurring in the different unit indicate that there was a change
in attitude. The central management came to realize that it was difficult to carbon copy
systems and procedures from Scandinavia and that some diversion from the ideal model
needed to be accepted. This is supported by respondents in the foreign units. Discussing
whether they felt supported by the central management in their attempts to introduce
changes in the standardized processes and methods most respondents said they felt the
support increased as their arguments for change were getting more clearly across to Nor-
way. At the same time, a majority of the respondents indicated that although room had
been provided for local adjustment of work processes, there was little encouragement
when it came to local initiatives in other areas, such as local development of machinery
and techniques that eventually might improve production worldwide, e.g. the new testing
machine developed in Mexico. Innovation as such in production is neither encouraged
nor may one say, approved by the central management.
The central management had focused on standardization on certain areas like SAP,
machines, tools, supplies and to a large extent designs and technology, but there were
other areas which had not received sufficient attention. When the US and Mexican unit
failed the QS9000 audit in 2003, several respondents stated that they lacked the proper
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procedures and that the company had not provided them. The difficulty was that exist-
ent procedures in Scandinavia had to be translated to the U.S. and Mexican context,
and this involved a lot of work. On the other hand, the respondents in the U.S. stated
that it helped them that the company now had several units abroad, expecting that this
would increase the understanding in Scandinavia about the difficulties of logistics and
the necessity to adapt to local conditions. While the U.S. unit had for several years been
the only one arguing for its local needs, there were now other units who did the same.
9.4.3 Socialization
The company employs control and coordination mechanisms which rely on acculturation
and socialization. The Human Resource department is central in devising and employ-
ing these mechanisms. Examples of such mechanisms are management courses, trainee
program, expatriate policies, different seminars and meetings, as well as more informal
communication.
The values that the central management has endorsed are swift, but informed decision
making, personalized responsibility, risk taking and no-bureaucratization. A joke among
the employees was to describe the company as “lean and mean”. Even though it was
used humoristically, there is also a serious undertone in that the expression emphasizes
the types of feedback these employees felt they received in the company. This was feed-
back which valued the qualities of hard work, difficult challenges and being tough. A
different example was the discussion that was aroused when one of the top managers
took his parental leave, and the younger employees were surprised (positively) because
they saw it as counter to the image of the company. The values heeded by the central
management are also exemplified by the use of short deadlines for projects, and the
manager role which is to include a wide variety of tasks, also those which may be con-
sidered menial tasks. A manager within the company should be ready to take on practical
tasks. Picking up garbage from the factory floor in passing, is used as an example by the
company’s president. These values are diffused throughout the company by such means
as leadership courses, lower management courses, internal newspaper, the internet, and
through informal meetings and relationships.
The head office has used expatriates as a way to teach foreign subsidiaries “the Kongs-
berg way” as well as a means for control. The expatriates are described as the bridge
which can ease the communication between the Scandinavian units and the foreign sub-
sidiary. In 2000 the central management found they lacked employees who were willing
and able to work as expatriates. An internal course, called ‘Interdal’, was created direc-
ted towards young high potentials who were willing to take on an international career.
The great majority of the first group who took the course were Norwegian and Swedish.
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Only two were foreign employees, one from Poland and one from the US unit. The
course had a clear aim of acculturation, and each of the five sessions was dedicated to
a different business area presented by its top manager. A re-occurring theme during the
course was the challenges related to working abroad. Several of the participants at the
course were sent abroad shortly after the course was finished. Also, a trainee program
initiated a couple of years earlier resulted in other expatriates in the foreign subsidiaries.
While expatriates were used to disseminate the values of the head office and to explain
the “Kongsberg way”, foreign employees were also invited to come to the head office
or to the production units in Scandinavia. These visits could extend to a few weeks in
order to give proper training to the foreign employees, or were shorter visits dedicated
to specific matters. The president of the company said he attempted to teach the new
employees his manner of thinking in a subtle way. He said he once had spent several
hours traveling with the Polish manager talking to him about the values and norms of
the company, but the president was sure that the Polish manager did not think of it as a
conversation related to such issues. The president held that culture and what he referred
to as “the Kongsberg way” could not be merely explained to someone, but that it had to
be continuously demonstrated over time. Or as he said, “culture is a result of systematic
action over time”. The top management uses words like the “Kongsberg family”, and
also relates the construction of the company to more idealistic goals. As the president
of Kongsberg Automotive holds; “International companies are peace-keeping forces”.
9.4.3.1 Reactions and change
Most respondents agreed to the basic ideas of what the central management presented.
There were, however, different views as to what their origins were, and how they
were related to the close integration the central management was trying to achieve. In the
U.S. and Mexico, the respondents saw these values as typical of European companies.
Few of the respondents identified with the shared “Kongsberg Automotive” identity, nor
with the conception of the company as one international, but closely integrated “fam-
ily”. Few of the production workers abroad knew much about Kongsberg Automotive
as an international company. Most managers had a different knowledge base, but many
of them had not been employed by the company for very long. Others who had long
experience with the company suggested that there might be more diversity within the
company than the central management sometimes liked to think. In this perspective the
company had a “U.S. way”, a ”Kongsberg Automotive way”, and also a “Scandmec
way” (the competitor Kongsberg Automotive bought in 1996). In Mexico, the manage-
ment had consciously chosen not to inform the workers about the company or about the
production in Poland, Sweden or other places. To provide too much information about
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the company at large was viewed as unnecessary, or moreover, to not provide too much
information was seen as a way to shield the workers. What several of the foreign man-
agers agreed on was that the central management exposed a certain Scandinavian bias.
They felt this was expressed through a too-strong reliance on Scandinavian managers
and too little on local resources abroad. Despite the emphasis applied by the central
management to create an integrated company, few of the respondents abroad felt that
this had occurred or even that it was desirable.
In 2002 – 2003, there were increased discussions within the central management
about how they presented the company within the organization, which values they were
dispersing, and whether the international character of the company now demanded a
broader view of what the foreign subsidiaries could identify with. There were efforts
undertaken to counterbalance some of the characteristics mentioned above. The start-up
of the Polish plant and the subsequent evaluation led to discussions within the company
which placed greater emphasis on less tangible issues like management values, training,
and relations between workers and management. According to the participants at the
first Interdal course there was a growing awareness in the company that socio-cultural
factors do matter. Also the rhetoric used by top management in different presentations
had a stronger focus on the diversity of perspectives and a softening of their reputation
for being ”lean and mean”. There were also efforts towards increasing the emphasis
on feedback and support. The second Interdal course also reflected attempts to move
away from a Scandinavian bias. While the first course had only 2 of 23 participants who
were from foreign subsidiaries, the second course included 6 participants from these
subsidiaries. The second Interdal course also had a larger emphasis on culture, values
and norms than the first one. As one from the central management stated; “we have rec-
ognized that we have been naïve in the globalization process, the focus is now therefore
less on whether cables are 11.5 cm [standardization] but more on values and attitudes”.
In 2003 an encompassing survey to identify common values for the organization was
launched, asking the employees at home and abroad to characterize the company and
what they wished to identify with.
Language difference is a part of the problem, but perhaps more so is the failure to
focus on the world outside of ones own unit. This was apparent in Åmotfors when the
Polish factory was to be established. The move to Poland, even though it did not result
in fewer jobs in Sweden, represented a move to a cheaper country which Sweden was
seen to have problems competing with. The Swedish employees were not motivated to
see the Polish unit succeed, and while it is difficult to assert whether they sabotaged
the move, several respondents indicated that they did. However, this may also be due
to a failure on the part of the management and the head office to emphasize the need to
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shift attention from only ones own unit towards viewing the company as an international
organization. This was a change which to a large extent was taken for granted by the
management, but which seemed to demand more time and effort than expected. The
importance of having an international attitude was gradually put on the agenda during
2002 and 2003, and received more attention from both managers and employees.
While the coordination and communication between the head office and the various
subsidiaries has received much attention in recent years, there has been less focus on
inter-unit relations. The foreign units have complained that the head office does not
initiate or encourage inter-unit collaboration and coordination, and that the means to
do so have been lacking. In all the foreign units closer lateral relations with other units
were seen as the most promising way of improving the problems they struggled with.
In Poland and Åmotfors the need for better understanding and knowledge of the other
was seen as a way to reduce misunderstandings and coordination problems. In the US
and Mexico it was especially the problems during the winter of 2003 that made these
respondents address the need to create closer relations between the two units. Most felt
that an important source for their problems was a failure to understand each other. It was
held that they could struggle with misunderstandings for days and spend too much time
trying to solve the issues, but once they were face-to-face the matter would be easily
solved. While the head office took few initiatives to strengthen the cooperation between
the units, there seems to have been a greater understanding of the need. The creation
of the cross-geographical team between production managers which was established in
2003 seems to have been formed by such an understanding.
Whereas earlier the central management had an approach where it was certain values
that they themselves identified with that were diffused from the head office and out, a
less centralized stance was later introduced. A greater understanding and perhaps ap-
preciation of the heterogeneity of the company now reflects the socialization mechanisms
that are in use, and the emphasis on such mechanisms has increased over time.
9.5 Discussion
It is seen as imperative for a MNC to control and coordinate its various subsidiaries.
Former theories have applied structural explanations to predict the governance structure
in a MNC. I have also included the role of actors and how their interaction may be
seen to affect the employment of different types of control mechanisms. Below I will
discuss in further detail my second research question; why are governance system built
both upon structural and cultural control mechanisms?
The use of control mechanisms in Kongsberg Automotive may in part be explained
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by the structural variables discussed at the beginning of this chapter. The character of a
global industry allows for more centralized control than in other industries. The company
is seen to rely on such mechanisms to a large extent. In line with the expectation that
European MNCs employ more decentralized mechanisms, Kongsberg Automotive have
also relied to some extent on informal relations, especially relations directly between
the central management and the various subsidiaries. The emphasis on personalized re-
sponsibility can be understood as a result of the administrative heritage and nationality
of the central management. With time these mechanisms became more pronounced,
and different measures were taken to strengthen the decentralized control mechanisms.
Whether this may be said to be a result of increased international experience, or whether
this is a consequence of increased trust between the central management and the foreign
managers is difficult to assert. I am more inclined to the latter, as different statements
from both actors have emphasized how trust increased and how they, as a result of this,
were granted more autonomy.
There are little differences in the manner which the central management has chosen
to control and coordinate the various subsidiaries. Even though the South Korean unit
was subject to a more incremental implementation of the SAP, the same reports and
procedures were asked for, albeit through a different format. The size and age of the
Mexican unit does not seem to have caused a different approach to this unit either. It is
similarity in the governance structure that characterizes the different subsidiaries more
than variances.
From the descriptions above on how control and coordination mechanisms were de-
veloped in the company, it seems that the interaction between central management and
representatives from the local unit is important in understanding these developments.
These actors were influenced by their different interests, power, institutional constraints
and their social embeddedness when they negotiated on the different control mechanisms
that were used.
The relative power of the central management over the different subsidiaries has
been substantial as shown in earlier chapters. However, their ability to employ different
control mechanisms has varied. They have been constrained by available resources, the
transferability of standards and tacit knowledge, and by time differences and geographi-
cal distance. The reactions from the foreign subsidiaries have been decisive as well.
These factors have complicated the employment of different mechanisms, and affected
the ability of the central management to use them. The lack of expatriates meant for
instance that there was not an expatriate in the Polish unit before 2003, even though
the central management had attempted to find someone in 2001. The person who came
to the Polish unit was moreover a trainee with limited experience within the company.
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The attempts to transfer the “Kongsberg way” therefore relied more on informal talks
with the president and others in the central management, and the plant manager’s par-
ticipation at the Interdal course. For the Polish management this meant that they were
more involved in decisions and in closer contact with the central management than they
perhaps would have been otherwise. The challenges of transferring standards between
the units meant that more autonomy had to be given locally to decide which standards
they needed to follow in order to satisfy their customers. It also caused a stronger
awareness about the need for learning and knowledge transfer between the units. This
was also related to the problems of transferring tacit knowledge. The lack of updated
drawings and specifications in the move to the Polish factory, meant a stronger emphasis
on such issues at the Scandinavian factories, as well as increased understanding of the
nature of some of the knowledge they were trying to transfer. The reliance on formaliz-
ation and centralization mechanisms was somewhat moderated after these experiences.
Also time differences and geographical distance demonstrated the flaws in relying too
much on such mechanisms, and made for more informal contacts and more face-to-face
communication between the units.
The interest of the central management towards employing the various mechanisms
has varied as well. Former theory states that the main reason for using centralized con-
trol mechanisms is the need for control, formalization is used to avoid overt hierarchical
control, and socialization mechanisms are used to create consensus. In Kongsberg Auto-
motive a number of other incentives were present as well. The use of formalization
mechanisms such as QS9000 is a direct result of the automotive industry, and what the
industry considers as compulsory mechanisms in a legitimate company. Other mech-
anisms were motivated by a desire to lower costs (e.g. centralization of purchasing),
obtain comparable information (SAP), and others again because there was a belief that
it was possible to transfer standardized procedures and routines. It seems as though few
within the company realized the extent of adaptations that needed to be made, and it
was through time and increased experience that such knowledge was obtained.
The central management was criticized for operating with a Scandinavian bias in
their dealings with the foreign subsidiaries. Respondents held that this bias was visible
in who they selected as participants in the Interdal course, in that the Scandinavian way
of doing things was considered the norm, and in a failure to view the company with an
“international mindset”. The central management seem to have taken their institutional
background as a given when internationalizing their company. It was only after there
were reactions from other units that these assumptions began to be questioned. The cen-
tral management attempted to change their attitude and initiated a number of schemes
aiming for a larger emphasis on the heterogeneity of the company. This was for instance
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done through the project focusing on values in 2003 and a larger emphasis on such
issues in the second Interdal course. The lack of international experience also affected
the focus in the Scandinavian units. This is related to some of the problems occurring
between Åmotfors and Poland. Åmotfors and Mullsjø as the two plants which had been
most involved with the subsidiaries abroad did not become aware of its new role for
some time. The realization that some of their capabilities needed to be redirected to-
wards central or global tasks came slowly and late. There was information given to the
employees and through the unions but the foreign subsidiaries were still viewed as last
priority, and the local employees served domestic needs first. With time there was an
increasing awareness that there was a need to change the focus.
The close relations between the management in Norway may have influenced how
they chose to approach the internationalization process, emphasizing the process as an
integration process. Their awareness of how close relations had influenced their own work
seems to have been translated into a desire to duplicate these relations into an extended
“Kongsberg family”. As the president of the company said in one of his presentations;
[we need to] “treat new units the same way as the old family members”. While the main
goal was the need for control, the central management can also be seen to attempt to
create closer social networks with the foreign managers.
Central leadership affects the use of different control mechanisms. The central man-
agement as boundedly rational actors has through time changed their use of control
mechanisms based on their ability to employ them and their perception of need and
interest. The reactions from the foreign subsidiary has made them question their own
institutional constraints, and made way for a more heterogeneous approach where the
foreign units are accorded more autonomy and a more legitimate role in shaping the
organization. Time has mattered in this process in that their increased international
experience has allowed for new alternatives to be valued.
9.6 Interrelations between structural and cultural control
mechanisms
There has been a limited emphasis in earlier research on why organizations create
governance structures based on a combination of structural and cultural control mech-
anisms. The emphasis has been on finding the relevant structural variables which cause
centralized vs. decentralized control in an organization (e.g. Ghoshal and Nohria 1989).
Based on the developments in Kongsberg Automotive, I have shown above that even
though the company at the outset may be described as relying to a great extent on
centralization and formalization mechanisms, their emphasis on these mechanisms was
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weakened in time and a greater reliance on socialization mechanisms ensued. There were
several reasons for this change. The introduction of standardized procedures and rules
did not go as smoothly as had been expected in all the units. Procedures, production
processes, products specification which earlier were coordinated mainly in Sweden be-
tween Åmotfors and Mullsjø were difficult to transfer to other places, and received new
interpretations as they were implemented in the new subsidiaries. One of the difficult-
ies was that solutions and practices were to some extent based on tacit knowledge. This
caused a greater awareness of the fallibility of these methods at the central management.
The reactions from the foreign units to the central management’s attempts to control
and coordinate the subsidiaries, was a different reason for the change. This goes against
another assumption in earlier research. A common assumption has been that control mech-
anisms are something employed from above, and that it is the sole decision of the central
management to choose which mechanisms to employ. The reaction from the subsidiaries
and possible changes as a result of such reactions have rarely been included. In Kongsberg
Automotive the central management increasingly recognized the different views held
by the employees abroad and implemented schemes both to understand more about the
heterogeneity of the organization and used control mechanisms which were less stringent.
The various groups of mechanisms discussed above have also often been viewed sep-
arately in earlier research, while in fact they are intertwined and affect each other. While
Fleming and Søborg (1998) hold that hierarchical control is conceptually outdated, and
that the increased complexity of organizations makes them obsolete, this does not seem
to be the case in Kongsberg Automotive. Even though there was a stronger reliance on
socialization mechanisms after some time, centralized control mechanisms were still
seen as essential. The challenge in this company was not whether to use centralized and
formalized mechanisms vs. socialization mechanisms but more to achieve an appropriate
balance between a whole range of mechanisms. That is a balance which could appro-
priately accommodate the needs for control and flexibility at each local site and at the
head office.
While socialization mechanisms allow for more autonomy at the subsidiaries and
more decentralized responsibility, their use as mechanisms of control should not be
under estimated. As Michel Foucault (1977) argued, to create a mutual understanding
of reality is also a means to control and discipline people’s behavior. In Kongsberg
Automotive the increased number of activities that aimed at creating a shared identity
in the company should also be understood as means for controlling and coordinating the
behavior of members of the organization. When organizational members share norms
for right and wrong they also engage in self-monitoring activities, disciplining their own
behavior towards an accepted norm.
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In Kongsberg Automotive the central management could not freely choose the mech-
anisms they saw fit. The lack of available personnel, time and funds restricted their
choices. In earlier research an assumption has been that the MNC has all resources avail-
able to choose freely among the various control and coordination mechanisms. The use
of control mechanisms is restricted by the resources at the company at a given time, and
hence affects the choice of mechanisms. One of the major challenges when a company
attempts to expand internationally is to have a sufficient and competent supply of man-
agers with international experience (Arbose 1986). In Kongsberg Automotive such a
supply was missing during most of their internationalization process. Also restrictions
set by outside parties, such as major customers who make some mechanisms compul-
sory are not included in earlier research. While it is difficult to assert to what extent the
automotive industry in this case restricts the choices of the central management, there
are some mechanisms which are compulsory within the industry and which the top-
management of the company complied with. The use of QS9000 is an example of such
a mechanism. Further research as to how companies in different industries are restricted
by customers and others in their strategies for control and coordination is needed.
The discussion above shows that the use and development of various control mechan-
isms can be seen to be influenced by the interaction between boundedly rational actors.
Both actors from the head office and the subsidiary interact in this process. This is in
line with the arguments of Doz and Prahalad (1984) who criticize traditional research
on these issues for having a unidimensional approach to what is essentially a multidi-
mensional problem. The former reliance on structural explanatory variables has led to
an approach which has ignored underlying processes in the organization related to in-
formation, interaction, communication, learning and trust. The interaction of boundedly
rational actors should be included in an analysis of how formal structure and institutional
environments affect the governance structure of the organization.
9.7 Concluding remarks
As seen in this chapter, the governance structure in Kongsberg Automotive was gradually
developed to include both structural and cultural control mechanisms. While structur-
al variables such as administrative heritage, the global automotive industry and their
increased international experience cannot be dismissed, the interaction between central
management and representatives from the subsidiaries can in this case be seen as having
a strong influence on how the company chooses to control and coordinate an increasingly
larger multinational company. To achieve a balance between control and flexibility in the
organization depends on a process where relevant actors interact to shape the outcome.
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The governance structure in a MNC changes over time according to the various interests
and capabilities of those involved. To attempt to predict the best ‘fit’ between the dicho-
tomy centralization vs. decentralization and the geography or organization structure of
a company is in this perspective not a fruitful approach. It is a focus on the underlying
process in an organization which involves boundedly rational actors and their varying
interest, power, institutional constraints and social embeddedness which brings more
central issues to the fore. The interaction between these actors is a central dimension in
understanding why and how some mechanisms are employed when others are not.
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10 A perspective on learning
10.1 Introduction
In the two previous chapters I’ve analyzed and discussed the behavior of two groups of
actors, the local managers and the central management, below I will focus on the inter-
action between these actors and look at how learning processes emerged and changed
the organization. It is the third research question which will be addressed in this chapter:
Why is a perspective on learning important for understanding the internationalization
process? An understanding of the relationship between the central management and
the local subsidiaries, as characterized by bargains and negotiations, explains to some
extent why the central management and the local leaders reach agreements as to which
solutions and practices one should implement. But how can one explain that the re-
lationship between these actors evolves and changes through time, and that they create
solutions which are neither grounded in the practices of the local institutional environ-
ment nor the parent institutional environment? Why can a perspective on learning offer
explanations as to the fundamental changes that occur in the organization through the
internationalization process?
Why such a perspective may provide insight for understanding the internationalization
process will be discussed below with regards to the changes that occurred in Kongsberg
Automotive. I will focus on how and why the relationship between the central manage-
ment and the different local subsidiaries changed through time, and the different practices
and solutions that emerged. In the last part of the chapter I will discuss in more detail
why it is important to understand the internationalization process as characterized by
processes of learning. Finally, I will address the implications of such a perspective on
earlier theory and research on internationalization processes.
An intensive internationalization process such as the one Kongsberg Automotive have
undertaken can be a tremendous learning experience. There are great possibilities for
new knowledge involved in moving from a limited environment in Norway and Sweden
to creating and including subsidiaries in a number of countries around the world. In a
lot of the literature on organizational learning it is held that in order to create learning
from such organizational changes there are a number of provisions that needs to be made
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beforehand to be prepared for learning. While organizations most certainly can improve
in terms of their learning capabilities, there are also grounds to argue that learning can
be seen as unavoidable. Profound changes, such as the ones that Kongsberg Automotive
has gone through creates knowledge and experiences which only a myopic organization
can avoid being influenced by.
It is crucial for an organization to create organizational knowledge. For the organiz-
ation and its members to cooperate efficiently they need to have some degree of mutual
knowledge. The organization learns when such knowledge is changed and developed.
However, learning does not merely have an effect on isolated practices and solutions at
each local unit in the organization, but can over time also have an effect on solutions and
practices employed in the totality of the organization. However, dependent on how the
organization approaches these new experiences more or less learning may be created. A
too strong domination in the learning process on behalf of a group of actors or through
strong prevalent norms and beliefs may hinder the participants from grasping the value
of divergent opinions and the creation of new solutions. On the other hand, interaction
over time is also expected to affect the actors as they learn how to negotiate through
increased knowledge of each other, increased trust and by constructing behavioral rules.
Within an institutionalist perspective, discussions on the role of learning have been
largely absent. When learning has been discussed within new institutionalism the focus
has been on negotiations between separate parties and how negotiations ultimately lead
to adaptation to institutional pressures. Here, I will employ a learning perspective which
emphasizes how interaction may create new practices in the organization, even though
these are not torn loose from the local institutional context. In this chapter I will focus
on the upper part of the model provided in chapter 2.
In accordance with earlier research on organizational learning, I assume that learn-
ing has taken place when a set of individuals start to behave according to some tacit
or explicit rules produced in cooperation with others in the organization. These include
formalized and written rules and procedures, tacit and informal norms, roles and codes
based on experience. The production and re-production of such rules take place when
individuals are confronted with specific situations in their daily work. In the case of
Kongsberg Automotive I focus on how the interaction between the subsidiary and the
head office produce such rules. The head office attempted to transfer explicit organiz-
ational knowledge to the local units through strategies such as replication of production
processes. However, much of the knowledge they were attempting to transfer was tacit,
or was not understood or accepted in the new units. This was the case with the pro-
cedures that were moved from Åmotfors to Poland, but also the case for more general
knowledge, such as rules on ‘how to act’, or what they themselves call the ”Kongsberg
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way”. This knowledge was attempted to be transferred from one community-of-practice
to another and acceptance by the new organizational members relied on reinterpretations
both abroad and at home.
10.2 The characteristics of organizational learning processes
The learning perspective adopted in this thesis is one emphasizing how knowledge is
practiced within social networks, and how learning is dependent on changes in such prac-
tices. An important distinction between the approach adopted here, and earlier accounts
on developments within institutionalist perspectives is that learning here is expected to
create something ‘new’ and is not seen as a selection between viable alternatives to find
the most appropriate ‘fit’.
Central to understanding how organizations incorporate knowledge and experiences
are what may be called organizational rules. These rules may be recorded in the minds of
individuals, in work descriptions and procedures, in physical objects and in the prevalent
norms and assumptions. Such rules encode the experience of the organization (Argyris
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and Schön 1996). The cognition and behavior of the members in the organization are
organized by such rules and they also serve as templates for interaction between the
members. Organizational rules restrict what a member sees as relevant questions, ap-
propriate approaches and alternative solutions. These rules contribute to what may be
termed an organization’s unique identity, which is often characterized by referring to the
dominant behavior among a central group of people. The processes of continuously pro-
ducing and re-producing organizational rules through repeated negotiations, bargaining
and compromising can be regarded as ‘organizational learning processes’. Organizations
learn when their knowledge in the form of such rules is changed (Argyris and Schön
1996). But this change is dependent on the knowledge of individuals. Organizational
knowledge in the forms of routines for instance exists only to the extent that individuals
draw upon them and accept them as a part of their own knowledge.
Argyris and Schön distinguish between single-loop and double-loop learning. Single-
loop learning is defined as instrumental changes in how the organization performs its
tasks. It is the detection of an error in e.g. the quality of a product and the measures taken
to ensure that the production process is changed so that the error may be avoided. Double-
loop learning on the other hand causes changes in the values, strategies and assump-
tions of the organization’s theory-in-use. Theory-in-use is best described as the prevalent
practices in the organization, while espoused theories are descriptions of these practices.
These two types of theories are most often incongruent, as it is impossible to arrive at
a complete and accurate description of how a task is performed. This is amongst other
things because there is often a lot of tacit knowledge involved which formal descriptions
ignore, and there are many different practices as different individuals perform them. The
distinction between these types of theories is similar to what Brown and Duguid (1991)
call canonical and non-canonical practices, descriptions of practices and the actual prac-
tices. Returning to the learning perspectives discussed by Argyris and Schön, it is double-
loop learning which is most important for the development of the organization, since such
learning alters fundamental assumptions and norms which in turn determine the practices
of the organization. On the other hand, learning is not necessarily productive. Within
this definition learning is seen as change, and such changes may be false or unworkable.
To arrive at productive learning in an organization, Argyris and Schön ascribe a ‘the-
ory of action’. Productive learning is achieved by creating conditions for collaborative
inquiry. This implies that the practices or the theory-in-use in the organization allows its
members to share control over processes of generating, interpreting, testing and using
information. It is through interaction and internal commitment that valid information is
produced. This also implies that the strategies and subsequent action employed in an
organization should be seen as experimentation, open for alterations and new information.
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To understand how individual knowledge and organizational knowledge are linked, a
clarifying concept is ‘community-of-practice’ (Brown and Duguid 1991). The perspec-
tive on communities of practice acknowledges that the performance of the organization
is dependent on how individuals work together and that it is through interaction that
individuals are able to combine their individual experiences and create shared interpre-
tations that are more useful than the individual interpretation of each member. These
individuals and their interaction constitute a community-of-practice. This is a community
which cannot be analyzed out of its physical context, since the site where practice is
done also influences the practices that emerge. Structures as well as actors are therefore
important for understanding learning. Within an organization there are many different
communities of practice, here I focus on how the different subsidiaries in Kongsberg
Automotive may be seen to represent different communities of practice. On the other
hand, I also acknowledge that within one such subunit there may also be different
communities, but for the sake of the further analysis I will view one subsidiary as one
community of practice. It is the interaction between these communities which I argue
constitutes the learning process in Kongsberg Automotive.
To understand how such separate communities interact in shared learning processes
one may distinguish between intra- and inter-organizational learning processes (Holmq-
vist 2003). Inter-organizational learning processes are expected to produce more variety
in learning as the organizations involved have not become ‘skillfully incompetent’
(Argyris 1993) or ‘simple-minded’ (Cyert and March 1963). Or put in a different way,
they have not developed an inability to fully comprehend the complexity of a situation.
Inter-organizational learning is expected to be more problematic and tends to involve
more conflict and explicit compromising, bargaining and negotiating than intra-organiz-
ational learning processes. It is argued that this is due to the lack of a formal structure
of authority between the organizations (Killing 1982; Mowery, Oxley and Silverman
1996). On the other hand, it might also be a result of a lack of behavioral couplings
between the actors (Holmqvist 2003).
If one party dominates the process too much this may restrain the learning process.
Asymmetrical bargaining is a typical characteristic of organizational learning processes.
This is due to the formal hierarchy in the organization where typically there is a group of
individuals who are able to dominate the learning process and its subsequent outcome.
Domination affects the degree of heterogeneity in the learning process as domination is
always grounded in this group’s simplified understanding of experiences. Domination
will therefore limit the amount of attention paid to the full complexity of the situation.
However, domination and power may also be seen as constructive tools in the learn-
ing process (Levin and Klev 2002). Domination can have a disciplinary effect on the
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process in that it creates focus and pushes towards taking decisions. Domination need
not be vested in a group of individuals who are seen to have authority over others;
domination is also expressed through discourse, in those arguments and ideas which
are regarded as more legitimate than others. This is related to another barrier towards
taking full advantage of the learning process; a biased approach. If one or both parties
in a learning process approach learning with an attitude strongly grounded in his own
conception of reality, this may be a barrier towards understanding the other as well as
conceiving of new ideas and interpretations. Defensive behavior may also result. One
or both parties may attempt to place the explanation or necessary changes in all other
places than those related to themselves.
In the beginning of learning processes the actors have few behavioral couplings be-
tween them. They have limited experience in interaction and knowledge of each other.
One may expect conflict, misunderstandings and complications in their interaction, but
this may also cause both parties to reflect on their own taken-for-granted assumptions.
Through repeated negotiations such assumptions are challenged by the other party, and
they are increasingly made explicit. The actors are also expected to produce joint be-
havioral rules which make future interaction and learning more predictable and stable.
Such behavioral rules can take the form of knowing how the other will react, what the
most effective arguments are, what the most prioritized goals are, what routines and
procedures one should follow to present ones case and so forth. These rules, routines and
norms both parties become aware of and respect through their increasing interaction. To
create such mutual knowledge as well as trust between the actors is crucial if coordi-
nation of action is to become possible. The result is similar and predictable behavior in
both parties. The advantage is a learning process which is relatively smooth and fast, and
where the outcome is in line with expectations in the company. It produces behavioral
stability. It follows that learning may thus become less varied, but more reliable.
I expect that the learning processes in Kongsberg Automotive can be described as
both single-loop and double-loop learning. The outcomes will both have instrumental
consequences on the practices in the subsidiaries and in the organizations, and more
substantial consequences for the assumptions and norms underlying what constitutes the
theory-in-use in the organization. The latter may be seen as related to the arguments of
Ingram and Clay (2000) as discussed in chapter 2. Institutional change in the organiz-
ation is supported by and created by changes in private-decentralized institutions – the
norms and beliefs individuals hold.
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10.3 The learning processes in Kongsberg Automotive
The learning processes I will discuss below are seen to begin when the company em-
barked on their international expansion. The extensive internationalization process the
company undertook was a great learning experience as the former Norwegian company
included and established units abroad.
As seen in earlier chapters, the company’s strategy for including the new units in the
organization was largely based on replicating production procedures and organizational
structures from Norway. The rational behind this policy was that these were procedures
and structures they knew were efficient and which they had experience with. However, it
also entailed a certain narrowness in perspectives as other alternatives necessarily were
disregarded. The approach they met the new units with and which they attempted to
export can be summarized in the concept of “Kongsberg way”. The “Kongsberg Way”
discussed in earlier chapters represents a set of implicit and explicit behavioral rules
that organized how employees in Scandinavia perceived their experiences. It was the
prevalent organizational rule in the organization at the time and made for a certain beha-
vioral stability between those employees who were familiar with it. When describing the
“Kongsberg way” the respondents emphasized personal responsibility, swift and fact-
oriented decision-making, but also a somewhat tough attitude, illustrated by the internal
joke of ”lean and mean”.
The company also moved fast when they established new units. The central manage-
ment held that even though the establishment of new units could be planned in more
detail over a longer period of time, it was better to move fast and repair problems
afterwards. A quote from one of the respondents illustrates this policy: “… sometimes
it is better to take action first and clean up afterwards. Because sometimes the tempo
forces actions rather than analyses. Analyses are of little value, if you don’t know what
the proper premises are. In the face of the unknown it is very hard to pinpoint what the
proper premises might be, and then it’s better to be there, and to take corrective action
on the spot”.
The central management thus heeded a policy where they were prepared to learn
through action rather than to analyze and prepare too much beforehand. It was seen as
necessary to use such an approach, because they were not able to acquire the knowledge
and experience they needed before they had started the process. However, in the units
abroad this approach was seen as too hasty and caused additional problems. This was
especially apparent during the establishment of the Polish plant. The Polish management
argued that a number of important issues had been overlooked, and that they were the
ones left to fix the problems. In their opinion this made the first year difficult as they
were constantly repairing old problems and were not able to look ahead. This focus on
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fast establishment and quick decisions restricted the learning process in one manner, the
domination of the central management was pronounced as they pushed for decisions
and actions, and those employees who made the decisions used what they already knew
– the familiar context of Scandinavia and how the factories worked there. On the other
hand, it also meant that the necessary adaptation to the local context became apparent
through action and in negotiations with the employees abroad.
When the central management and the employees in Scandinavia were faced with
the “new members of the family” – the new foreign subsidiaries – these employees
questioned the legitimacy of the “Kongsberg way”. They questioned whether this was
the appropriate way to behave and demanded further arguments from the Scandinav-
ians before they were willing to adjust to the norm. This occurred when Scandmec was
acquired in 1996, and reoccurred when each new unit was added to the company. As
mentioned earlier, the particularities of a “Scandmec way” were still seen to be present in
the organization in 2000, and there were still discussions in the organization, especially
between employees from Norway and Sweden as to what the prevalent organizational
rules should be. Employees in Sweden characterized the central management’s approach
as more authoritarian, hierarchic and old-fashioned than what they had been used to.
The foreign local managers in Mexico, Poland and the U.S. held that the central
management and the employees in Norway and Sweden operated with a Scandinavian
bias. Especially when units were established, there were time limitations, and hence
most decisions were taken with a basis in Scandinavian ways of reasoning – that is, they
were “embedded” (Giddens 1991) in a Scandinavian context, despite the fact that they
were put to work in a different setting abroad. The Scandinavian bias was expressed on
different issues. The centralized departments in Scandinavia were by some respondents
abroad believed to focus on the needs of local Swedish units, rather than to serve all
parts of the organization on an equal basis. For the employees in Scandinavia the or-
ganizational rules that should prevail in the company were those they were used to. As
one respondent said: “Kongsberg does have plants abroad, although we’re relatively
small. When I was in touch with people here, this realization was not really there. You
got to hear that “this is not how we do it in Sweden”, and that’s a ridiculous thing to say
abroad. You can say that this is not how we go about things in Kongsberg Automotive,
but not “this is not the way it’s done in Sweden or Norway”, because they don’t give a
damn; they couldn’t care less about that”.
The Scandinavian part of the organization was also seen to lack knowledge or under-
standing about local conditions abroad. At the same time there was a high degree of
centralized decision making and respondents abroad said they felt the decisions were not
always appropriate because of a lack of knowledge. One respondent said: “they have to
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get away from the idea that at Kongsberg Automotive, we have our rules, and therefore
the rest of the world is going to adhere to our rules”. As I have discussed earlier there
was a strong reliance on solutions originating in Norway and Sweden, and also to some
extent on the personnel from Scandinavia. Some of the foreign managers held that the
company should use more local resources. This was for example argued to be the case
at the start-up of the Polish factory.
In addition, the central management and employees in Scandinavia did not exhibit
any great eagerness to learn from the local units. Respondents from the management
level who had interaction with representatives from Norway and Sweden were unani-
mous, saying that no, in the beginning they did not feel that people from the parent
company were interested in learning anything from them. However, at the second round
of interviews more respondents said that they now felt there was more willingness to
learn from the units abroad. By our respondents this was also linked to how they felt
they received more respect from Scandinavian colleagues after some time and that their
colleagues were more ready to listen to them. This was also related to trust, and also on
this account the respondents said it had taken some time for them to gain the trust of
the central management. They also indicated that it was the distance and lack of face-
to-face interaction which could explain why it had taken time.
The dominating party in the learning process between the foreign subsidiaries and the
Scandinavian units was clearly the central management and the other Scandinavians. This
was both because of the centralized decision structure and the direct intervention from the
central management, and because the organizational rules that prevailed in Scandinavia
were attempted to be exported as the legitimate norm for the whole organization.
10.3.1 Creating mutual knowledge
Within the organizations in Norway and to some extent Sweden, there was less need for
explicit and implicit bargaining over organizational rules. These discussions were to a
certain extent finished as these former separate units had created a shared history and
the members of the organization had a larger agreement on the prevalent organizational
rules. Meeting a number of foreign subsidiaries and their managers and employees meant
that their taken-for-granted beliefs were challenged. The central management and em-
ployees in Scandinavia had to reflect on their taken-for-granted behavior and make it
explicit so that it was understandable to the new members. After some time the need to
constantly having to explain the logic and rational behind the practices was reduced, and
the two parties created mutual knowledge which made their interaction more efficient.
Such mutual knowledge took the forms of behavioral rules, trust and knowledge of the
other.
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Some concrete examples may serve to illustrate how behavioral rules were created.
Because of a former incident between the president of the company and the Belgian
manager in the U.S., they had created a saying which emphasized the possible misun-
derstandings of speaking a language which was foreign to them both. In their interaction
they used the phrase; “we have to check our dictionaries”, reminding them of the poss-
ible misunderstanding that could occur. At our third visit to the Polish plant we arrived
the same day as the local management was preparing their strategy to convince the
central management of certain local solutions they wanted to introduce. Discussing how
and why they had a meeting to prepare the strategy, we were told that with time they
had learnt how they needed to argue, and that the central management would demand
thorough documentation that sustained their arguments. The issue they were now pre-
paring was one they had attempted to introduce earlier, but which had failed because
they had not known how, when and where to present it in a convincing manner. The last
example I have mentioned earlier, the local managers came to realize after some time
that even though their local autonomy was restricted, the behavioral norm advocated by
the central management was that it was better to take actions and ask afterwards if you
could be seen to act for the benefit of the company. What most local managers had first
perceived as restricted autonomy and too much hierarchy, was perceived differently as
they came to know the central management.
Especially during the first round of interviews, some respondents indicated that
Scandinavian managers, simply because of their nationality, were granted more trust
than foreign managers. Foreign managers and employees also held that they did not feel
they were trusted enough. Later, however, several of the respondents stated they now
felt they were trusted by the central management. Most held that this had been a result
of proving themselves and their results, and that with time the central management had
gained trust in them. Also, the other way round, it seems that trust had been created.
At the second round of interviews there were more comments and statements which
expressed understanding and confidence in the strategies and decisions of the central
management.
Also in terms of increased knowledge, the relationship between the parties improved.
During our second round of interviews most of the respondents abroad felt that insuf-
ficient knowledge about local conditions was more apparent in the past and that things
had improved. They also held that their Scandinavian colleagues now expressed a
greater eagerness to learn from them. As one respondent said when asked whether his
colleagues in Scandinavia wanted to learn from them: “No, not from the start. More re-
cently, I think they have realized that we have had some experiences here that they need
to understand”. This had also resulted in a weaker Scandinavian bias. There had been
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a change in perspective, from a practice based on Scandinavian terms, to a perspective,
where local knowledge was combined with Scandinavian experience and perhaps also
with more general insights from the fields of production management and organization
theory.
Even though mutual knowledge was created and the bargaining between the parties
may be seen to have become more efficient, there were still hindrances that arose. Cultural
differences were seen as such a barrier towards understanding and accepting employees
from other units. The central management and employees in Scandinavia focused on
such differences when they were criticized by the Poles for not preparing the move from
Åmotfors to Poland sufficiently. When the Poles blamed the Scandinavians for not pro-
viding sufficient documentation, the Scandinavians held that this was essentially a Polish
problem because of Polish communist history where detailed procedures and routines
had higher priority than results. Also much later, between the U.S. unit and Mexico in
2003, cultural differences were held up as the main explanation for the problems they
had. Cultural differences had not been seen as a problem when we visited the unit one
year earlier, but because of the problems with the QS9000 audit these explanations came
to the fore. Again it was a matter of where to place the blame. Since none of the units
wanted to admit their own faults in the process, it was explained by referring to the
culture of the other which made them behave in ways counterproductive for interaction
and the business. These defensive behaviors seemed to take the focus from the actual
problems and made learning difficult.
10.3.2 New organizational rules
The examples above illustrate that the learning process between the Scandinavian parent
company and the foreign subsidiary was not unidirectional and without hindrances on the
way. On the other hand, there are also numerous examples of new organizational rules
that were negotiated and which altered both the strategies and policies of the head office
as well as the approach and understanding of the local subsidiaries. As seen in earlier
chapters, the different local units were able to negotiate local solutions to an increasing
degree with time, but also more encompassing changes occurred affecting the whole of
the organization. These changes were dependent on changes in the norms and beliefs of
those devising the various policies and solutions, changes that came about because of
the meeting between the old and the new members of the organization.
While the company in the beginning of their international expansion relied strongly
on Scandinavian expatriates and project managers, such positions became available to
foreign employees with time. One may argue that their former reliance on Scandinav-
ian employees was because they lacked foreign employees who were familiar with the
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company and who could be used in such positions. But the scope of the first Interdal
course provides grounds to argue otherwise, as foreign employees were hardly included
in this course even if it was designed to create the future international leaders of the
company. However, with time, foreign employees were given more equal opportunities.
The second Interdal course included more foreign employees, and for the forthcoming
establishment in China, a U.S. employee will be an expatriate in the new unit.
Earlier, the foreign subsidiaries had little contact with other local units, as their con-
tact and cooperation with the rest of the company was mainly limited to contact with the
units in Scandinavia. Their demand for more communication between the various units
was answered to a certain extent by the creation of a cross-geographical team between
the U.S., Mexico, Poland and Sweden. There is also an increased emphasis on seminars
for different function areas such as for instance purchasing and sales where employees
from different units meet.
As seen in chapter 9, the use of different control mechanisms was given a more bal-
anced approach after some time. The employment of socialization mechanisms came
more to the fore, and these mechanisms allowed for more communication between the
different employees in the company. Seen in a learning perspective, these socialization
mechanisms have much in common with methods seen to enhance learning in an or-
ganization. As stated earlier, exploratory learning models require more relaxed control
to function optimally. In addition, there were more arenas for communication created
both horizontally and laterally in the organization. There were efforts taken to increase
the discussion on taken-for-granted assumptions, beliefs and norms than earlier. In 2003,
a focus on the company culture was introduced and there were efforts to more directly
socialize and integrate new employees, above all the management from the various
units, in the company at large. Underlying these changes was an increased understanding
in the company of the limited use and fallibility of formalized and centralized control
mechanisms. Even though these were essential, they were also dependent on creating
shared understanding and trust in the organization in order to create the control and
coordination they were in need of.
A stronger reliance and awareness of socio-cultural factors seems to have been intro-
duced. This was reflected in the content of the second Interdal course which relied more
strongly on such issues, and also in the implementation of more instrumental solutions.
The ambitions and expectations for the various SAP projects were lowered with time, and
people were better prepared for eventualities arising from differences in local contexts.
The start up of the Polish plant and the subsequent evaluation led to discussions within
the company which placed a greater emphasis on less tangible issues like management
values, training, and relations between workers and management. Also the rhetoric used
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by the central management in different presentations had an increasingly stronger focus
on the diversity of legitimate perspectives and a softening of their reputation for being
“lean and mean”. There were also efforts towards increasing the emphasis on feedback
and support.
The central management and the employees in Scandinavia had been accused of op-
erating with a Scandinavian bias, and the foreign units were asking for what they referred
to as an “international mindset”. After some time, more respondents acknowledged that
the company had undergone a learning process, and that the central management was
increasingly demonstrating their qualities as global leaders. The respondents abroad saw
this as a result of a changed awareness and understanding in Scandinavia and as a result
of the challenge stemming from now several foreign units.
10.4 Discussion
Despite the fact that the learning process was highly dominated by the central manage-
ment, and by the organizational rules that prevailed in Scandinavia, the meeting between
the Scandinavians and the foreign employees resulted in learning experiences that altered
the organization. The domination both in terms of authority and organizational rules
diminished in time as the local units challenged the former norms and beliefs. And the
learning processes which in the beginning only involved central management and certain
employees in Scandinavia and in the foreign units, multiplied as more lateral relations
were created involving more actors and the outcomes of the learning processes were
dispersed to a larger part of the organization.
In line with former theory, mutual knowledge was created between the organizations.
While earlier theory has relied on a separation between inter- and intra-organizational
learning processes, Kongsberg Automotive is an example where learning processes
movefrom being inter-organizational to intra-organizational. It is also a case which dis-
putes the claim that inter-organizational processes are always characterized by a lack of
formal authority. The discussion above shows that it is not the lack of formal authority
which distinguishes the process from the beginning of the international expansion and
later, but more so the lack of mutual knowledge in the form of behavioral rules, trust
and knowledge.
Even though the central management acknowledged that the internationalization pro-
cess could not be planned in detail but had to rely on experiences on each local site, a
strategy in line with Argyris and Schön’s theory of action, the full consequence of such
a practice was not embedded in the organization. When the establishment of new units
yielded new information, such as the need for more documentation in Poland, the Scandi-
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navian units reacted by defensive behaviors. Their argument was that the Polish demand
for more documentation was due to their communist history. This was an argument that
neither questioned whether they were providing too little documentation nor why the
Polish unit was in need of more documentation. As seen above, the move of machines
and production processes from Scandinavia to Poland was supported by incomplete de-
scriptions of how these machines and processes had been practiced in Scandinavia. When
the Polish unit was faced with figuring out how to work the machines, and how to meet
the standards that were specified in the SAP, they realized that they had not received
adequate information. On the other hand, in later establishments such as in Korea, the
strategy of introducing the methods and practices of the parent company was done in a
more cautious manner. A manner suggesting that the management was expecting new
information to emerge, and which included the local employees to a larger extent.
One of the challenges the company had to face was how to create behavioral rules,
trust and knowledge between the separate organizations across geographical distances.
This was a challenge that was increasingly recognized by the central management and
this acknowledgement made for important changes in their strategies. Our respondents
acknowledged that the lack of face-to-face interaction and the distances made it diffi-
cult to build trust between the organizations. They therefore called for more exchange
and more arenas for communication. Because of the international character of the or-
ganization many formal and informal relations were disembedded, or torn loose from
social contexts. Normally, trust is embedded in a particular social context, and devel-
ops over time through formal and informal interaction in different situations (Giddens
1991). The people involved get to know each other’s values, knowledge and reaction
patterns. This was to a lesser extent the case in Kongsberg Automotive, and the lack
of shared local contexts meant that to create trust took more time, and had to be based
on other shared frames of references than the daily interaction in a local setting. While
the different groups and units became closer with time and developed efficient learning
and interaction behaviors, these relationships were also fragile. When problems arose
at a later time, a convenient strategy was to reintroduce the concept of ‘us’ and ‘them’,
blaming the other for difficulties in the relationship. They used cultural differences as
an explanation, even when this had not been seen as a problem earlier. Such defensive
behaviors, as discussed by Argyris and Schön (1996) inhibit productive learning in the
organization. And even though organizations can be seen to attempt to move away from
such defensive reasoning one should also expect that regressions occur.
The outcome of the learning processes was, as seen in earlier chapters, isolated sol-
utions implemented in the local units, but also more general insights which took the form
of instrumental changes as well as changes in the private – decentralized institutions in
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the different units. The changes in these institutions ultimately made for transformations
in the private – centralized institutions in the organization. This can be seen as equivalent
to what Argyris and Schön call single and double-loop learning. Instrumental changes
were related to how the SAP, for instance, was more gradually introduced with time,
and the acceptance of the need to provide more accurate specifications on drawings etc.
to the foreign units. The changes that occurred in the central management’s approach
towards the units and to the future challenges of the company can be described as double-
loop learning. The awareness of a former Scandinavian bias and the need for a more
international mindset ultimately made for other strategies when it came to recruitment,
training, local autonomy, lateral cooperation between the units and an increased focus on
socialization mechanisms. These changes made for new private-centralized institutions
in the organization which emphasized interaction and a stronger acknowledgement of
how practices determine both learning processes and outcomes.
10.5 A learning perspective for understanding an
internationalization process
The value of applying a learning perspective on the internationalization process of an
organization is that it draws our attention to the fact that such a process is characterized
by uncertainty and lack of knowledge, and that the ability to learn and develop new
knowledge is of the utmost importance for success. It also accentuates the trial-and-error
experimentation involved as boundedly rational actors attempt to make sense of new
situations and problems. This is in line with Argyris and Schön’s definition of learning
as change. To view the internationalization process as trial-and-error experimentation
also acknowledges that false or unworkable practices may emerge.
On the other hand, Argyris and Schön also hold that for productive learning to take
place it is not trial-and-error experimentation which is the answer. Such a perspective on
how the organization relates to its strategies and actions implies to ignore that intent is
an important part of the actions that are realized. Their recommended theory of action
is to view the design of a strategy as a hypothesis and the action as a probe. Such a per-
spective fosters a more open dialogue in the organization as to possible improvements of
both intention and action. This is a perspective which can be situated between a rational
approach to strategy where strategic intent is imposed through rigorous implementation
and a natural approach where strategy is viewed as behavioral adaptation to changes in
the environment. The theory of action thus holds that when both strategies and actions
are viewed as more exploratory by the members of the organization, there will be a
larger potential for creating new and better informed practices.
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The learning potential involved in the internationalization process of Kongsberg Auto-
motive can be expected to be higher than in more narrow intra-organizational learning
processes as the available pool of alternative views and ideas is greatly enlarged. This
is also argued by Brown and Duguid (1991) who state that separate perspectives of
different communities-of-practice may be amplified by interchange among such com-
munities. An internationalization process should perhaps be seen as a particular case
when viewed in a learning perspective. Brown and Duguid hold that the alliance between
separate organizations with different interpretive schemes, enables the composite group
they make up to have more options to choose from as these are independent members
of the groups and not restrained by a rigid hierarchy. Despite hierarchical authority, the
new members in Kongsberg Automotive contributed to an enlargement of perspectives.
However, their ability to do so seems to have been increased when these communities
received more autonomy and their interconnectedness was improved.
Traditional research on subsidiary – parent company relations has mainly focused
on how institutional forces affect the choices made within the organization, and has
emphasized less the effect of the interaction between the different groups of actors. The
mutual adjustment that occurs creates shared knowledge which affects both the per-
ception of the actors and the subsequent outcome of the learning processes. Mintzberg
refers to mutual adjustment as a “simple process of informal communication” (1983: 3
– 9). A simple process, but as discussed in this chapter it can have profound effects on
the participants and the social system they interact within.
On the other hand, understanding the various units in Kongsberg Automotive as
communities-of-practice also acknowledges that practices that prevail are situated in a
context. The structures and the institutional environments of the local organizations in-
fluence the practices in the community. That practices from one community to another
cannot be replicated without some form of confusion and subsequent alteration in the new
community is illustrated in the case of Kongsberg Automotive. The description of work
practices does not represent the actual practices. This was the case when machines and
production processes were moved from Scandinavia to the new subsidiaries. There was
tacit knowledge existent in Scandinavia which was not transferred, and the new contexts
of the subsidiaries demanded alterations. There were few attempts to construct arenas
where these separate communities could have interacted and built shared interpretations
of both practice and context.
In former research on organizational learning processes domination has been seen as
having a negative effect on the outcomes of these processes. The material from Kongs-
berg Automotive shows that learning processes and fruitful outcomes occur even when
the interaction is strongly dominated by one party and is at the outset characterized by
212
10 A perspective on learning
conflict and misunderstandings. A too strong focus on the conflictual aspect of power
ignores the possible formative forces that power can have. Productive learning as de-
fined by Argyris and Schön (1996) emphasizes the potential in problematic situations
and sees the experience of surprise as a prerequisite. Conflict in this perspective is seen
as a challenge to prevalent norms and beliefs and may therefore function as a pressure
for improvement and change.
The learning perspective applied here draws the attention to the underlying processes
in the organization relevant for learning. These processes make for explanations as to how
changes in private-decentralized institutions come about, what Ingram and Clay (2000)
calls the origin of preference. As shown above, preferences are changed in interaction
with others. That individuals change their preferences, further infers explanations as to
how changes in the private-centralized institutions of the organization may come about.
The perspective applied above counteracts the former reliance on structural expla-
nations to predict the outcome of the dichotomy centralization vs. decentralization in
former research on MNCs. While structural factors do matter, the case of Kongsberg
Automotive also illustrates that the role of boundedly rational actors and their inter-
action is important for understanding the outcome of the subsidiary – parent company
relationship. A learning perspective such as that advocated by Argyris and Schön views
learning processes as contingent upon actors and their intent as well as changes in the
environment. However, the focus when attempting to understand how an organization
develops needs to be on the interaction processes between boundedly rational actors
who are situated in their specific communities.
10.6 Concluding remarks
The value of applying a learning perspective on the internationalization process is that it
fosters an understanding that organizational development is neither a result of environ-
mental adaptation nor a result of strategic action. The focus on learning emerges these
two perspectives of adaptation and action as boundedly rational actors are seen to inter-
act within institutional constraints. It was interaction between separate communities-of-
practice which in Kongsberg Automotive’s case resulted in new practices that became
institutionalized in the organization. When the central management attempted to transfer
the practices of the Scandinavian units abroad they relied to a great extent on descriptions
of these practices. There were few measures taken to create arenas for communication
between those who were familiar with the production processes and the new units who
were expected to implement them. Knowledge that was tacit in Scandinavia was there-
fore not transferred, and confusion and subsequent alterations in practices followed in
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the new units. This was also the case for what the central management referred to as
the “Kongsberg way”. While the Scandinavian employees saw this as the most appro-
priate way to do things, employees in the new units questioned and challenged these
assumptions. They described the decisions that were taken as biased by Scandinavian
reasoning. Because of domination by the Scandinavian units in the internationalization
process, both through authority and legitimized norms, the views from the new units
were ignored or argued to be irrelevant because they were seen as culture-specific.
However, through time their interaction created interdependencies between the sep-
arate communities. Behavioral rules, trust and increased knowledge of each other were
gradually created. These couplings made it possible to create new practices which were
based on the new context of the organization. A more international mindset ensued and
as seen in former chapters; the local units were granted more autonomy and the con-
trol measures employed by the head office were more sophisticated, diminishing the
unidirectional centralized control applied earlier.
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11 Theoretical implications
11.1 Introduction
With a theoretical framework based on new institutionalism I have analyzed the devel-
opment of organizational structures and practices in Kongsberg Automotive. While I
have included structural explanations in this framework, it is the processes of learning
where individual actors have interacted which have been given the main emphasis. Such
a perspective has allowed for an analysis focusing on how an intensive internationaliz-
ation process changed the private – centralized institutions of the subsidiaries and the
organization as a whole. This process was contingent upon both actors and institutional
environments.
Former theory, analyzing the relationship between the head office and subsidiary, has
explained the development of both local solutions and the use of control mechanisms by
emphasizing structural explanations. The analysis of Kongsberg Automotive has shown
that the role of boundedly rational actors is central to a more comprehensive understand-
ing of these issue areas. Both when it concerns the development of local solutions and
of control mechanisms in the organization, the role of actors constrained by institutions,
power, interest and their social embeddedness has explanatory value. Below I will dis-
cuss further the relevance of these findings for existent theory and future research on
multinational companies.
In line with prevailing theory, institutions have in this thesis been defined as stable
patterns of rules and norms which influence the behavior of individuals as well as or-
ganizations. However, in order to grasp the complex nature of multinational corporations
I have above advanced a more comprehensive, yet flexible concept of the institutional
environment. This is a concept which holds that the institutional environments of MNCs
are multiple, layered and involve a variety of stakeholders who ultimately deem the or-
ganization as legitimate. The contribution of this thesis on new institutionalism is this
re-conceptualization of institutional environments in the case of MNCs. This diverts
some from prevalent theories where it is the slow-changing and exogenous character of
institutions which has been given prominence.
Below, I will discuss in more detail the theoretical implications this analysis has for
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both an organizational-learning perspective and for new institutionalism. I will base the
discussion on the theoretical framework and research questions presented in chapter 2.
I will also include some thoughts on future research which could further increase our
understanding of these issues.
11.1.1 A learning perspective emphasizing institutions and actors.
The emphasis on leadership in this thesis is partly a result of the inclusion of the ac-
tor perspective, but also a result of the nature of the MNC itself. Because of language
barriers and geographical distances there is a restricted number of individuals who be-
come central to the internationalization process of a company. Even though there was
much interaction between the foreign units and the Scandinavian units of Kongsberg
Automotive, the local managers abroad had a central role in representing their units.
These local managers were more essential to the internationalization process than other
employees in the foreign units.
Organizational theory has to some extent left the issue of leadership to more nor-
mative management literature, but it is vital for organizational research to understand
how leadership is exercised and its effect on the social systems of organizations. In an
internationalized company the former transparency of the organization is reduced as the
parent company lacks the knowledge (language and cultural codes) to communicate di-
rectly with large parts of the organization, and lacks the resources to be present because
of geographical distances. The role of local leadership takes on a different character than
in smaller and more homogenous organizations. Former research on control and coordi-
nation has made some assumptions that do not seem to hold as to how the governance
structure of a MNC develops. The analysis of Kongsberg Automotive shows that the
employment of control mechanisms is not merely dependent on decisions by the central
management, but is conditioned by the usefulness of the mechanisms themselves and
whether other actors in the organization perceive them as legitimate.
11.1.1.1 Local solutions and local leadership
Former theory has emphasized how the development of local solutions in subsidiaries is
dependent on the power and interest of the unit to push for such solutions when nego-
tiating with the head office (Gates and Egelhoff 1986; Garnier 1982; Rosenzweig and
Nohria 1994; Gupta and Govindarajan 1991). The ability and interest of subsidiaries in
these studies are explained by structural variables such as extent of dependency on local
resources, size, dependency on parent company and so forth.
In this thesis I have argued that the status of the different units in terms of these
structural variables does not seem to have much effect on the extent of local autonomy.
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However, I do acknowledge that other means of measuring these variables could have
provided other results. On the other hand, earlier research emphasizing structural ex-
planations for the degree of local solutions has to some extent omitted the role of the
local leadership. The material from Kongsberg Automotive suggests that this may be
an error. This brings me to my first research question: Why is local leadership crucial
in creating local solutions?
The local manager of a foreign subsidiary may at times be the only representative
from the unit that the central management relates to directly, and he serves therefore as
the main interpreter of local conditions as well as to how practices are translated and
implemented at the unit. He is the principal link between the parent company and the
local unit, and both local employees as well as central management depend to a great
extent on this one person to represent their interests. What role the manager takes on
may therefore determine the solutions that are advocated locally, and those which are
fronted in negotiations with the parent company.
I have above shown how the local leaders in Kongsberg Automotive had different
approaches towards their role as managers of the local subsidiaries. A perspective em-
phasizing that these are boundedly rational actors who are shaped by their relative power,
interests, social embeddedness and institutions made it possible to discuss the variety
among the local leaders in Kongsberg Automotive. Even when faced with the same
central management, these leaders took on different roles both in regards to the local
unit and in negotiations with the central management. The roles the local managers in
Kongsberg Automotive took on varied from being the representative of the head office
to the spokesperson for the production workers.
The local managers were influenced by different institutional environments. Some of
the managers in Kongsberg Automotive had a background from the same environment
as the head office and were strongly influenced by these institutions in their approach
abroad. Others identified more with the automotive industry and the norms and beliefs
inherent to this global industry. This seems to have been the case for the Polish manager
in Pruzkow who had most of his work experience from large U.S. companies in Poland.
Others again heeded to a greater extent the local environment of the subsidiary. The
Mexican manager and the South Korean manager for instance were strongly influenced
by the local environment and were seen to push for maintaining or creating local sol-
utions. The manner in which these managers related to the institutional environment can
be seen as a support of Rottenburg (1996) proposition. He holds that the institutional
environment consists of a myriad of institutional orders. The introduction of new sol-
utions is more dependent on a translation which does not contradict institutional orders
than on a predetermined format. The political skills of the local manager are therefore
217
Introduction
important in the endeavor to create acceptance both at the head office as well as locally.
Through tactics and rhetoric the local manager is able to create legitimacy for his ideas
and solutions. The importance of the organization to be viewed as legitimate is also
central to new institutionalism even though their focus has been on external stakeholders
more than those internal to the organization.
11.1.1.2 Governance system
Earlier research has maintained that companies rely on different control and coordi-
nation mechanisms because of their interests in creating consistency or allowing for local
autonomy in its subsidiaries. The type of industry – multidomestic or global- affects
to what extent the company needs to consider local market receptivity, and hence their
interest in allowing for local autonomy (Gates and Egelhoff 1986). The national ori-
gin and administrative heritage is expected to create a tradition for using some type of
mechanisms above others (Hedlund 1981; Egelhoff 1984; Bartlett and Ghoshal 1998).
While earlier research has been inconclusive as to the effect of increased international
experience, it is held that increased experience allows for more autonomy to the local
units (Stopford and Wells 1972). It has also been argued that how dependent the unit
is on its local environment vs. the parent company will determine the extent of local
autonomy in these units (Garnier 1982; Hedlund 1981; Picard 1977; Cray 1984). In
addition to these structural explanations I have above included the role of boundedly
rational actors in my analysis.
When explaining the governance structure in Kongsberg Automotive, the role of such
actors becomes central. The ability of these actors to choose different control mechanisms
over others was determined by how these mechanisms affected the internationalization
process and the organization at large. The use of different mechanisms had at times
unintended consequences, which in turn made for changes in how these mechanisms
were applied. Earlier theory has maintained that the motivations for using mechanisms
such as formalization or socialization are to avoid overt use of hierarchical control or a
need to create consensus (Nohria and Ghoshal 1994; Evans 1992). The analysis above
suggests that there is greater variety in the motivations for employing different mech-
anisms. The various control mechanisms that were employed affected the relationship
between head office and subsidiary. A perspective emphasizing interests, power, social
embeddedness and institutional constraints highlights how the central management were
restricted by, as well as motivated by, a number of factors in their choices of control
mechanisms. This brings me to the research question posed earlier: Why are governance
systems built both upon structural and cultural control mechanisms?
When attempting to control and coordinate their increasingly international organiz-
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ation Kongsberg Automotive experienced that their ability to rely on some mechanisms
over others was affected by lack of resources, time and the usefulness of the different
mechanisms. The formalized control and coordination mechanisms, such as standardized
operating procedures, proved to be fallible. The functioning of the production procedures
replicated from Scandinavia was based on tacit knowledge in the Scandinavian units.
The knowledge of how to achieve the same result as in the Scandinavian unit was
thus not transferred together with the operating procedures. This was also related to the
standards for the produced items. Production workers from different units did not agree
on the details of the standards, but the production process and the subsequent expected
outcome was already set as a standard in the resource planning system, SAP. It was thus
the standards existent in Scandinavia which served as a norm for the rest of the organiz-
ation, even though these found that they did not have the know-how on how to reach
it. Other procedures such as those related to the implementation of the QS9000 quality
system had not been transferred. This was seen as one of the reasons why the U.S. and
Mexican unit failed the QS9000 audit. It was differences between the Scandinavian and
U.S./Mexican context which caused difficulties for transferring these procedures.
The varying local contexts of the foreign subsidiaries represented problems when
relying on standardization. It was difficult to introduce the SAP into the Polish context.
A different alphabet and language together with other laws and regulations demanded
alterations in the system. In Mexico the overall production process was changed from
a ‘push’ to a ‘pull’ system accommodating the education level and living situation of
the workers. Also a different tester for quality control was introduced. Even though the
use of SAP allowed for controlling the increasingly large organization it also demanded
a higher level of support from Scandinavia to the foreign units. These, together with
other weaknesses connected to the use of formalized and centralized mechanisms, as
described in chapter 9, meant that the strong reliance on such mechanisms needed to be
supplied with other means for control and coordination, those connected to socialization
mechanisms.
The reactions from the units were a different reason for the change in governance
structure. Employees in the foreign subsidiaries did not agree with the rational behind
some of the mechanisms. The extent of centralization was seen to limit lateral coordi-
nation between the units, and to restrict adaptation to the North American market. The
centralization of purchasing was viewed as an obstacle for production as it created a
need to keep larger inventories, and could limit the availability of supplies on a short-
term basis. Centralization of other areas such as IT-support, R&D and finance was also
viewed as an obstacle because of time differences and geographical distances.
The increased reliance on socialization mechanisms came as a result of the above,
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but was hindered by lack of resources. While the head office wished to use expatriates
as a means for controlling and coordinating the foreign subsidiaries they were short on
personnel who could take on expatriate assignments. This was attempted to be resolved
by creating the Interdal course, but also other means for achieving a more integrated
organization were initiated. A stronger focus on values and attitudes was an attempt to
create a stronger consensus in the organization. This also involved the head office trying
to learn more about the differences between the local units and how these perceived
the company. More arenas for communication were also created through the cross-geo-
graphical team of production managers and a number of functional seminars involving
employees from different units.
In Kongsberg Automotive there was a growing understanding of the fallibility of
formalized, standardized and centralized mechanisms, as their knowledge of the var-
iety in local needs and contexts increased. With time, a more sophisticated balance was
achieved, as a wider range of mechanisms was employed. The central management’s
ability to choose their preferred means for controlling and coordinating the organization
was affected by whether these mechanisms were appropriate for the issue areas they
attempted to control and whether actors in the foreign subsidiaries perceived them as
appropriate. This meant that the governance structure they were attempting to create
needed to be built both upon structural and cultural means for control and coordination.
The increased degree of autonomy the local units received came as a result of the
fallibility of formalized and centralized control mechanisms.
However, local autonomy may also be understood as a different means for control-
ling the units. Employees in the foreign subsidiaries are persuaded to engage in self-
monitoring through increased participation and by sharing company goals. That a com-
mon understanding of reality is a means to regulate and discipline people’s behavior
through shared norms of right and wrong, has earlier been argued by Michel Fou-
cault (1977). This is increasingly a control mechanism that is used in companies, as
Fleming and Søborg (1998) argue; reflexive, self-monitoring and evaluation-focused
employees are the new tools for integration and development of the company. An
important element in such a change is the decentralization of responsibility from
the central management to employees at the individual subsidiaries (Clegg and Pal-
mer 1996; Sennett 2001; Clarke and Clegg 1998; Beck 2000). When former research
has focused on explaining whether a company is centralized or decentralized, the ef-
fect of different types of control mechanisms has received less attention. A greater
acknowledgement of how control mechanisms are intertwined and affect each other
seems to be in order. This is increasingly important as companies are seen to employ
more sophisticated means of controlling and coordinating their organizations. As Beck
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(2000) quotes Andreas Zielcke1, ”early capitalism was based upon the exploitation
of labor, while today’s capitalism is based upon the exploitation of responsibility” (p.
151).
Based on these findings the structural explanations advocated in earlier theory may
still be valid in predicting the extent of centralization in a MNC. But such explanations
also need to incorporate a greater understanding of the effect of different control mech-
anisms. The choice of governance structure is conditioned by how useful different
mechanisms are for controlling and coordinating the various tasks of the organization
and whether actors in the organization perceive them as appropriate. This means that
a less conflictual route towards integration is achieved by employing both structural
and cultural mechanisms. Former theory has also ignored how some mechanisms are
considered compulsory by a great number of companies regardless of national origin
or organizational structure. For example, Kongsberg Automotive employed the QS9000
quality system because the system is increasingly viewed as mandatory in the automotive
industry. Some mechanisms may be seen as becoming institutionalized throughout the
industry.
11.1.1.3 A perspective on learning
The final research question I have attempted to answer in this thesis is: why is a per-
spective on learning important for understanding the internationalization process? The
emphasis on learning processes highlighted the many changes that occurred in the or-
ganization during the years of international expansion. Such a perspective allows for
understanding how the meeting between different institutional environments and actors
produce negotiations over prevalent organizational rules, but also how new solutions
are created. The learning processes in Kongsberg Automotive reflect those described by
Argyris and Schön 1996, and Brown and Duguid 1991.
I characterized the learning processes in Kongsberg Automotive as moving from
inter-organizational to intra-organizational. The separate organizations of the company
gradually created mutual knowledge which increasingly unified the organizations and
its members. This is in contrast to earlier research which has highlighted the differences
in these processes, where the distinction has been based on the lack of formal authority
(Holmqvist 2003). Inter-organizational learning processes have been described as more
exploratory since both the process and the outcome may be expected to be more open
ended. This exploratory quality has been ascribed to the lack of formal authority. Intra-
organizational processes characterized by formal authority and mutual knowledge have
1) Zielcke, A. Der Neue Doppelgänger, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 July 1996.
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been seen as limited by the myopic nature of the organization which inhibits its members
to see the full complexity in a situation. In Kongsberg Automotive the learning processes
were to a large extent characterized by formal authority, but it was the lack of mutual
knowledge which made for more exploratory learning experiences in the beginning as
prevalent organizational norms were challenged by employees abroad.
Even though such learning processes are seen to be vulnerable to domination and
dependent on more relaxed control, the formal authority and use of power in Kongsberg
Automotive’s case can be seen as constructive elements in the process. Domination
in learning processes has been viewed as negative because it implies that one party’s
simplified understanding is allowed to dominate the learning process and subsequent
outcomes. On the other hand, power may also be seen as a constructive and formative
force in learning processes as it may create focus and induce decisions (Levin and Klev
2002). In Kongsberg Automotive the use of power was observable not only in the shape
of a hierarchical authority, but also highly visible in the form of a strongly legitimized
“Kongsberg way”. The Scandinavian part of the organization adhered to these norms and
beliefs and these were attempted to be exported to the new members of the organization,
the new foreign units. That many of the assumptions and norms the Scandinavians ad-
hered to were taken-for-granted became clear only when these were confronted by foreign
employees who did not see or understand the rational behind the practices. The meeting
between those who expressed a “Scandinavian bias” and the outsiders was essential for
the fundamental changes that occurred. This further accentuates the explanatory value
of including the role of boundedly rational actors. Organizations are inert structures and
they resemble the individuals within them. Individuals are reluctant to change unless
there is a problematic situation which demonstrates the limitations in prevalent norms
and understandings.
When new units were added to the existent organization there was for some time a
higher level of conflicts and misunderstanding between employees in these units and
those in the Scandinavian units. Through time mutual knowledge was created in the form
of behavioral rules, trust and increased knowledge on both sides. Both parties expressed
greater understanding and trust at the second round of interviews. Explicit behavioral rules
were created, more arenas for communication were formed and the participants came to
have more knowledge of each other. Trust was seen by the respondents themselves as
essential in the relationship between the head office and the local units. A greater extent
of trust seems to be a part of the explanation as to why the central management relied
on more relaxed control after some time, and also why the local managers expressed
a greater understanding in the decisions the central management initiated. This learn-
ing process may have been enhanced by an increased use of socialization mechanisms
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that have similarities to the means earlier advocated for improving learning processes.
Argyris and Schön argue that to develop productive learning the different communities
in the organization needs to be more autonomous and included in a collaborative process
towards common goals.
These learning processes resulted in changes in the private-centralized institutions
of the organization as the central management moved from employing a “Scandinavian
bias” to what was described as a more “international mindset”. The outcomes of the
learning processes meant that former practices which had favored Scandinavian employ-
ees above employees from the foreign units, were changed. This implied more equal
opportunities for all employees. A more critical approach towards taken-for-granted
assumptions was also visible as discussions on values and priorities increasingly empha-
sized the international character of the organization. As Scandinavian institutionalists
have argued, such changes come about through social processes where actors discuss,
interpret and certify some ideas as more appropriate than others (Czarniawska and Se-
vón 1996; 2003). This is also in line with Argyris and Schön’s emphasis on interaction
as an essential part of productive learning. The logic of what was considered appro-
priate within Kongsberg Automotive was altered when new actors familiar with other
institutional environments were included in the organization. As such, it was a meeting
between separate communities-of-practice (Brown and Duguid 1991). This is related
to the processes of institutional change which Ingram and Clay advocate (2000), fo-
cusing on how preferences are changed in social interaction. I will below discuss the
implications of such a perspective in further detail, as I look closer at the theoretical
framework applied in this thesis.
11.2 A theoretical framework based on new institutionalism
Much research has been devoted to studying the relationship between an organization
and its environment (Child 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Hannan and Freeman 1989;
Singh and Lumsden 1990). However, there has been limited research on multinational
companies and their multiple environments (Szulanski 1996; Zaheer 1995). The concept
of institutional environments applied in earlier research has frequently and implicitly
been seen as congruent with national boundaries (Rosenzweig and Singh 1991). It is
the local organization or organizational field within national context which has received
the main focus. While some authors have recognized the importance of focusing on
how organizations are influenced by multiple environments, few have addressed these
issues in empirical research (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Ro-
senzweig and Singh 1991). This study has attempted to remedy some of this lack in
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previous research, focusing on a multinational company with subsidiaries in as diverse
local contexts as South Korea, U.S.A., Poland, Mexico, Norway and Sweden.
Studies which have a bearing on understanding complex organizations such as those
focusing on the internal relationships between head office and subsidiaries, have re-
lied on structural explanations for their observations (Pugh et al. 1969; Garnier 1982;
Hedlund 1981). While including structural factors which have been found to affect the
head office – subsidiary relationship I have above emphasized the role of actors and
their interaction. I have allowed for structural explanations of human behavior as well
as an inclusion of the effect of individual choice (Ostrom 1997). As Doz and Praha-
lad (1984) have argued, the former research approach which has relied on structural
explanatory variables, has ignored important underlying processes in the organization.
Processes related to communication, information, negotiations, learning and trust. These
processes which involve the interaction of boundedly rational actors, are essential for
understanding the development of organizations.
A tendency in studies focusing on head office – subsidiary relationship has been to
give prominence to the influence of the head office on the various subsidiaries. There
is reason to expect that like in all social systems, there is an upward influence from the
subsidiaries to the head office as well as to other local units in the organization. For
instance, in studies of how international companies control and coordinate their local
units an underlying assumption has been that the employment of such mechanisms is
the sole decision of the head office and that it remains unaffected by other parts of
the organization. When analyzing the development of the internationalization process
in Kongsberg Automotive I have given emphasis to the influence of the various local
units and their managers on the central management and the organization as a whole. It
is the interaction between these actors which ultimately results in new practices in the
organization.
The inclusion of these perspectives in a study of a multinational organization has
allowed for an analysis which highlights how contradictory institutional pressures are
perceived and how these are solved within the organization. However, this also implies a
re-conceptualization of institutional environments and those stakeholders who deem the
organization as legitimate and socially acceptable. I have earlier argued that the environ-
ments of MNCs should be conceived of as multiple, layered and that the organizational
structures and practices are judged legitimate by internal as well as external actors.
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11.2.1 Multiple environments
The multinational organization of Kongsberg Automotive has been shown to be af-
fected by different institutional environments. The various subsidiaries were subject to
institutional pressures originating in their different local environments, from the parent
environment and from an increasingly institutionalized global environment of the auto-
motive industry. The inclusion of multiple environments in an analysis of MNCs allows
for acknowledging that the challenge of such organizations is not so much whether to
adapt locally or to centralize according to the institutions of the parent company. The
challenge of these organizations cannot be expressed in such a dichotomy, but is rather
based on creating a balance between multiple institutional environments. It follows that
the organization also needs to seek legitimacy among a variety of actors, both internal and
external. Altering the argument from new institutionalism; it is through complying with
a number of institutional environments simultaneously that an international organization
is able to be perceived as legitimate, socially accepted, credible and to gain increased
survival capabilities and resources. Those who deem the organization on these terms
are situated in different geographical locations, have different interests, are internal and
external to the organization and have different means of sanctioning an organization
perceived as illegitimate.
On the other hand, the distinction I have made between the three different institutional
environments is also limited and does not encompass the variety in relevant institutions
that may affect an international organization. Neither have I included all the different
stakeholders who ultimately perceive the organization as legitimate. I have concentrated
on actors internal to the organization. This re-conceptualization of institutional environ-
ments, however, accommodates the nature of the MNC which operates in a number of
geographical locations and where its complexity obscures the employment of a supreme
and unidirectional force from the head office.
11.2.2 Institutions on different levels
Institutions were in chapter 2 defined as regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive
elements which provide stability and meaning to social behavior. While institutions may
be defined as shared by those living in one geographical area, it may also be defined as
adherent to one organizational field encompassing one type of organization; hospitals,
banks, schools etc. A different approach is to distinguish between institutions on different
levels and focus on who creates and enforces them (Ingram and Clay 2000). In this per-
spective there are different institutional systems adherent to the state, organizations of
all kinds, and individuals. These institutional systems are interrelated as they constrain
and support each other.
225
A theoretical framework based on new institutionalism
The distinction advocated by Scott (2001) between the various elements of insti-
tutions (regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive) is essential for an understanding of
institutions. He also acknowledges that institutions are seen to exist on different levels
in society, but that earlier new institutionalists embraced a definition of institutions as
more overarching systems with a somewhat unreachable character. The inclusion of cen-
tralized – decentralized and public – private dimensions advocated by Ingram and Clay
(2000) implies a larger role for actors and change. Decentralized – private institutions
shared by a group of individuals support higher level institutions, and changes on higher
levels are contingent upon changes on the individual level. While institutional change in
former theory may be understood as major changes in overarching systems, the above
distinction makes it possible to conceive of change as occurring on a lower level among
individuals. Minor changes in private – decentralized institutions belonging to groups
of individuals may in due course affect larger institutional systems. Institutional change
thus begins incrementally among groups of individuals.
I have earlier argued that such a development occurred in Kongsberg Automotive. The
private – centralized institutions of the organization, which were formerly characterized
by a strong ”Scandinavian bias” were increasingly conceived of as more “international”.
The stronger ”international mindset” of the central management made for new practices
which gave the local units a more integrated role in the organization. A practice where
it was mostly Scandinavians who were given opportunities as expatriates and who re-
ceived training as future international managers was altered to include more foreign
employees. Lateral cooperation between local units was introduced, whereas earlier this
had been virtually non-existent. And respondents from abroad increasingly stated that
they were listened to and that Scandinavian colleagues now understood the value of
their knowledge and experience.
11.2.3 Multiple stakeholders
Even though Scott amongst others acknowledges that those who ultimately deem the
organization as legitimate are both internal and external to the organization, the main
tendency in earlier institutional research has been to focus on external stakeholders
(Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Hannan and Freeman 1977; Meyer and Rowan 1977). That
is customers, suppliers, governmental agencies and society at large. The focus in this
study has been on stakeholders internal to the organization. In accordance with insti-
tutionalism these actors are seen to be constrained by institutions, but when they comply
with them, institutions also serve as resources. In this study I have shown that actors
may exploit institutions. Based on knowledge and familiarity with prevalent institutions
individuals may be seen to draw advantage of aspects of these institutions when at-
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tempting to introduce alien solutions or to create new practices. This was the case in the
Mexican unit where the local manager introduced a more participative, organizational
model when regular production workers were promoted to team leaders and the former
foreman position was abandoned. A company which was earlier conceived of as not a
“proper maquila” was after the change seen to have its advantages.
A related finding is divergent opinions within the organization. Since the analytical
level within institutional research has mainly been on comparing different organizations
within an organizational field, these organizations have also tended to be viewed as
coherent entities (Scott 2001). When new solutions and practices are introduced into an
unfamiliar institutional environment these solutions have been characterized as alien.
The assumption has been that there will be resistance among local stakeholders towards
such alien solutions. And, further that institutions belonging to the local environment
are considered legitimate by all its members. As discussed earlier, individuals can be
seen to aspire for changes in their institutional environment as norms and beliefs are
considered legitimate by some but not all. The introduction of practices from a differ-
ent institutional environment, such as that of a Scandinavian company in Asia, may be
seen as a long sought after chance to alter norms and practices. Practices which are
highly institutionalized such as e.g. the seniority system in South Korea, are also prac-
tices which women and younger males may disagree with. The policy and principle of
adapting locally should therefore be viewed with some degree of skepticism. What local
stakeholders consider legitimate may well be ‘alien’ solutions.
The variety in institutions, levels of institutions, stakeholders and institutional orders I
have discussed above gives perhaps more room for bargaining between actors attempting
to create legitimate local organizational structures and practices than what has earlier
been advocated. It follows that the goal in earlier research of finding the right ‘fit’ in
an institutional context should be seen as a futile attempt.
11.2.4 Institutional change
Institutions are important for understanding the workings of different social systems
and how individuals behave within them. And institutions matter because they are in-
terpreted and expressed through individuals who are both constrained by them and who
may use them as resources. Because actors are able to choose from different institutional
logics they can also be seen to find ways of heeding their institutional environment and
simultaneously introduce what may be termed alien practices. The largest limitation to
such translations is not perhaps the institutional environment, but rather depends on the
approach of the actor.
The failure to account for the origin of preferences has earlier been identified as one
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of the weaknesses in new institutionalism. Ingram and Clay (2000) hold that institutions
on an individual level (private – decentralized institutions) consist of norms and beliefs
which are shared by groups of individuals. These researchers also argue that preferences
are created and altered by individuals who interact. It is the interaction and the rhetoric in
these encounters which provides the individual with the interest and motive to change his
own preferences. When there is interaction between groups of individuals who adhere to
different institutional environments one may expect that such encounters produce results
more varied and different than when the individuals belong to the same familiar insti-
tutional environment. This is related to what Argyris and Schön (1996) call productive
learning. It is when an individual encounters a problem and becomes surprised because
his efforts to solve it are not accepted by others nor produces the expected result that
he is most likely to start to think and act in a new way. In a meeting between individu-
als from different institutional environment one may expect more surprises than when
these individuals share norms and beliefs from the same institutional environment. In
Kongsberg Automotive the employees from the foreign units questioned and challenged
the Scandinavians on their taken-for-granted understandings.
The learning perspective that I have applied in this thesis may have a higher expla-
natory value for a MNC or for companies undertaking great changes in their organization.
But even if learning-processes and the subsequent outcomes are perhaps more easily
observable in these organizations, I expect that the relevance of such a perspective is
no less elsewhere. In all social systems there will be a continuous bargaining and re-
bargaining over organizational rules because individuals are not similar and situations
change. There will therefore also be learning-processes and outcomes which are a result
of these. The interaction between different communities-of-practice resulted in the cre-
ation of new practices in Kongsberg Automotive. This is not a perspective that argues
that changes occur as a result of adaptation to institutional environments nor that it is
the ability of specific groups to define reality that explains the practices of the organiz-
ation. Both institutional constraints and power are important influences on how actors
interact, but it is the interaction which determines the practices that are created.
On the other hand, the fairly small size of Kongsberg Automotive as compared to
larger multinational companies (e.g. Coca-Cola, McDonald’s) may have affected their
necessity to learn. Larger companies may have more power to execute organizational
change in line with predetermined strategies. These companies have more resources
available and may also have less need of creating a consensus in the organization as
non-compliers may be easily replaced by others who agree with the policies of the cen-
tral management. Smaller companies may therefore need to adjust and adapt more than
larger companies, as they are more vulnerable to conflicts because of fewer resources.
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11.3 Future research
The research process underlying this thesis has conveyed that there are some issue
areas which deserve to be granted more attention in future research. This is related
to issues of theoretical importance within new institutionalism and those affecting
internationalization processes within companies.
While I have above included the role of the automotive industry and the institutional
pressure stemming from globally accepted solutions and standards, more research is
needed in this area. A fast growing trend is how popular solutions and practices become
institutionalized as a growing number of organizations view them as mandatory and
legitimate. These institutional environments also restrict the individual organization and
its members, and may be expected to have a similar effect regardless of local or national
institutional environments. More research on the effect of such international standards
on individual organizations is needed.
There has been limited research on how major organizational changes such as inter-
nationalization processes affect the use of control mechanisms. So far the emphasis in
research on control and coordination has been on more stable features of the organiz-
ation, e.g. administrative heritage and parent company dependency. One of the reasons
why the use of control mechanisms may change when the organization as such develops
is as mentioned above, the reactions from those subject to the control, the local units.
Another is that the actors involved are engaged in a learning process where they, through
interaction, conceive of new ways of solving the challenges of the organization.
An issue which is related to the role of the local manager and his ability to influence
the negotiations between head office and subsidiary, is the role of other individuals who
serve as interpreters and translators. These have not been discussed in this thesis. It may
be expected that expatriates for example, who are unfamiliar with the local institutional
environment will attempt to find someone who may translate and interpret the local
organization and practices. Such a role may be filled by assistants, secretaries and inter-
preters in the organization. We observed how this was the case in the South Korea unit
where the English teacher/translator worked as an interpreter between the South Koreans
and the foreign manager. The role and power of such individuals are important aspects
in understanding how the organization develops and what comes to be viewed as viable
solutions and alternatives. Possible similarities to the concept of ‘cultural brokers’ as
advanced by Wenger (1997) may be a viable path towards exploring these issues. Such
cultural brokers are seen to be central in the interaction between different communities-
of-practice.
I have discussed the various organizational structures and practices which emerged
at the new units and in the organization as a whole. A closer view at these structures and
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practices as advocated in Actor-Network theory may have revealed more as to variety
among the units and how actors in a wider sense (including material and non-material
entities) interrelate in translating and implementing practices (Callon and Latour 1981;
Latour 1991; Czarniawska and Sevón 1996). A closer scrutiny of the content and charac-
teristics of such practices within an institutionalist perspective may also have revealed
in more detail how institutional environments affect the implemented solutions. My per-
spective has rather been on how the people involved have been affected by the institutional
environments. An analysis which seeks to merge the perspectives of institutionalism and
Actor-Network theory, may give increased understanding as to how institutions affect
individuals, objects and practices as these interact in networks.
11.4 Concluding remarks
An international organization is less transparent than a national organization where
geographical distances and language seldom represent barriers towards interaction and
communication. In an international organization the interaction between the head office
and the local subsidiaries may be expected to be strongly dependent on a few individuals.
These individuals have the formal authority to act as interpreters of local conditions, and
of parent company solutions and practices. Since geographical distances and language
barriers may impede the direct interaction between other local employees and the parent
company, the local manager becomes the main interpreter in the relationship head office
and subsidiary. The role and approach of the local manager is therefore of importance
in understanding how an international company develops.
One of the largest challenges in a MNC is how to control and coordinate an increas-
ingly large and complex organization. The findings in Kongsberg Automotive suggest
that the choice of governance structure is dependent on the usefulness of different con-
trol mechanisms and of a consensus in the organization as to the legitimacy of such
mechanisms. When creating a more sophisticated governance structure incorporating a
variety of different means for control, they were also able to introduce mechanisms for
self-monitoring at the local units. This allowed for more local autonomy and a greater
acceptance of the governance structure in the foreign units. Also institutional constraints
stemming from the automotive industry were important explanations as to the employ-
ment of certain mechanisms. This was one of the results of the intensive learning process
the organization went through.
The learning processes in the organization seems to have moved from inter-organiz-
ational, characterized by few behavioural rules, conflict and misunderstanding, to intra-
organizational, characterized by behavioural rules, trust and more predictive, but efficient
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learning experiences. Power and dominant discourses were in this perspective seen to
have a formative effect on the learning process.
Because of certain fundamental differences between national and international or-
ganizations an institutionalist framework for studying international organizations needs
to accommodate the variety in institutional environments and stakeholders relevant for
these organizations. A concept of institutions as multiple, layered and subject to judg-
ments from a variety of stakeholders is a step towards creating a notion of institutions
more suited for the study of MNCs. Research emphasizing how multiple institutional
environments affect an organization needs also to include the problem of divergent
opinions within the organization, and not resort to simplified labeling such as that of
‘alien’ solutions. According to the findings in Kongsberg Automotive the creation and
subsequent implementation of new solutions and practices in an organization is more
dependent upon interaction and presentation than whether it is alien to the local context
or not.
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